Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

Oral Answers to Questions — SCOTLAND

Roads (Expenditure)

Lord James Douglas-Hamilton: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what effects he estimates cuts in expenditure will have on road works in Scotland; and if he will make a statement.

The Minister of State, Scottish Office (Mr. Bruce Millan): As part of the general need to control public expenditure the total amount of money available for roads has been reduced. The entire programme is being kept under review and start of work has been deferred on some schemes.

Lord James Douglas-Hamilton: I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his reply. As the plans for the proposed outer city bypass at Edinburgh between Colin-ton and Fairmilehead have already been approved, will the right hon. Gentleman consider approving the plans for the rest of the outer city bypass which would skirt the centre of population in Edinburgh? Will he permit work on this project to begin as soon as practicable?

Mr. Millan: As far as I am aware we are not holding up any project in Edinburgh at present. Progress on the outer city bypass is now a matter for the Lothian Regional Council which will, no doubt, be considering this proposal and scheme in relation to the other matters which it has to take into account when it formulates its transport policies and programmes.

Mr. Buchanan: I congratulate my right hon. Friend on his accession to the Privy

Council. The right hon. Gentleman opened the Monkland motorway a few weeks ago. The opening of such motorways creates as many problems as it solves. In any further cuts in expenditure will he ensure that improvements in the Provan interchange feeding on to the Monkland motorway will in no way be restricted?

Mr. Millan: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for what he said. He will know that the second phase of the Monkland motorway will proceed. To my knowledge, it has not been called into question.

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: I also congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on joining the Privy Council. I understand what he said about cuts in the road programme, but can he assure the House that in areas where oil-related developments are taking place—because, after all, the future prosperity of our country will depend on what takes place in these areas—road programmes will not be cut? In addition, will he give an assurance that procedures for approving projects in these areas will proceed expeditiously and will not be delayed with an intention of reducing expenditure?

Mr. Millan: Certainly any reductions in expenditure will be made cleanly. There is no question of using administrative or other delays to achieve what we have in mind. I can give an assurance that oil-related schemes are not affected by these reductions in public expenditure.

Mrs. Bain: Will the Minister accept that the vast expenditure on the road network in Glasgow is a strange priority, particularly in view of the census indicators in the Report on Urban Deprivation, which show acute poverty in Glasgow? Does he not agree that it would be better to spend money on housing in Glasgow?

Mr. Millan: I think that the hon. Lady has tabled a Question about some of these matters, and perhaps she will wait until my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State answers it. We want a balanced development in Glasgow and elsewhere. As a Member of Parliament who represents a Glasgow constituency, I am well aware of the scale of urban deprivation in Glasgow and the urgent need to tackle it, as it has been tackled both by the local authority and by the Government.

Scottish Trades Union Congress

Mr. Alexander Fletcher: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland when he next proposes to meet representatives of the STUC.

The Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. William Ross): I would refer the hon. Gentleman to the reply I gave him on 23rd April.—[Vol. 890, c. 1459–60.]

Mr. Fletcher: Will the Secretary of State meet again members of the STUC at the earliest opportunity? Has he noticed in today's Press reports that Scottish trade unionists are set to administer the coup de grâce to the Government's incomes policy—the social contract? Will the Secretary of State urge moderate trade unionists in Scotland to speak up against Communists in their ranks, in an effort to ensure that Scotland is not denied the jobs and the investment that are so badly needed?

Mr. Ross: I can assure the hon. Gentleman that when I meet the Scottish TUC the agenda will be dictated not by the whimsicalities of the hon. Gentleman's political nightmares but by the realities of the situation and problems that face Scotland, with the solution to which the STUC is concerned, as I am sure all hon. Members are. I wish the hon. Gentleman would give due credit to the STUC for the constructive work which it is doing about the Scottish situation.

Mr. Crawford: I agree with the Secretary of State that we should give the STUC due credit. However, when he next meets the STUC will he discuss with its members the case of the firm of Glenfield and Kennedy—in his own constituency—and the 29 other companies which have recently been taken over by English companies and have moved their operations and their employment from Scotland to England?

Mr. Ross: As far as Glenfield and Kennedy is concerned, it was not recently taken over by Crane's. It was some time ago, and the hon. Gentleman had nothing to say about it at that time.

Mr. Teddy Taylor: Will the right hon. Gentleman at least discuss with the STUC the savage effect on Scottish living standards and employment prospects which will stem from the quite astronomical

increases in rate poundages being announced? Has he tried to get from the Treasury an interim relief scheme, similar to that approved last year in respect of England and Wales? Has he succeeded? If not, will he look into this matter?

Mr. Ross: With due respect, the Treasury has nothing to do with this Question, which refers to the STUC. If the hon. Gentleman would care to table a Question on the matter he has in mind, I should be glad to answer it.

Hampden Park

Mr. Monro: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he has received the report of the working party on the future of Hampden Park; and if he will make a statement.

The Under-Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. Robert Hughes): Yes, Sir. The report's findings are directed in the first instance to the football authorities and other bodies represented on the working party. I shall consider any comments they may make to me on the recommendations of the report in the light of the views of other interested bodies and of the current economic situation.

Mr. Monro: Does the Minister accept that this is a quite exceptional report, both in its argument and its conclusions? Is he aware that the people of Scotland will be resentful if we do not go ahead with a national stadium and recreation centre worthy of our country? As financial resources will be very small in the next two years, will he bring together the interested parties and go ahead with the planning of this magnificent project?

Mr. Hughes: As the hon. Gentleman says, the report is an exceptional document. It lays down, in the first instance, broad design concepts. However, as the hon. Gentleman is aware and as the House will wish to be aware, considerable public expenditure costs are involved. The major scheme would cost £15,400,000. of which the report recommends that the Government should find £6 million. Strathclyde £4,188,000, and Glasgow £4,188,000. In addition to those costs of building and construction, Glasgow and Strathclyde each would be required to find £75,000 per annum in subsidy on running costs.
Having had the report for four weeks, I think that one would need to study the whole concept of the design and cost carefully. But I would certainly hope to meet the bodies concerned, once they have discussed the report, and have some preliminary discussion of it.

Referendum

Mr. Fairgrieve: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland how his policies for Scotland will be affected by the results of the referendum.

Mr. William Ross: As my right hon. Friend the Prime Miinster said in his statement to the House on Monday, 9th June, the Government intend to give a lead to the country in working together to play a full and constructive part in all Community policies and activities; my colleagues and the departments under my control will offer a similar example to Scotland.

Mr. Fairgrieve: I welcome that reply. Will the Secretary of State give me assurance on two points'? First, will he assure me that he will urge on his Cabinet colleagues the early implementation of Article 138, paragraph 3, of the Treaty of Rome, so that we can elect our members direct to the European Parliament from Scotland, instead of having them selected for us by the Westminster administration?
Second, will the right hon. Gentleman assure us that he will resist the dreich and dreary separatist policies and ideas of the Scottish National Party and other newly-founded European vocalists who would like us to operate in the European institutions as 5 million people—putting us on a par with Denmark and Ireland—instead of as at present, with the 55 million United Kingdom muscle, with Germany and France?

Mr. Ross: On the first point, I think that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister did say that the matter of direct election was one for consideration by all parties in the House. Certainly I shall give it due thought.
As regards the hon. Gentleman's point about separatism, I do not think that there is any doubt that there was no great joy for those who proclaimed separatism in the result that came forth from the referendum.

Dr. Bray: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the Commission has undertaken a major exercise to encourage industrialists from the more prosperous European countries to invest in South Italy but has decided that it could not undertake a similar exercise in relation to Scotland, pending the referendum? Will my right hon. Friend explore with the Commission the possibility of such an exercise?

Mr. Ross: This is one of the things about which we have already heard. There have been suggestions that there was uncertainty about investment and that investment plans were being held up by the uncertainty in relation to the referendum. That uncertainty has been removed. I sincerely hope that with the ending of that uncertainty, plans for investment will come to fruition in Scotland.

Mrs. Winifred Ewing: Will the right hon. Gentleman convey to his right hon Friend the Prime Minister the gratification felt on the SNP bench that the timetable for the Assembly is not to be held up, irrespective of the result of the referendum? Will the right hon. Gentleman now consider very urgently the question of direct representation across the board on all the institutions of the EEC'? The SNP bench is aware—as no doubt the right hon. Gentleman is aware—that we have a Commissioner who is a Scot, and a judge who is a Scot, but nevertheless they are not there as Scots as of right; they merely happen to be there, and their appointments are due for revision. Will the right hon. Gentleman express his view about direct representation across the board, including the position of his own office, and accept that we would like him to have every possible assistance and would like an additional Minister to be appointed on this matter?

Mr. Ross: First, in respect of the Assembly and what the hon. Lady has said, there never was any question of its being held up. Why people should rise to every rumour put forward, I do not know. On the point about representation, there is a later Question on the Order Paper about that, but I assure the hon. Lady that I do not agree with her rather more parochial outlook, which, indeed, implicitly spells out separatism.

Mr. Steel: Does the right hon. Gentleman accept that some of us are a little disappointed that he has not shown a more enthusiastic welcome for the decision of the Scottish people in the referendum, and that we expect this from him now, if rather belatedly? On what date will the Government's White Paper on devolution now be published, if it is not to be delayed as a result?

Mr. Ross: I cannot give the exact date for the publication of the White Paper, but it will be in the autumn. That is clear from what has been said.

Mr. William Hamilton: Does my right hon. Friend agree that if there was one party in Scotland that got a bloody nose as a result of the referendum result, it was the Scottish National Party? Will he now give an assurance that he will get on with the introduction of the Scottish Development Agency Bill in this House and get that on the statute book, because it is quite clear, is it not, that nothing in the Treaty of Rome inhibits us from implementing the policies inherent in that Bill?

Mr. Ross: On the latter point, there was never any doubt about that. Long before the referendum, I was urging this House, and particularly the Conservative Party, to co-operate with us and not to obstruct us, as Conservative Members nave been doing in that respect. I hope that we shall get an early opportunity of seeing whether any new co-operation is forthcoming.

Mr. Rifkind: Does the Secretary of State realise how grateful the House and the country were that he himself did not decide to resign following the rejection of his advice by the Scottish electorate? Does he now reject the remarks made by his junior colleague the Under-Secretary—the Minister responsible for devolution matters—who said on 3rd June that if the people of Scotland voted "Yes", it would represent a substantial setback to the cause of devolution?

Mr. Ross: My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary is entitled to his own opinions, on many matters We are all entitled to our own opinions. I could cite a lot of opinions from the Opposition side of the House—but I would not ask the hon. Gentleman to bear with me in that.

Local Authority Elections

Mr. Canavan: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether and when he expects to introduce measures to amend the legislation which disqualifies certain people from standing for election to Scottish local authorities.

Mr. Millan: As explained to my hon. Friend on 1st May, we are looking into this matter, but I cannot make any forecast about legislation.

Mr. Canavan: When are we to get rid of the ridiculous unfair anomaly whereby local government employees who do an honest day's work—such as direct works labourers, grave-diggers, teachers, bus drivers, and many other categories—are barred from standing for their councils, whereas there is no such bar on businessmen and their lackeys who are after local government contracts?

Mr. Millan: As regards the employees, my hon. Friend will be aware that the Government are holding consultations on this matter at the moment following the report of Lord Redcliffe-Maud's commission on standards of conduct in public life.
As regards contractors and people of that kind, rules are laid down in local government legislation. This is an extremely difficult area. Some of the matters concerned will no doubt be dealt with in the report of the Royal Commission. I can only repeat that we have no immediate plans to change the present legislation.

Development Agencies

Mr. Fairbairn: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what is the anticipated administrative cost of operating the Community Land Bill, the British National Oil Corporation and the Scottish Development Agency; and how many extra civil servants will be required to staff these agencies.

Mr. William Ross: The estimated administrative cost and number of staff, who will not be civil servants, of the Scottish Development Agency are given in the explanatory and financial memorandum to the Bill now before Parliament. Similar estimates, on a Great Britain basis, relating to the community land


scheme are given in the memorandum to the Community Land Bill.
Responsibility for the BNOC rests with my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Energy.

Mr. Fairbairn: The Secretary of State and other Ministers have told us that in the present circumstances £15 million is too much to pay for a national sports centre at Hampden Park. In view of the fact that hospital and school building programmes are being cut, will the Secretary of State use his influence in the Cabinet to ensure that these absurd schemes—which no one in Scotland would prefer to those which are being reduced—are brought to an end immediately?

Mr. Ross: I do not consider that the Scottish Development Agency is an absurd scheme. I do not think that the plans in relation to the oil industry—which will be of considerable benefit to Scotland—and in relation to the BNOC, which will be based in Glasgow, are absurd. Whenever the Government of either party makes an effort to do something that brings to the people a return from land and from the resources of Scotland, the representatives of those who see it as their first job to protect the proprictorial rights of their own types of people are the first to scream.

Mr. Dalyell: As regards the Community Land Bill, will the Secretary of State confirm the undertaking given after midnight last week by the Under-Secretary of State for the Environment that the Church of Scotland will be exempted, unlike some other charities?

Mr. Ross: There is a slight difficulty here. The Bill is now in Committee. There are certain restrictions in relation to that. I can rest upon the fact that the Prime Minister met a delegation of the leaders of the Churches. He gave an assurance that the matter would be looked at.

Mr. Crawford: In the context of the Scottish Development Agency, will the Secretary of State give an assurance that the writ of the London-based National Enterprise Board will not run in Scotland?

Mr. Ross: I think that the sooner we get down to the Second Reading of the Bill the sooner we can sort these matters out. I give the assurance that the Scottish

Development Agency will be Scottish-based. It will be responsible to the Secretary of State and to no one else.

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: Does the right hon. Gentleman think it wrong for Members of Parliament to stand up to the proprietorial rights of the Church of Scotland in relation to the Community Land Bill?

Mr. Ross: I assure the hon. Gentleman that the row being created is not related to the Church of Scotland.

Furnished Accommodation

Mr. Galbraith: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what has been the effect of recent legislation on the availability of furnished accommodation for letting in Scotland; and if he will make a statement.

The Under-Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. Hugh D. Brown): No clear indication is yet available of the effect of the Rent Act 1974 on the supply of furnished accommodation in Scotland. I am keeping in touch with the situation and I shall look closely at the results of relevant research commissioned by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Environment.

Mr. Galbraith: The Minister must be aware that many people who would like to let their houses for short periods are afraid to do so. Therefore, people who would like to rent houses for short periods are not obtaining them. What is the purpose of this legislation, which hurts the very people whom it was intended to help? Is this not another typical example of what the Government are always doing? The road to Hell is paved with good intentions. The Government want to help the tenant but they end up by hurting him.
I do not know what the right hon. Gentleman is laughing about. If he wanted to rent a furnished house he would not be able to do so. Just take that stupid grin off your face.

Mr. Speaker: Order.

Mr. Galbraith: I apologise to you, Mr. Speaker. I was referring to the right hon. Gentleman.
Why cannot the right hon. Gentleman allow contracts freely entered into to remain binding so as to help the person who wants to let a house for a short time


and the person who wants to rent one for a short time?

Mr. Brown: I have no intention of going to Hell. I had a big enough job getting here.
The 1974 Act achieved its objective in giving full security to tenants of nonresident landlords, who formerly lacked it. The privately-rented sector declined over the years even when the Conservative Government were in power. That has created problems, especially for students, amongst other groups in the community. We are looking into that aspect.

Mr. Welsh: Looking at this matter, is the Secretary of State aware that the majority of Scots must rely on the available public housing? Will he therefore confirm or deny the allegation that the City of Glasgow has built only eight houses in the first two months of this year to service a waiting list of 40,000 people?

Mr. Brown: The hon. Gentleman exaggerates, as usual. I do not accept that figure. I remind members of the Scottish National Party that there is no limit to the public expenditure available for new housing in Scotland. I am encouraged by the increase in the number of starts, approvals and completions of new houses for the people of Scotland.

Western Isles (Cost of Living)

Mr. Donald Stewart: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he will set up a committee to investigate what action could be taken by the Government to ensure to the people of the Western Isles the same cost of living and amenities of life as elsewhere in the United Kingdom.

Mr. Millan: No, Sir. It is already a function of the Highlands and Islands Development Board to keep under review and advise me on all matters relating to the economic and social well-being and development of the Highlands and Islands.

Mr. Stewart: Is the Minister aware that my constituency is No. 6 in the table of self-employed people in the country who are suffering from the recent penal increase imposed by the Government? Is he aware that we have the highest rate

of unemployment in the United Kingdom and the highest transport costs? Is he also aware that I have received a far poorer response from the Secretary of State and his colleagues at the Scottish Office than I had from their Conservative predecessors when asking for assistance for my constituency. In view of that, what does he intend to do?

Mr. Millan: I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman is trying to encourage me to take away the £2½ million subsidy to MacBrayne's, which the Government have just announced. As the hon. Gentleman should know, massive amounts of assistance are going to his constituency, and rightly so. We are happy to do that. We would be even happier if the hon. Gentleman would occasionally say "Thank you".

European Community (United Kingdom Representation)

Mr. MacCormick: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland on how many occasions in the past year officials of the Scottish Office have attended to support the permanent United Kingdom representation in Brussels.

Mr. William Ross: On 94 occasions in the year ended 31st May 1975.

Mr. MacCormick: Bearing in mind the Secretary of State's great courage in saying that he did not want us to join the Common Market, and bearing in mind that we have done so, does he agree that his job is to show the same guts and courage in making sure that Scotland has proper national representation within the institution of the Common Market rather than simply being passed off as similar to a region of Italy or a laude of Germany?

Mr. Ross: The hon. Member has a very jaundiced idea of what really goes on in these matters. He should appreciate that we have been in the Common Market since 1973. The Scottish Office, with me as Secretary of State, has been participating fully in that work. There is nothing more important to the hon. Member, in relation to agriculture, than the hill lands, in respect of which a very good directive has been produced. A Scottish Office Minister led the team dealing with that. We are participating where we are needed and I can assure the hon.


Member that Ministers will be there when they are required.

Mr. Buchan: Does my right hon. Friend accept that the work he did on behalf of those of us who were opposed to the Market was considerably greater than that done by the dishonest and ambivalent attitude maintained throughout the campaign by the SNP? It there not a case now, however, for ensuring the maximum possible Scottish representation at Brussels, not excluding the opening of an office there similar to the Bavarian Office which is established there. I cannot understand why the SNP should be so completely wrong on its history on this one. This has nothing to do with a separate and permanent representative on the Council of Ministers, which would be a backdoor form of separatism, but it is necessary to protect historic sections of the British people.

Mr. Ross: I got the impression that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister had said that the debate was over and that we should get down to maximising the benefits which exist for Scotland, which is what I want to do. If the point concerns representation on various kinds of committees, this has been happening quite apart from the actions of Government. For example, in the last few years the NFU has probably had more people in Brussels than it has in London. We have to examine our approaches to these things afresh and maximise the benefits for Scotland.

Mr. David Steel: If I may take up the point raised by the hon. Member for Renfrewshire, West (Mr. Buchan), why has the Scottish Office by now not set up its own liaison office in Brussels?

Mr. Ross: Because, obviously, it was not required.

Devolution

Mr. Rifkind: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what discussions he has had with local authorities in Shetland and elsewhere regarding the Government's proposals on devolution.

The Under-Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. Harry Ewing): There have been no discussions about devolution with local authorities in Shetland. Copies of the consultative document on devolution

published in June last year were sent to all regional, islands and district councils in Scotland and to the existing local authority associations. Views on the document were received from the local authority associations and from some individual local authorities, and Scottish Office Ministers later held oral discussions with some of their representatives.

Mr. Rifkind: Is the Minister aware that the Shetlands Council, with its traditional feeling of independence on national issues, has said that notwithstanding the fact that devolution might be given to Scotland as a whole, they do not wish to have devolution but wish to continue their traditional links with Westminster? Will he inform the House whether the Government accept as a basic criterion of their devolution policy that it will not be imposed irrespective of the wishes of people in other parts of Scotland but only where it will demonstrably help the good government of those people?

Mr. Ewing: The hon. Member must accept that one of the cardinal aims of devolution is to promote good government, not only for Scotland but for the whole of the United Kingdom. As for the specific point about the Shetlands, it is interesting to note that the policy committee of the Shetlands Islands Council was in favour of declaring complete independence for the islands, but this approach was amended by a full meeting of the whole council to one of "wait and see". In other words they want to wait and see what the Government propose when the Bill is published according to the timetable laid down by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister.

Mr. Sillars: Yesterday the Prime Minister said that the Labour Party was sticking to the White Paper which was published last autumn. Does he accept that the White Paper was somewhat ambiguous on the question of trade and industry powers, and will he confirm that this is not a closed matter as yet?

Mr. Ewing: It is true that the White Paper did not discuss the question of the devolution of trade and industry powers to a Scottish Assembly, but it must be accepted in all parts of the House that we are in a position of open discussion at the moment. In my view that was


what was being said on Monday and yesterday by my right hon. Friends the Prime Minister and the Leader of the House.

Mr. Michael Clark Hutchison: Does the Minister realise that some of us do not want devolution? is he aware that the British public are fed up with chopping and changing, and want a period of tranquility and peace?

Mr. Ewing: I realise that there is a small minority in Scotland to which the hon. Gentleman undoubtedly belongs.

Local Authorities (Expenditure)

Mr. Teddy Taylor: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what discussions he has had with local authorities about the reductions he has called for in their educational and social work capital expenditure programmes.

Mr. Gray: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what discussions he has had with local authorities regarding proposed reductions in expenditure on roads.

Mr. William Ross: Following the Budget Statement of 15th April I had a preliminary discussion with the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities on 25th April about the implications of the statement for the capital and current expenditure of local authorities. The issues involved have since been discussed by the official working party on local government finance and my right hon. Friend the Minister of State is having a further meeting with the convention on Friday of this week.

Mr. Taylor: Will the Secretary of State say how much of the £45 million of cuts which he announced on 28th April for capital spending in 1976–77 applied to education and social work, and does he agree that these reductions do not help local authorities in any way to overcome their revenue spending problems which are causing the most alarming rate rises which will cause very real hardship in Scotland? Since he has announced his rate support grant and reallocation scheme for council budgeting, will he say whether it is his intention to do anything more about it, or whether he intends not to seek an interim relief plan for ratepayers who are facing alarming increases?

Mr. Ross: I think that the last point was covered when we discussed the rate support grant. I gave details about the amounts of money fed in to deal with the situation arising in the first year of local government financing. The result of that was that the highest rate of grant ever given was awarded to the Scottish local authorities, and it amounted to 75 per cent. of the local reckonable expenditures being paid for by central Government.
I am sorry that I cannot give the hon. Member a detailed line-up of the actual cost. We are discussing this with the local authorities, who showed considerable understanding of the position. I hope we shall experience that understanding in the House as well. I hear many Conservative speeches calling for cuts in local government expenditure, yet when we approach the subject in a reasonable fashion we tend to get howls of protest in respect of individual cuts. The present situation demands a realistic approach no' only to Government expenditure but to local government expenditure as well.

Mr. Gray: Does the Secretary of State accept, as I do, the statement by the Minister earlier that there will not be any cuts in roads in oil-affected areas? That was the information I also received in a Written Answer. Will the right hon. Gentleman make certain that the oil-affected areas will also receive special consideration in respect of other cuts in the expenditure, particularly on schools and housing?

Mr. Ross: There are no cuts in housing, so the hon. Gentleman can rest easy on that one. There is no cut in relation to basic needs for schools, either.

Mr. Doig: Over and above the cuts made in the social work programme by the Government, the Tayside Regional Council has made substantial further cuts. Is he aware that this has deprived the region of necessary social work expenditure?

Mr. Ross: I think that my hon. Friend means that certain allocations have been made to the council but that it has not taken up its fill allocation. That is matter within its own discretion.

Mr. Grimond: Will the Secretary of State confirm that I have suggested to


him certain cuts that could be made in local government expenditure? Will he assure us that the Government's policy is that cuts in unproductive expenditure, such as office buildings for public authorities, are justified? Will he give us an assurance that roads in Sullom Voe and the oil-related area in Shetland will be adequate?

Mr. Ross: The question of roads in Sullom Voe and the oil-related areas of Shetland has already been attended to. I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for taking the matter seriously enough to make detailed suggestions on the new area health board.

Miss Harvie Anderson: The right hon. Gentleman said that there were only limited cuts in housing. Does he not realise that where housing is to be provided on any significant scale, new schools are also needed? That is a hold-up in certain areas that is becoming increasingly serious.

Mr. Ross: I take note of that point. We have to appreciate that we cannot make decisions of that kind without facing the consequences of stringency. We are looking at all these matters as carefully as possible to ensure that there is no consequential hold-up in relation to other matters which we consider to be of basic importance.

Mr. Thompson: When considering cuts in road expenditure, will the Secretary of State look with a kindly eye on the representations he has received from the Dumfries and Galloway Regional Council with respect to turning the A75 into a dual carriageway? Will he confirm that that road, in effect, is an international highway running from Italy to Ireland? I understand that it is an excellent highway until it reaches Gretna. Will the right hon. Gentleman do something about it?

Mr. Ross: I had better have a look at this new highway first. I was in the hon. Gentleman's area fairly recently and I noticed that the roads were fairly good.

Mr. Munro: In view of the thoroughly unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg to give notice that I shall seek to raise the matter on the Adjournment.

General Practitioner/Patient Relations

Mr. Dempsey: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will consult general practitioners with a view to studying ways of improving general practitioner/patient relations; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Robert Hughes: Officers of my Department regularly discuss the general practitioner services with representatives of the profession. I believe that relationships between general practitioners and patients are generally very good, but if my hon. Friend has any particular difficulty in mind I shall be glad to look into the matter.

Mr. Dempsey: Is my hon. Friend aware that the relationship between the family doctor and the family has deteriorated in the past few years and that this is evidenced by the removal, at a stroke, of entire families from some doctors' lists? May I persuade my hon. Friend to take some initiative, involving all the relevant interests, to restore the meaning, purpose and value of the family doctor service to the family?

Mr. Hughes: I understand that there is a great deal of ill-feeling on the question of the removal by a doctor of particular families of patients from his list. but both doctors and patients have a long-standing right to make a change on their own account. If the doctor and the family do not get on, clearly it is better for a change to be made. I have from time to time expressed disappointment in individual cases where that has happened, but, because it happens in individual cases, it is wrong to draw a broad, sweeping conclusion that relationships between doctors and patients have generally deteriorated through the years.

Dr. Miller: Will my hon. Friend confirm that, notwithstanding some problems which are bound to occur from time to time between patient and doctor, in general terms the general practitioners in Scotland do a very good job, for which they should be commended? My hon. Friend the Member for Coatbridge and Airdrie (Mr. Dempsey) spoke of a good patient/doctor relationship. Does the


Minister agree that he should be thinking in terms of bringing the patient as well as the doctor into discussions? Does my hon. Friend agree that one of the best ways of achieving a good relationship is to make sure that the doctor practises from premises which are custom-built? Will he encourage doctors to work in health centres, he having provided the health centres for that purpose?

Mr. Hughes: Of course I commend the good work done by so many general practitioners in Scotland through the years. Where reasonable practitioner facilities can be made available in health centres I do everything I can to encourage that policy. Of course we want to bring the patients into consideration. The establishment of local health councils will do a lot to bring into being good relationships. Perhaps we in Scotland could do much more as individuals to raise particular difficult issues. The National Health Service Commissioner had 500 complaints from United Kingdom residents about the health service, but only 40 from Scotland. It would be comforting to think that this meant that the situation in Scotland was perfect. If people have complaints, I hope that they will bring them forward. If there are bad eggs in any part of society in Scotland we want them to be exposed.

(Hunterston Nuclear Power Station)

Mr. Lambie: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what representations he has received from the South of Scotland Electricity Board about the construction of a future nuclear power station at Hunterston: and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Millan: I have received an application from the South of Scotland Electricity Board for consent under Section 2 of the Electric Lighting Act 1909 to the construction of a third nuclear power station at Hunterston.
Preliminary consultations are now under way and, provided these are satisfactorily completed, I shall direct the Board to advertise the application.

Mr. Lambie: Will my right hon. Friend give an assurance that he will carry out a full investigation into the application before planning permission is

granted, to ensure that a go-ahead for the SSEB will not be used at some future date to prevent the British Steel Corporation going ahead with its integrated steel mill at Hunterston? If a decision has to be made between a steel mill and a nuclear power station, the steel mill must be at Hunterston and the nuclear power station to the south.

Mr. Millan: Subject to being slightly careful in saying anything about a planning matter 'which may subsequently fall to my right hon. Friend for decision, I can say that it is Government policy that there should be an integrated steel mill at Hunterston, and we shall do nothing to prejudice that. I cannot at the moment go beyond that general statement.

Mr. Reid: On the question of future power stations, does the Minister appreciate that, according to the draft EEC energy policy document, the EEC proposes to dictate the type of fuel used in future power stations? Will he comment?

Mr. Millan: I do not appreciate that. because I do not think that it is true.

Fishing Industry

Sir John Gilmour: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he is satisfied that the Scottish fishing industry will be operating at a profitable level in the second half of 1975.

Mr. Henderson: asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will make a statement on the current position of the Scottish fishing industry.

Mr. Hugh D. Brown: It is too early to make a detailed forecast, though there is some evidence of a recovery in quayside prices of fish. A secure future for the industry depends upon international agreements on the reduction of catches to what fish stocks can sustain. The level of prosperity of the industry in the meantime depends on a number of factors including the quotas available to it as, for example, under the recent recommendations on herring from the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission. These recommendations will require substantial sacrifices in the short term. Arrangements have been to discuss with the catching and processing sides of the


industry the best way of distributing the quantities of herring available.

Sir J. Gilmour: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that in view of the reduced quota of catches agreed to at the conference to which he has referred, and the fact that within two weeks financial assistance to the fishing industry will cease, it is urgent for him to make a statement about the Government's policy of help to the fishing industry over the next few months?

Mr. Brown: There are two questions here. We are treating as a matter of urgency the problem of herring and the sorting out of arrangements within the quotas. Meetings will be held next week, as I said. On the second matter—the subsidy—we have received a specific application from the Scottish Trawlers Federation for the second half of 1975. It is a very detailed application, which involves many considerations, and we are treating that as a matter of urgency. Obviously, we shall have to make an announcement fairly soon.

Mr. Henderson: Does the Minister accept that, in addition to a small increase in fish prices there has been a substantial increase in the number of boats tied up and in the amount of unemployment in fish processing factories? Does he accept that it would be helpful to the fishing industry to have a moratorium on the repayment of loans for a period, to enable the industry to improve its cash flow position? Does the Minister also accept that other countries strongly desire an increase in limits, and will he impress on his right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary the importance of getting into touch with the Norwegian and Icelandic Governments and others who have proclaimed their intention of increasing limits, so that we may all increase our limits at the same time?

Mr. Brown: With the best will in the world, I cannot answer 10 questions in one supplementary question. I would point out that the hon. Gentleman is reported as having said that there is only a limited amount of fish in the sea. That is a very profound statement, with which I agree. All the comments that he makes about moratoriums, repayments and limits are relevant, but they do not alter

the fact that there will be a reduction in the amount of fish, particularly herring, that is available to the industry. I think that it is wrong to spread alarm and despondency when we are going into detailed discussions on how best we can look after the industry's long-term interests.

Oral Answers to Questions — CONTEMPT OF COURT

Mr. Fairbairn: asked the Lord Advocate how many persons were convicted of contempt of court since January 1973 by a court of first instance; and what was the number of disposals which involved a fine and a custodial sentence, respectively.

The Lord Advocate (Mr. Ronald King Murray): In 1973 the number of persons convicted of contempt of court by courts of first instance in Scotland was 149. Of those convicted, 119 were fined, 12 received custodial sentences, and 18 were otherwise disposed of by admonition, deferred sentence, and so on.
In 1974 the provisional figures disclose that 194 persons were convicted of contempt of court by courts of first instance in Scotland. Of those convicted, 153 were fined, 16 received custodial sentences and 25 were otherwise disposed of by admonition, deferred sentence, and so on.

Mr. Fairbairn: In view of the increasing concern about the application and procedures of the law of contempt of court in Scotland, whereby the court of first instance may be one of two courts, will the right hon. and learned Gentleman remit to the Scottish Law Commission the question of the practice and procedure of the law of contempt as a matter of urgency? Although these matters are necessarily summary powers, the fact that they may in certain circumstances be powers of an equivalent solemn nature means that the present procedures are unsatisfactory and are causing considerable public alarm.

The Lord Advocate: One has to have a sense of proportion when dealing with these matters. The figures that I have given show that the cases of contempt disposed of by custodial sentence constitute only about one-twelfth of the total. I take note of what the hon. and learned Gentleman has said, but I would inform


him that the Phillimore Committee, which reported recently, bears very much on this matter. The Government have the recommendations of the Phillimore Committee under urgent consideration.

Mr. Canavan: Bearing in mind that a recent case of contempt of court referred to a meeting of my constituency of the Army of the Provisional Government of Scotland, will my right hon. and learned Friend consult the Secretary of State to see that every possible legal and security measure is taken to ensure that such meetings do not recur, particularly on Saturday in Bannockburn at the SNP rally?

The Lord Advocate: The case to which my hon. Friend refers is sub judice and it would be wrong for me to make any comment on it. As regards my hon. Friend's general comments, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State will have heard his strictures about security.

Oral Answers to Questions — DISTRICT COURTS

Mr. Rifkind: asked the Lord Advocate by which date he intends to ensure that there will be legally qualified prosecutors in all the district courts.

The Lord Advocate: All district courts have legally qualified prosecutors. In most districts the prosecutor is the procurator fiscal. In the others the local authorities have appointed solicitors as district prosecutors.

Mr. Rifkind: Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman inform the House whether the assurance that he gave in Committee that there would be more highly qualified prosecutors by 16th May of next year will be met? Will he inform the House whether he is, in general, satisfied with the performance of the district courts in the short period that they have been in operation?

The Lord Advocate: As regards the last part of the hon. Gentleman's question, I have been encouraged by the performance of the prosecution in the district courts throughout Scotland. I should like to pay tribute to the procurator fiscals' service and the new district court prosecutors for the way in which they have risen to the challenge. I cannot speak beyond that because it is a matter beyond my ministerial jurisdiction.
As regards the first part of the hon. Gentleman's question, as he will appreciate, there are only 15 districts around the outer limits of Glasgow where Crown prosecutions do not take place at present. I am able to make a firmer prediction that there will be Crown prosecutions in these districts, as throughout Scotland, by 16th May 1976.

Mr. Henderson: Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman accept that we all wish to see the prosecution staff fully equipped so that he can proceed with such necessary measures as the prosecution of Hamilton Brothers for the theft of Scottish oil and its removal from the jurisdiction of the Scottish courts?

The Lord Advocate: I have constantly under consideration the investigation of all crime wherever it has taken place.

Oral Answers to Questions — TRAFFIC OFFENCES

Mr. Thompson: asked the Lord Advocate if he is satisfied that the police have adequate powers to bring to justice vehicle drivers from the Republic of Ireland who commit traffic offences in Scotland.

The Lord Advocate: The Scottish police are responsible for detecting road traffic offences committed in Scotland regardless of whether the offender resides in Scotland, the Republic of Ireland, or elsewhere. The extent to which these duties are undertaken depends largely on the availability and deployment of police manpower.
Once the police have detected an offence, it is the responsibility of the procurator fiscal to institute criminal proceedings against offenders who have committed road traffic offences in Scotland. For most road traffic offences there is no provision for arrest and so, in the case of many offences, an offender from abroad cannot be physically prevented from leaving the country before he can be brought before the court. Of course, there are law-abiding drivers from abroad who voluntarily comply with the requirements of our procedure and so enable the procurator fiscal to take proceedings.
This matter is, however, causing me some concern and it is under active consideration by the Home Office Committee. I understand that various matters


which may have a bearing on this problem have also been considered by the Thomson Committee on Criminal Procedure in Scotland.

Mr. Thompson: I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for his lengthy reply. Is he aware that there is considerable disquiet in my constituency at the tales that are circulating, whether they be true or false, that the police merely move on Irish drivers who are committing lesser traffic offences? Perhaps I should make it clear that I am referring to drivers from the Republic of Ireland. There is great difficulty because we do not have an adjective to cover the two different parts of Ireland. Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman confirm that there have been cases of under-age drivers from the Republic of Ireland driving heavy vehicles, and that they also have been allowed to go through the net? Could not some arrangement be made with the Government of the Republic of Ireland to deal with these admittedly relatively few cases?

The Lord Advocate: These are difficult and weighty questions, and I think I would require notice of them.

Dr. M. S. Miller: I am rather surprised that the hon. Member for Galloway (Mr. Thompson) should raise this matter. Is my right hon. and learned Friend aware that one of the hon. Gentleman's supporters wrote to me not long ago objecting strongly that he was fined in an English court for a motoring offence which he committed in England?

The Lord Advocate: We must consider, when we are thinking of remedies, that any stronger measures which we give to the police to deal with drivers from overseas will necessarily put an increasing load upon the domestic British driver.

Mr. Powell: In the course of the welcome reconsideration which the right hon. and learned Gentleman mentioned, would it not be wise to consider whether the Criminal Jurisdiction Bill, which is to come before the House tomorrow, should not apply to the United Kingdom as a whole?

The Lord Advocate: As the right hon. Gentleman will know, great difficulties are involved in that proposition. However,

I have taken note of the right hon. Gentleman's suggestion, as, no doubt, have others.

Oral Answers to Questions — DIVORCE LAW REFORM

Mr. Sproat: asked the Lord Advocate if he will arrange a meeting with the Law Society of Scotland to discuss the reform of Scottish divorce law.

The Lord Advocate: I see no need for me to arrange such a meeting.

Mr. Sproat: As it is known that the Law Society is in favour of reform of the divorce laws, and as the right hon. and learned Gentleman is known to be in favour of such reform, will he not urge on his right hon. Friend the need to make time available for the Scottish Grand Committee, before the Summer Recess, to debate the matter? Does he not consider it an extraordinary reflection on the Government's priorities that last Friday a full day was given to debating hare coursing and yet, so far, they have refused to give time to debate the much more important matter of Scottish divorce reform?

The Lord Advocate: It is fair to say that divorce law reform cannot be considered in isolation; it is an aspect of family law generally. It is a matter that is under review, and the status of family law for the future will at some point have to be decided. The matter of Government time is not one for me, but the hon. Gentleman must be aware that pressure on debating and legislative time in the present Session is particularly heavy.

Mr. Buchan: I hope that my right hon. and learned Friend will not buttress the argument by saying that the matter should be referred to a review of the whole family legal situation. It is now a scandal in Scotland that we have been unable to debate and pass this measure. I am sure he is as confident as I am that the Opposition would not oppose this subject's being sent to the Scottish Grand Committee. Perhaps even the eccentric Member for Glasgow, Hillhead (Mr. Galbraith) would agree with that sentiment. I hope that the Lord Advocate will decide to discuss this matter with the Secretary of State for Scotland.

The Lord Advocate: My hon. Friend is, as ever, persuasive, but we must face reality. Debates on the principle of divorce law reform are perhaps less important than the question of legislative time. I hope that there will be legislative time if a private Member is lucky in the Ballot next Session.

Mr. Galbraith: Since my name has been mentioned, is it not a fact that we shall not receive an answer on this matter until the Lord Advocate, and, indeed, it appears, the hon. Member for Renfrew-shire, West (Mr. Buchan), realise that this is not an impersonal legal problem, such as the law of contract, or reparation, or conveyancing, but a human matter which should be dealt with not merely by legal experts—for example, the Law Society of Scotland—but by those who are experts in emotional and human problems? Members of this House should not encourage the right hon. and learned Gentleman to get out of his depth by regarding this as a purely legal matter—because it is not.

The Lord Advocate: I agree that humanity comes into this question, but I hope that the hon. Member for Glasgow Hillhead (Mr. Galbraith) will have some humanity and consideration for those

many women who are unable to obtain a divorce because of the technicalities of the law of divorce at present.

Oral Answers to Questions — BILL PRESENTED

NORTHERN IRELAND (EMERGENCY PROVISIONS) (AMENDMENT)

Mr. Secretary Rees, supported by Mr. Secretary Jenkins, Mr. Stanley Orme, Mr. Roland Moyle, Mr. Attorney General, and Mr. J. D. Concannon, presented a Bill to amend the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973; to make further provision with respect to criminal proceedings, the maintenance of order and the detection of crime in Northern Ireland; to provide for the detention of terrorists there; and for connected purposes: and the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time tomorrow and to be printed [Bill 179].

STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS

Ordered,
That the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) (New Town of Glenrothes) (Special Development) Order 1975 (S.I., 1975, No. 908) be referred to a Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments.—[Mr. Pendry]

REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE (AMENDMENT) (NO. 2)

3.32 p.m.

Mr. Clement Freud: I beg to move,
That leave be given to bring in a Bill to amend the Representation of the People Act 1949.
The purpose of my Bill is to amend the Representation of the People Act, 1949 to enable citizens of the United Kingdom to hold direct elections to the European Parliament.
This matter is dealt with by Article 138 of the Treaty of Rome, which says that
the Assembly shall consist of delegates who shall be designated by the respective Parliaments from among their Members in accordance with the procedure laid down by each Member State.
It was in accordance with that article that the United Kingdom was given 36 seats in the European Parliament. If, as it seems likely, the country decides to take up its full entitlement of those seats, surely it is logical that the people of this country should have a voice in the election of their representatives.
The basic aim of my Bill is to provide for direct elections now, by the use of a proportional system to allow Scotland, Northern Ireland, Wales and the regions of England to elect their own representatives.
In an excellent pamphlet entitled "Direct Elections to the European Parliament" following a study group held under the chairmanship of Lord Chelwood, there is a chapter headed "Why Direct Elections?" which contains points which are good enough to bear repetition:
Direct elections would fulfil an important psychological purpose—there is nothing so concentrates the collective mind of a political party, for example, as the prospect of losing an election… the holding of direct elections would embody another fundamental principle: it would reflect the faith of the Community in parliamentary democrasy… direct elections would, of themselves, provide a valuable means of maintaining—or of reestablishing—the momentum of the Community… Finally, there is one severely practical argument. The Treaties, until the coming of direct elections, prescribe that the Members of the Parliament shall be designated by the respective Parliaments from among their members '—in other words that each Member shall have a 'dual mandate'

That aspect bears investigation, because it has been proved that a British Member of Parliament performing a "dual rôle" would need 450 days a year properly to discharge his duties to his constituents, to this House, and to the Assembly at Strasbourg. It seems essential that, just as the absence of the right hon. Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Stonehouse) has occasioned a sum of money to be given to the hon. Member for Walsall, South (Mr. George) in order that his constituency work be discharged, so should Members of this House who represent us in Europe receive some financial consideration in order that they may appoint an acceptable deputy to do a measure of their constituency work.
The current state of the European Parliament shows how unfair is the representation. Of the 13 members from this House 12 are Conservative and one a Liberal. Of these, there are two from East Anglia and three from the Home Counties. There is nobody at all from Wales, nor is there anybody to put the views of Northern Ireland.
We have heard today that the Labour Party is meeting to select its 18 representatives. I very much hope that we can discount rumours that they might take from the Liberal Party—the only political party which has been steadily and wholeheartedly pro-European—50 per cent. of our representation of two, which rightfully, proportionately, should be seven.
The Belgian Parliament is currently discussing an all-party motion in favour of direct elections. It is important to encourage preparations for direct elections now, because the European Parliament sets the target date for these as 1978. It seems to me that nine individualistic and different countries can achieve such a target date only if proper preparations are begun at once.
The referendum, which is now behind us, gave the wholehearted consent of the country to the European concept. It is only fair to offer different parts of Britain and the different political opinions of this country a proper and a proportional representation. It must be the aim of this House to assist the credibility of the European Assembly by our participation and by sending truly representative Members on our behalf.
In introducing direct elections now we can give the lead to our EEC partners, which for many of us would be a refreshing change for this country. For those reasons I commend the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Clement Freud, Mr. Jeremy Thorpe, Mr. Cyril Smith, Mr. David Steel, Mr. Russell Johnston, Mr. Richard Wainwright, Mr. Jo Grimond, Mr. Alan Beith, Mr. Emlyn Hooson.

REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE (AMENDMENT) No. 2

Mr. Clement Freud: Mr. Clement Freud accordingly presented a Bill to amend the Representation of the People Act 1949: and the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time upon Friday 11th July and to be printed. [Bill 180.]

BAHAMAS (GIFT OF A MACE)

3.40 p.m.

The Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. Edward Short): I beg to move,
That an Humble Address be presented to Her Majesty praying that Her Majesty will give directions that there be presented on behalf of this House a gift of a Mace to the House of Assembly of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas and assuring Her Majesty that this House will make good the expenses attending the same.
The gift to the House of Assembly of the Bahamas follows an established and very happy tradition that we send gifts from this House of Commons to other legislatures within the Commonwealth. On 3rd July, 1973, in reply to a Question from my right hon. Friend the then Leader of the Opposition about independence gifts to the Bahamas, the then Prime Minister said that Her Majesty's Government would propose that the House of Commons should offer a parliamentary gift to the House of Assembly of the Bahamas. It is that undertaking which we are now pleased to honour.
The Speaker of the Bahamas House of Assembly was, of course, consulted about the form of the gift and very much welcomed the proposal to present a Mace. The Mace has now been made. It is a very beautiful piece of British workmanship. It was on display in the Upper

Waiting Hall of the House for hon. Members to inspect last week. I expect that many hon. Members have seen it. If the House accepts the motion, as I am sure it will, arrangements will be made, I hope, by you, Mr. Speaker, to send a small delegation from the House to present the gift later this year.
I therefore commend the motion to the House in the expectation that it will be accepted as an expression of friendship and good will towards the House of Assembly of a sister Commonwealth country with which we have such long and extremely happy ties. In doing so, I know that I shall be speaking for the whole House in expressing our good wishes for the future to the people and Parliament of the Bahamas.

3.42 p.m.

Mr. Reginald Maudling: On behalf of the Leader of the Opposition, may I say that my right hon. and hon. Friends wish to be very warmly associated with what the Leader of the House has just said. We welcome very much that this is being done and trust that this Mace will remain as a symbol of the warm and continuing friendship between the peoples of our two countries.

3.43 p.m.

Mr. Jeremy Thorpe: As one who has been privileged to go to the Bahamas on one or two occasions, and who has some knowledge of the feelings of friendship which the people of the Bahamas have towards this country, which I believe are reciprocated, may I warmly associate myself with everything the right hon. Gentleman has said and hope that this Mace will remain as a symbol not only of the links between our countries but of the fact that we continue to enjoy parliamentary democracy in common.

3.44 p.m.

Sir David Renton: I rise only because I had the honour, on behalf of this House, as leader of the delegation from this House, presenting the Mace to the National Assembly of Uganda. I express the hope that our friendship with the Bahamas will remain at least as good as our friendship with Uganda has been since then.

Question put and agreed to.

To be presented by Privy Councillors or Members of Her Majesty's Household.

INDUSTRY BILL (ALLOCATION OF TIME)

3.46 p.m.


The Under-Secretary of State for Industry (Mr. Gerald Kaufman): I beg to move,



That the Order of 12th May be supplemented by substituting the following paragraph for paragraph 2:—


Report and Third Reading


5
2.—(1) The Proceedings on Consideration and Third Reading of the Bill shall be completed in three allotted days and shall be brought to a conclusion at Eleven o'clock on the last of those days: and for the purposes of Standing Order No. 43 (Business Committee) this Order shall be taken to allot to the Proceedings on Consideration such part of those days as the Resolution of the Business Committee may determine.


10
(2) The Business Committee shall report to the House their Resolutions as to the Proceedings on Consideration of the Bill, and as to the allocation of time between those Proceedings and Proceedings on Third Reading not later than 23rd June.



(3) The Resolutions in any report made under Standing Order No. 43 (Business Committee) may be varied by a further report so made, whether before or after 23rd June, and whether or not the Resolutions have been agreed to by the House.


15
(4) The Resolution of the Business Committee may include alterations in the order in which Proceedings on Consideration of the Bill are taken'.

Mr. Speaker: I inform the House that I have selected the Opposition amendment.

Mr. Kaufman: My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Industry agreed, during the final stages of the Industry Bill Committee, to approach his colleagues with a view to extending the time allotted for the Report stage of the Bill. The Government have concluded that it would be appropriate to extend to three days the time for Report and Third Reading in order to assure an adequate opportunity for the discussion of amendments. I am pleased to be able to introduce the motion necessary to extend the timetable.

3.47 p.m.

Mr. Michael Heseltine: I beg to move, in line 5, leave out 'three' and insert 'four'.
I think that the whole House will regard that explanation as totally inadequate, because the Secretary for Industry did not undertake definitely to extend the time available for Report. What he did was to give an assurance that if substantial amendments were to be introduced he would recommend to his right hon. Friend and to the Government that adequate time should be given on Report. So the Under-Secretary today, without

spelling it out, is saying that the Government have decided that there shall be extensive amendments to the Industry Bill on Report, and that takes us back to the beginning of the dialogue which provoked the unprecedented suspension of the Standing Committee on no fewer than three occasions last week.
The whole debate began when the former Secretary of State for Industry referred a week ago to the possibility of a further White Paper on the Industry Bill, although that is a most unusual procedure to put to the House, but he was not able to answer questions in the Industry Committee as to whether the review to which he had referred in answering questions was going to make substantial amendments to the Bill. He was not able to be found, and the Standing Committee was not able to question him. As a consequence, the Under-Secretary, having done his best to find the Secretary of State for Industry but having failed, was not himself able to answer questions.
On that very night, Tuesday last week, the Secretary of State for Industry left his job in order to move to his new position. But everybody on that Standing Committee knew that the dialogue, which we had been conducting for what amounted in the end to 40 sittings, would not be resolved until after the referendum, when


the Government were able to come to grips with the central issue whether or not the Bill was to follow the White Paper or whether the Bill itself was to stand supreme.
There were two conflicting views. One was given by the Prime Minister in reply to his hon. Friend the Member for Nuneaton (Mr. Huckfield), when the Prime Minister made it clear that he took the view that the Bill would be subject to the White Paper. He repeated this assurance on a number of occasions, including yesterday, on the Floor of the House. The then Under-Secretary took the view that, notwithstanding the Prime Minister's word, as he so quaintly told the Standing Committee, the Bill would stand in its drafted form. This has been the background against which we have conducted deliberations in the Standing Committee.
This last week we saw, in a whole range of much franker statements than we have had previously, the very clear position—that the Government intend to conduct the review and, having conducted the review, to consider substantial amendments. I think that the new Secretary of State for Industry should have come to the House this afternoon to explain the position. I find it difficult to understand why the Under-Secretary, who has the sole distinction of not having attended any meetings of the Standing Committee, should have to come here to explain something to which he was not party in any way.

Mr. Kaufman: My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Industry is not in the House today for this motion because he is meeting the Trades Union Congress with regard to the Bill.

Mr. Heseltine: That explanation is interesting and probably reflects what some of us on both sides of the Committee have felt—that the real decisions about the Bill are to be made by the TUC and CBI, and that the Secretary of State for Industry feels that it is more important to conduct the consultations with the TUC while the House is trying to discuss the Bill. I am most grateful to the Under Secretary for clarifying what his hon. Friends have been saying in the Standing Committee for some time and what the Government have done their best to resist in the face of hostility from their own

back benchers. That position is now clearly put on the record, and the House will appreciate the frankness of the Under-Secretary.
We have now the situation that, given the assurance which the Secretary for Industry gave the Standing Committee, if the Government decided that there were to be substantial amendments, extra time would be found. On Friday, the day after he gave that assurance, the Government decided to give an extra day on Report and put down a motion after the Chequers discussions which, I understand from the Press comments, concentrates around the sorts of amendments the Government would want to make. But the fact is that we are being given three days to discuss amendments which at the time the Government put down the motion in their name could not have been substantiated. All the Government could conceivably have known at that time was that there were to be substantial amendments. As they had not then met the CBI and TUC—very important meetings, as the Under-Secretary has pointed out—they could only have known in general terms that the Bill was going to be substantially amended.
I now come to the amendment standing in the name of my right hon. Friend and myself, which suggests that three days cannot possibly be adequate for the consideration of the Report stage of the Bill. We do not know what amendments will be tabled, and we do not know when they will be tabled. In a guillotine procedure, that itself is very important. The Under-Secretary made no attempt to clarify his position. We know only that what took 40 sittings of the Standing Committee will be amended substantially in a way which no one in this House other than members of the Government have any idea about unless we rely upon the widely leaked stories in the Press.
I believe that the whole House will feel that the treatment of Parliament in the context of this Bill is, first, without precedent and, secondly, shaming, because it reflects clearly that our deliberations in the Standing Committee were tantamount to a farce. They were designed—and I claim a part in this—to keep the Bill in Committee until after the referendum so that the Government could then take decisions which they were not prepared to take before the referendum.
That is the background against which we are asked to give an additional day to the deliberations on Report about matters which are not before the House. I regard this as a novel and regrettable method of treating first the Standing Committee and now the whole House. It is sensible, therefore, for the House to show its unwillingness to be treated in this way by voting not for three days but for four days, which will at least ensure that we have adequate time to consider what has been described by the Prime Minister as one of the most important industrial Bills ever to come before the country and which the Opposition believe is a major irritant to a situation where we have the fastest declining investment programme and the largest prospective levels of unemployment since the war.
This is a Bill of critical importance. Both sides of the House see it from different viewpoints, but what is beyond question is that the House of Commons should insist upon its right to have adequate time. Therefore, I shall recommend my right hon. and hon. Friends to vote for the amendment.

Mr. Michael Grylls: Before my hon. Friend sits down, will he deal with one further point? Four days instead of three days is a great improvement. However, as we are completely in the dark about any negotiations which are going on with the CBI and the TUC, will he agree that perhaps four days is too little time? If there are major changes, we may need another 40 days. Perhaps there should be a further amendment proposed to that effect.

Mr. Heseltine: There is considerable logic in my hon. Friend's intervention, which I find compelling. On the other hand, we have to bear in mind that the Government's programme is already in the most appalling situation. It would have been irresponsible of the Opposition to move in the direction that my hon. Friend suggests, although there would be an overwhelming argument for the House to take the matter into its own hands and to move that the whole Bill be sent back to Standing Committee for consideration. However, in my view, our protest would be made sufficiently if we showed the Gov-

ernment that we were not prepared to be treated in this way by voting tor four days instead of for three.

3.54 p.m.

Mr. Eric S. Heffer: I think that I speak for all my hon. Friends who served on the Standing Committee when I say that, provided that the amendments which come forward on Report arise purely out of our discussions and commitments given by the Government in Committee, we shall not press for any additional time. From our point of view, the original two days would have been quite sufficient since the amendments on Report would have arisen naturally out of amendments tabled by the Opposition and by my hon. Friends in Committee when commitments were given by the Government that they would look at the amendments, tidy them up, and move amendments of their own on Report to meet the wishes of the Committee.
Towards the end of the Committee stage, just before we walked out of the Committee, I asked for an assurance from the new Secretary of State that there would not be any amendments on Report in addition to those arising automatically from the work of the Committee. I am afraid that my right hon. Friend did not give me that assurance.
The majority of Government supporters who were concerned with the work of the Committee are not worried about discussions taking place in private with the TUC. The TUC is not pressing for any great changes in the Bill indeed, if there were important changes, it would be pressing to maintain the Bill as it is. We are more concerned about the CBI, which, as we know from Press statements, is pressing for substantial amendments to be made to the Bill.
I was not made any happier yesterday when my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister replied to a supplementary question which I put to him. I wanted to know whether there would be any substantial amendments. He replied that as far as he was concerned, quoting my own words to me, I was surely in favour of voluntary rather than statutory agreements.
I was talking about voluntary agreements in the context of planning agreements. The disclosure provisions—not


connected with the planning agreements, but disclosure provisions of the Bill- -were there in any case, and the Secretary of State had the right at any time statutorily to ask any company to provide information that he wanted.
On the basis of the Prime Minister's reply, I am concerned about whether those provisions are to be changed. If they are, that will mean a substantial change in the Bill as it was discussed in Committee.
Another point concerns the National Enterprise Board. In Committee, as is their prerogative, the Opposition attempted to get the Government to agree with the line that the CBI was pressing. In other words, when we were talking about the take-over of a profitable manufacturing company, it should be only with the directors of the company rather than with the shareholders as a whole. We all know that at times this happens in the business world. A bid is made to the directors of a company, and they refuse. Then the bid is made to the shareholders, and they decide against the wishes of the directors.
As the Prime Minister spelt out in a letter to the hon. Member for Henley (Mr. Heseltine), all that we were saying was that there was no question but that it should include shareholders as a whole. However, the CBI is demanding that it must be by agreement only with the directors. I assume that the CBI is still pressing for this. If an amendment along those lines is to be tabled, that represents a substantial change in the Bill.
Then there is the amount of money available for the National Enterprise Board. It is no good having such a board with all the trimmings laid down but with no money. If the money is not there, all the instruments in the world will achieve nothing. The board will be simply suspended in mid-air unable to do the job which the Labour Party believes to be essential.
Those are the three areas which deeply concern us. We know that we lost the argument in relation to other areas. We pressed in Committee—and it is no secret that I pressed in Government—for the entire programme of the party as it was laid down in 1973 to be in the White Paper. We lost the argument. We lost the further argument in the Committee.

so we are not saying we go back. We may well put down amendments, if there is time in the two days, to raise further argument, hoping even at this late hour to win the argument and gain support; and we could still do it within two days.
We are now faced, or could be faced, with agreed policies and amendments to be formulated by the Government. We do not expect that they would take a CBI amendment just like that and put it in. But discussions were started with the CBI yesterday afternoon, and they came out looking like the cat who had just had the cream, with beaming faces, saying "We understand the Government are doing their best to meet the kind of requirements we need and are doing their best to help us."
I am not interested in helping the CBI to change a Bill which has emerged from years of discussions within the Labour movement and Labour Party and is going through the parliamentary processes. I do not want the CBI to be making proposals at this stage and to discover that those proposals come forward within three days as substantial amendments. So far as I and many of my hon. Friends are concerned, even if there were 50 amendments that were not substantial the two days, I believe, would be accepted. But if the amendments are substantial ones three days would not be enough. We should need more than three days.
Probably we shall not vote on this question because we shall have to see what amendments actually come forward. We know that it will then be too late but we could still make our position clear on the Floor of the House in relation to those amendments before we discuss them; so we will withhold our fire on that. But I would tell my hon. Friend now, and I warn my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, not to come forward with any fundamental changes which reflect the opinions of the CBI. We in the Labour movement do not accept that that should be done, and if it is done, I say right now that we in the Labour movement will not accept them and we shall fight those amendments all the way through and shall have a lot to say about them, even if they


should be passed, until eventually they are removed from the statute book.

4.3 p.m.

Mr. Richard Wainwright: In view of the sombre warning which the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer), in characteristic manner, has just given to the Government it is disappointing, not only to me but, I am sure, to many other hon. Members, that he should have just indicated that he will not be backing that warning with a vote on this motion, because the House is being asked this afternoon to decide upon a very strict limitation of time for transacting work the nature of which has not yet been disclosed.
This House is much given—and I myself, with other hon. Members, have been guilty of it—to complaining about the poor standard of management found in parts of British industry. But could management sink lower than to ask the work force to agree in advance to a strict limitation of time for performing certain tasks without disclosing what those are? There appear to be some very poor shop stewards in this place. I thought I could get information from the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the House, for I thought he was the shop steward for minority parties and ordinary MPs.
I do not want to labour arguments already adduced with which I am very largely in sympathy but I would add this consideration. Even in the Standing Committee, which is only a fraction, perhaps one-eighteenth, of the whole of this honourable House, it became utterly manifest—and I am sure no member of the Standing Committee would deny it—that this Bill, even in its first edition, attracted at least seven quite distinctive and separate points of view. On the Government side there was the Tribune point of view. I am not suggesting that that was necessarily always a solid and united point of view but broadly it was a voting group which brought forward some very interesting amendments, sometimes supported by 11, 12 or 13 honourable Members in Committee.
Then there was the Government point of view which was advanced by a rapidly changing variety of spokesmen during our 40 sittings. Then there was what is known, rather inadequately, as the

moderate Labour point of view, again not a solid block but an identifiable and very interesting point of view on this multifarious Bill. On the opposite side there was the orthodox Conservative point of view, what I choose to call the lowest common denominator. There was the distinctive point of view of the hon. Member for Cirencester and Tewkesbury (Mr. Ridley), who sometimes got support from some of his hon. Friends. Then there were the Plaid Cymru point of view and the Liberal point of view.
The Standing Committee did not include anybody to add to that variety the views of the Scottish National Party or the views of hon. Members from Northern Ireland, so that when one adds to the melange revealed in the Standing Committee other elements of the House who I am sure will want to take part in the Bill, it is quite clear that the Government never seize themselves of the point that time must be allotted not only for the old style Government and Opposition debate but for all these very distinctive points of view to be fairly put.
No matter what the nature of the amendments which are being concealed from the House at the moment, it is manifest that the time proposed by the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the House falls shamefully short of the time required for all points of view to be reasonably put, however concise these speakers may be. Furthermore, this is not the first time that the Government, in coming forward with timetable motions, have failed to realise, or at any rate have not been willing openly to acknowledge, that the nature of Parliament has changed as a result of the last two General Elections.
Other authorities in the House have been speedy in acknowledging the changed circumstances caused by the representation of many parties in this House, especially on the Opposition side, but the Government pretend that this has not happened. I must make the protest this afternoon that there has been no acknowledgment, not even by way of consultation, that there are now many voices, organised voices, in this House and they must be given time to deal with the matter.
I shall recommend my Liberal Friends to support the Conservative amendment


because I believe I recognise the honourable purpose behind it, but I cannot pretend that I will do so with great conviction, because no one in the House can say that four, five or six days are sufficient to transact business the nature of which we are not allowed to know.
I hope that on reflection the Under-Secretary, who has only just taken over his task, will bow to the weight of opinion which I believe will be revealed in the House during the course of this brief debate and will take this matter back and at least hold it back until he can present his amendments from the Government side.

4.09 p.m.

Mr. Douglas Crawford: I would like to inform the House that my party, too, supports the amendment in the name of the hon. Member for Henley (Mr. Heseltine), not because of any threat from the CBI or other Departments but because we wish to show that in this Bill the interests of Scotland have not been safeguarded.
The House will be aware that we were extremely angry that the Scottish National Party were not represented on the Committee and extremely angry at the cavalier way in which amendments were treated when put down by my hon. Friend the Member for Caernarvon (Mr. Wigley) and myself to ensure that the writ of the National Enterprise Board would not run in Scotland and that the writ of the Scottish Development Agency would run in Scotland and the writ of the Welsh Development Agency in Wales. We shall again be seeking on Report to table many amendments to this effect. We shall be wanting as much time as possible to test the wishes and opinions of this House and to see what the Government's intentions are about the Scottish Development Agency and the Welsh Development Agency. My party wants as much time as possible for Report in order to ensure that the writ of the London-based National Enterprise Board does not run in Scotland.

4.10 p.m.

Mr. Ian Mikardo: During the long course of the Committee proceedings on the Industry Bill I, not surprisingly, crossed swords

on a number of occasions with the hon. Member for Henley (Mr. Heseltine). I am, however, bound to say that this afternoon I find myself in complete agreement with his statement that the way in which the Government are handling the Bill at this stage is an insult, and an intolerable insult, to all hon. Members who spent 40 long, hard-working Sittings in Committee.
It is absolutely clear that the Government intend some action which will make null and void a great deal of the work done in Committee. Over many years in this House I have sat on a number of Committees, but I cannot recall any other which has been so assiduous and hard working. The amendments tabled from both sides—perhaps I should say from all quarters—of the Committee gave evidence of a great deal of study and research, not merely into the text of the Bill but into all the issues covered by the Bill and all the matters related to them. We did stick at it very hard.
What now seems to be the intention is to introduce de facto a different Bill. That means that the Government are saying, "Thank you very much for wasting your time. You gabbled away on a Bill which has ceased to exist. You put down amendments to a text which is no longer operative. You must have had a lot of fun." I do not believe that it is right for the Government to treat hon. Members in this way. I am bound to say that I share the view of the hon. Member for Henley that the way in which the Under-Secretary moved the motion today added to the offence.
I sympathise with my hon. Friend. It must be no easy or pleasant task to be pitchforked into a major Bill at this late stage. I fancy that he will not find it an easy time on Report, whether it be two, three or four days. Nevertheless, he ought to have come clean with us. He ought to have said what the extra time is wanted for. It is true that the Government made a considerable number, perhaps an almost unprecedented number, of concessions to both sides of the Committee. The then Secretary of State, my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer), in the period when he was Minister of State, and the then Under-Secretary showed a readiness to listen, to understand and to keep an open mind on amendments. This is something which we do not very often see.
As a result, I did not count the number of times but it must have been 40 or 50—they said, "If the hon. Member will withdraw his amendment we will have a look at this and produce something on Report". That makes a lot of work on paper. But it is only on paper, because nearly every one of those concessions was to meet the wishes of the Committee and therefore members of the Committee would not object to amendments embodying them. They were all pretty well non-controversial. Some of them were no more than marginal or tidying up.
We could get through that lot without any difficulty in a single day. We have therefore to ask, why two days? Even more, why three days? The Downing Street leaking machine—which functions with very great efficiency and is the most productive unit in this country—has made it clear what is going on. The Government need more time because they are to introduce amendments that are of considerable substance which totally alter the nature of the Bill.
I can understand the protests of the hon. Member for Henley, but if I had been in his position I would not have been making a fuss about it. I would have taken it all very quietly. The hon. Member must know that he has won. He has got everything—perhaps not everything but nearly everything—that he and his party wanted by way of changes to the Bill. He must know that for all practical purposes, and certainly for the purposes laid down for the Bill in the policy statement of the Labour Party, the Bill is as dead as the dodo.

Mr. Heseltine: I have considered the point the hon. Member makes. Naturally I would be delighted if I thought that he was right. Perhaps I have a little more respect for the Prime Minister than the hon. Member's remarks suggest that he has. Leaks can be leaked for all sorts of reasons. When I see the amendments to the Bill I may believe what the hon. Member says.

Mr. Mikardo: I take that point. The hon. Member and I and all the rest of us will be wiser not merely when we see the Government amendments but when we see, if ever we do—if they are not kept secret—the Prime Minister's guide-

lines, written in his own fair, lily-white hand, to the Secretary of State about the action or inaction which he is to take with regard to this Bill. We shall all have to wait quite a while to be wiser. We shall not be fully the wiser when we see the amendments. We shall be fully the wiser when we see what happens as a result of the passage of this Bill.
I have a horrible feeling that when that day comes we shall find that what I have said to the hon. Member about his having won will turn out to be all too true. I am not suggesting that he should be walking about, to steal the expression used by my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton, looking like the cat who has got the cream. But I do not think he ought to put on sackcloth and ashes either. The hon. Member has won.
The National Enterprise Board will not do anything beyond what it is doing with British Leyland. My hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton made the point that it is entirely limited, apart from all the other limitations which will be placed upon it in these hand-written directives, by the amount of money that it has available. The only money available to it is hypothecated for British Leyland. There is no National Enterprise Board, there is a British Leyland holding company which is called the National Enterprise Board.
As for the other important parts of the Bill on which we spent so many weary hours—planning agreements and disclosure—we shall have to wait and see what the amendments are.
I shall vote against this motion. To do otherwise would be illogical. I speak for no one other than myself. My point is simply that we could have managed in less than two days to carry out the normal process of adjustment that always needs to be carried out after Committee stage. Since far more time than that is to be allocated, it is clear that it is to be allocated because there are to be major changes. It is clear to anyone with any political nous that those changes will not be in the direction that I want but in the direction wanted by Conservative Members. I cannot, therefore, logically vote to provide more time for that purpose.

Mr. Crawford: Not all Members of the Opposition welcome all the changes that are to appear in the Bill, because members of the Scottish National Party fear that the writ of the NEB will run in Scotland. We would not welcome that.

Mr. Mikardo: The hon. Gentleman will be able to speak on that matter, whether we have two or three days. I look forward to hearing him argue his case. For the present the amendments may or may not be welcome— they are not welcome to me but they may well be welcome to the Conservative Party—and therefore it would be utterly illogical for me to vote for the provision of more time in order to enable amendments to be moved and carried when they are amendments to which I am opposed. That is why, in addition to voting against the amendment moved by the hon. Member for Henley, I shall also vote against my right hon. Friend's motion. I am deeply suspicious about what the Government are getting up to.
I end, as I began, by saying that it will be a long time before anyone induces me to sit again on a Standing Committee, knowing that 40 sessions of. 2½ hours were, for all practical purposes, thrown into the dustbin.

4.21 p.m.

Mr. John Stanley: I should have thought that both sides of the House could agree, on a dispassionate assessment of what the Committee did not cover and of what was undertaken during the Committee proceedings, that three days cannot be sufficient time to enable all parties to give adequate consideration to the Bill on Report. I should like briefly to endeavour to demonstrate that point.
The Bill has left Committee with a considerable number of the amendments and new clauses undiscussed. I do not want, at present, in any way to apportion blame to any party for that. However, I remind the House that when the Bill left Committee there were a total of 49 amendments, five new clauses and two new schedules undiscussed. All of those items raised substantive points not merely from the official Opposition but from the Liberal Party and from Labour back benchers. In my view, at least a day should be allocated as a minimum

to discuss on the Floor of the House what the Committee was unable to cover.
As the hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Mr. Mikardo) has said, during the course of the Committee proceedings Ministers showed that they were prepared to give serious consideration to a number of the amendments that were put down by Members on both sides of the Committee. They promised consideration during the Report stage. The former Secretary of State, the former Minister of State and the former Under-Secretary all gave a string of assurances that they would reconsider on Report a number of highly technical but important matters. The Bill left Committee after Ministers had firmly promised a total of 24 new Government amendments, which are due to come before us on Report. They also promised to reconsider a further 43 matters before Report, with a view to possible additional amendments. Therefore, a substantial volume of work can be expected on Report.
If we aggregate the items that were undiscussed in Committee with the items on which firm Government amendments have been promised on Report, and with the items which the Government have firmly promised to reconsider for Report, we already come to a total of 123 items which are legitimate subjects for the Report stage. That is before further consideration is given to additional Government amendments and amendments from the Opposition parties which were represented on the Standing Committee, and those which were not such as the Scottish National Party.
If we have merely three days to consider only the 123 new items, that allows 8·8 minutes for the consideration of each item. Even stretched over three days, that will not be sufficient for adequate consideration of the Bill on Report. Therefore, I hope that hon. Members on both sides of the House will give serious consideration to supporting the amendment in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Henley (Mr. Heseltine).

4.25 p.m.

Mr. Kaufman: I apologise to my hon. Friends for intervening and cutting out their speeches. I should not have wished to do so, but, as my hon. Friends and the House will be aware, this debate is guillotined, and I am sure that the House, after


the points that have been raised, would wish me to have a reasonable amount of time to reply. However, I assure the House that I should not have sought to cut out other speeches on this motion.
The hon. Member for Henley (Mr. Heseltine) argued very much to the contrary the argument of my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) and my hon. Friend the Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Mr. Mikardo). The hon. Gentleman implied that the time would be insufficient, whereas my hon. Friends implied that the time would be too much if the Government were not to have ulterior motives with regard to amendments. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bethnal Green and Bow pointed out, in view of the assurances given by my right hon. and hon. Friends during Committee a considerable number of amendments would in any event flow from Committee. My hon. Friend also said that in his view two days would be more than enough to deal with this matter. I point out that the time allocated, even the extended time which the Government propose, includes a substantial amount of time that would be provided for Third Reading as well as for Report.
The hon. Member for Henley seemed to imply that because of the consultations which are taking place outside the House it is wrong for us not to have a longer Report stage even than that proposed by the Government in the motion that we are putting before the House today. When the original guillotine motion was moved last month I do not recall the hon. Gentleman making any complaints about the time allocated for Report. His hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater (Mr. King) complained but I do not recall the hon. Gentleman doing so. The hon. Gentleman was well aware at that time—and I think it is necessary to draw this matter to the attention of my hon. Friends—that consultations were to take place.
The present Secretary of State for Energy, my right hon. Friend the Member for Bristol, South-East (Mr. Benn), made the position perfectly clear in a speech which he made on the guillotine motion on 12th May. I hope that my hon. Friends will listen, because this matter is very relevant to the remarks that they

made. My right hon. Friend the Member for Bristol, South-East said:
we have made it clear that after the Committee stage, in which many of these points will arise on an amendment, there will be further consultation with both the CBI and the TUC. In the course of these consultations it obviously flows and follows that a Government engaged in them will listen to what is said and will seek, in pursuit of what we say in Committee, if we think it right, to table amendments on Report. These consultations will take place after the Committee stage, when we have had an opportunity to consider the matter in the light of the Committee's deliberations."—[Official Report, 12th May 1975; Vol. 892, c. 116–117.]
Therefore, the hon. Member for Henley was never in any doubt that when the House voted for two days on Report and Third Reading the Government would take into account not only the Committee proceedings but the consultations which my right hon. Friend the then Secretary of State made completely clear were to take place with the CBI and the TUC.

Mr. Mikardu: That is precisely what I and my hon. Friends are so het up about. Why could not those consultations take place before we ended the Committee stage? What was the point of going through the charade of the Committee stage only to be faced by a new Bill? Why was not the Committee stage suspended? Why did not the consultations take place before the Government laid the Bill? This is a new and daft idea. People have worked for 100 hours and at the end the Government say "Now we shall start all over again."

Mr. Kaufman: I say to my hon. Friend with respect that those were questions he should have put to my right hon. Friend the then Secretary of State when he moved the guillotine motion which my hon. Friend supported. My right hon. Friend made it perfectly clear that those consultations would take place after the Committee stage had ended. If my hon. Friend, for reasons which I respect and accept, objects to consultations after the Committee stage, it would have been appropriate for him to state those objections to my right hon. Friend.

Mr. Heffer: My hon. Friend has read a speech made by my right hon. Friend the then Secretary of State for Industry. Would he care to read my speech in that


debate? I spoke of the possibility of secret deals, and received the assurance from my right hon. Friend that there would be none.

Mr. Kaufman: My hon. Friend may be sure that I intended to quote from his speech. When I reply to his remarks I intend to quote very fairly from what he said in that debate.

Mr. Heseltine: Mr. Heseltine rose——

Mr. Kaufman: I have limited time, so I should prefer not to give way. I wish to respond to what has been said in the debate, and I have told the hon. Member for Bridgwater that I shall give him some time to wind up on the amendment. If there is time after I have responded to the debate, I shall readily give way to the hon. Member for Henley, but it would be a discourtesy to my hon. Friends if I did not reply to their remarks as well as the remarks made by the hon. Member for Tonbridge and Mailing (Mr. Stanley).

Mr. Heseltine: Mr. Heseltine rose——

Mr. Kaufman: I have told the hon. Gentleman that we are under a time limitation.

Mr. Heseltine: Mr. Heseltine rose——

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. George Thomas): Order. We can have only one speaker at a time. I hope that another hon. Member will be able to speak after the Minister replies.

Mr. Kaufman: I have told the hon. Gentleman that I shall give way to him later if there is time.
The hon. Member for Tonbridge and Mailing made a great deal about the amount of ground still to cover, but such remarks are always made in guillotine debates. In this case the Standing Committee reached Clause 23 of a 30-clause Bill, and there are now to be three days for Report and Third Reading. On the Housing Finance Bill, which the hon. Gentleman's party guillotined, the Committee reached only Clause 70 of a 103-clause Bill, and there were then only two days on Report, followed by one day for Third Reading. Therefore, I shall accept criticisms about other matters, but I shall not accept criticism about that.
The hon. Member for Henley and my hon. Friend the Member for Walton were both apprehensive about the amount of time that would be available to consider amendments, especially, in my hon. Friend's case, because of apprehensions about the possible scope of those amendments. Therefore, I give the assurance that the Government will do their best to ensure that there will be adequate time for consideration of Government amendments before Report. Those who served on the Standing Committee will know that my right hon. Friend the then Secretary of State undertook that, apart from giving the House as a whole information, he would write to all members of the Standing Committee individually informing them of changes that would take place.
My hon. Friend the Member for Walton very fairly asked me to refer to his speech on 12th May in the debate on the guillotine motion. I have read it with the care which my hon. Friend knows I always devote to his remarks and interventions in the House. He made clear in that debate his apprehensions about what might happen in consultations with the CBI and the TUC. I know that my hon. Friend will not quarrel with my quoting the following words. I am not quoting them out of context; I have made it clear that they are in context. After an intervention by the hon. Member for Chichester (Mr. Nelson), my hon. Friend said:
There is nothing wrong with discussions with the CBI or anyone else. Discussions should go on with all interested parties.
He also said—and I in no way quarrel with this, because he stated the position as aptly and accurately as it could be stated when he was warning about his attitude to secret deals, as he put it:
Of course, despite all the talk of secret deals, this will not happen. Such things have been said in the past, but in the last analysis this House will decide on the legislation."— [Official Report, 12th May 1975; Vol. 892, c. 135.]

Mr. Heffer: I said that I hoped it would.

Mr. Kaufman: My hon. Friend said this categorically.

Mr. Heffer: My hon. Friend knows that I was being ironical. Perhaps I shall never be ironical again. I was saying


quite clearly that of course it would not happen, assuming my right hon. Friend took note of what we on this side of the House were saying. But if it does happen, and there are secret deals, we are in an entirely new ball game, and my hon. Friend and the Government had better recognise it.

Mr. Kaufman: Of course, I accept what my hon. Friend says. It is a problem about Hansard that although it prints words in brackets such as "Laughter" and "Interruption" it does not say "Irony". I did not hear my hon. Friend's speech, but only read it, and I apologise if I misinterpreted it. I did not seek to do so. As I am sure my hon. Friend will acknowledge, I read it with care, and I think that he will accept that I have quoted from it accurately.
My hon. Friend and my hon. Friend the Member for Bethnal Green and Bow were both apprehensive about the attitude of members of the CBI upon their emergence from their talks with my right hon. Friends yesterday. There have been a number of interpretations of the outcome of those talks. That well-informed and learned newspaper, the Sun, had as its headline this morning to the report of what took place:
Wilson bows to firms".
But the Daily Mirror had as its headline:
Wilson's shock for the CBI".
Its report began:
Industry chiefs were shocked last night to find that the Government is not likely to give them any major concessions in a redrafted Industry Bill.
It is not for me on this motion to indicate what kind of amendments there may be. As I pointed out earlier, consultations with the TUC, for example, are continuing. But I will say to my hon. Friends—and I say it advisedly—that there will be no emasculation of the Bill. My hon. Friend the Member for Bethnal Green and Bow pointed to my late arrival in the Department of Industry. I have not spent 15 months carrying out Labour Party policy in the Department of the Environment in order to come to this Department and sell out Labour Party policy there. I have come here to carry out the policy of this Government, and that is what I intend to do.
In the light of what I have said, I ask the House—

Mr. Richard Wainwright: Mr. Richard Wainwright rose——

Mr. Kaufman: I have promised the hon. Member for Bridgwater that I shall give him five minutes, but perhaps the hon. Gentleman will permit me to give way to the hon. Member for Colne Valley (Mr. Wainwright).

Mr. Richard Wainwright: I am grateful to the Minister for giving way, because I know that he pleaded just now for time to reply fully to the debate.
Will the hon. Gentleman address himself to the statement made from the Scottish National Party bench, as well as from the Liberal Bench, that concessions made by the Government to one party in Committee are not necessarily at all acceptable to other parties, and that time must be given to ventilate at least seven points of view?

Mr. Kaufman: One of the problems about parliamentary debate is that concessions to one side are often not acceptable to another. We shall have to wait to see who is satisfied at the end of the day.
In the light of what I have said, I hope that hon. Members will agree that it is right to extend the final consideration of the Bill by one day, but that the Opposition are being extravagant, particularly in view of their cavalier attitude towards guillotine motions in the past, in putting forward their amendment. I trust that the House will reject the amendment.

4.40 p.m.

Mr. Tom King: There are divided points of view on both sides of the House about the Bill. It has become clear from this brief debate that hon. Members on both sides of the House are united in their concern about the way in which Parliament and the Standing Committee have been treated over this whole matter.
This has not been a party political debate. Speeches by back benchers of all parties have expressed concern about the contempt with which the Standing Committee has been treated after no fewer than 40 sittings on the Bill. The latter proceedings of the Committee have been described as a farce. The last two sittings were certainly reduced to absolute


uselessness for any member of the Committee. We had a total change of Ministers. We now face the Report stage with a completely new set of Ministers, not one of whom played any part in the Committee stage of the Bill, except in its futile last passages. The ease with which the extra day was granted when the Secretary of State promised to press the Leader of the House for it was some confirmation of the embarrassment in which even the Government admitted finding themselves in a quite unprecedented situation.
The hon. Member for Colne Valley (Mr. Wainwright) put the matter very well when he said that the situation is rather ludicrous because we have to vote on this motion when we do not yet know what we are being expected to discuss and how many amendments have been tabled.
The Minister made great play of the fact that we were warned in the debate on the timetable motion that there would be discussions. There is one simple fallacy in what he has said and I am sure that Labour Members who have expressed concern will have spotted it. The right hon. Member for Bristol, South-East (Mr. Benn), the Secretary of State for Energy, is reported at col. 116 of Hansard for 12th May as having spoken about discussions, but it was made clear that there would be only two days for Report. We now have a situation in which there will be discussions—yes—but apparently there are grounds for even the Government conceding three days for Report. I well understand the concern of Labour Members about this situation.
As the hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Mr. Mikardo) said, any-

Division No. 237.]
AYES
[4.44 p.m.


Adley, Robert
Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)
Douglas-Hamilton, Lord James


Alison, Michael
Bryan, Sir Paul
Drayson, Burnaby


Arnold, Tom
Buchanan-Smith. Alick
Eden, Rt Hon Sir John


Atkins, Rt Hon H. (Spelthorne)
Bulmer, Esmond
Edwards, Nicholas (Pembroke)


Bain, Mrs Margaret
Chalker, Mrs Lynda
Elliott, Sir William


Baker, Kenneth
Churchill, W. S.
Emery, Peter


Beith, A. J.
Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)
Ewing, Mrs Winifred (Moray)


Bell, Ronald
Cockcroft, John
Eyre, Reginald


Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torbay)
Cooke, Robert (Bristol W)
Fairgrieve, Russell


Biffen, John
Cope, John
Fell, Anthony


Biggs-Davison, John
Cordle, John H.
Finsberg, Geoffrey


Blaker, Peter
Costain, A. P.
Fisher, Sir Nigel


Body, Richard
Crawford, Douglas
Fletcher, Alex (Edinburgh N)


Boyson, Dr Rhodes (Brent)
Critchley, Julian
Fletcher-Cooke, Charles


Braine, Sir Bernard
Crouch, David
Fookes, Miss Janet


Brittan, Leon
Dean, Paul (N Somerset)
Fowler, Norman (Sutton C'f'd)


Brotherton, Michael
Dodsworth, Geoffrey
Freud, Clement

one who is not totally politically naive knows that discussions of substance are taking place—and the Government have now conceded an extra day for Report. I entirely sympathise with the remarks of the hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow in a parliamentary sense, although he knows that I do not share his views in a party political sense. However, in a parliamentary sense, the points he made were valid. He was a little illogical in the conclusion that he drew because his argument was that if there are further amendments, it is illogical to allow any extra time because they will probably be amendments which Labour Members would not like and, therefore, we should not spend extra time on them.

However, the crux of the matter is that we are under a timetable motion. The other alternative is that the amendments will be moved and carried without discussion. Amendments may be carried which are against the opinion and wishes of the hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow without his even having the opportunity in Parliament to make his opposition to them or criticism of them clear.

If new amendments are tabled—and the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) is concerned that they will be, to use a Scottish word, "without" the previous discussion of the Committee—they must be amendments that we have an opportunity to discuss.

It is for those reasons that there must be adequate time for discussion on Report. Four days is the minimum that we should have.

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The House divided: Ayes 162, Noes 192.

Fry, Peter
Knight, Mrs Jill
Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)


Gardiner, George (Reigate)
Lane, David
Ross, Stephen (Isle of Wight)


Gilmour, Rt Hon Ian (Chesham)
Lawrence, Ivan
Shersby, Michael


Gilmour, Sir John (East Fife)
Lawson, Nigel
Silvester, Fred


Glyn, Dr Alan
Lester, Jim (Beeston)
Sinclair, Sir George


Gow, Ian (Eastbourne)
Luce, Richard
Skeet, T. H. H.


Gower, Sir Raymond (Barry)
MacCormick, Iain
Smith, Cyril (Rochdale)


Grant, Anthony (Harrow C)
Macfarlane, Neil
Speed, Keith


Gray, Hamish
MacGregor, John
Spence, John


Grieve, Percy
Macmillan, Rt Hon M. (Farnham)
Spicer, Michael (S Worcester)


Grimond, Rt Hon J.
McNair-Wilson, M. (Newbury)
Sproat, Iain


Grist, Ian
Mather, Carol
Stanbrook, Ivor


Grylls, Michael
Maude, Angus
Steel, David (Roxburgh)


Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)
Maudling, Rt Hon Reginald
Stewart, Donald (Western Isles)


Hampson, Dr Keith
Mawby, Ray
Stewart, Ian (Hitchin)


Hannam, John
Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin
Stokes, John


Harvie Anderson, Rt Hon Miss
Meyer, Sir Anthony
Stradling Thomas, J.


Hawkins, Paul
Mills, Peter
Tapsell, Peter


Hayhoe, Barney
Miscampbell, Norman
Taylor, Teddy (Cathcart)


Henderson, Douglas
Mitchell, David (Basingstoke)
Tebbit, Norman


Heseltine, Michael
Moate, Roger
Thatcher, Rt Hon Margaret


Higgins, Terence L.
Montgomery, Fergus
Thomas, Rt Hon P. (Hendon S)


Hooson, Emlyn
Moore, John (Croydon C)
Thompson, George


Howe, Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey
Morgan-Giles, Rear-Admiral
Thorpe, Rt Hon Jeremy (N Devon)


Howells, Geraint (Cardigan)
Morrison, Charles (Devizes)
Townsend, Cyril D.


Hunt, John
Morrison, Hon Peter (Chester)
Tugendhat, Christopher


Hurd, Douglas
Mudd, David
Vaughan, Dr Gerard


Hutchison, Michael Clark
Neave, Airey
Wainwright, Richard (Colne V)


Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)
Neubert, Michael
Wakeham, John


Irving, Charles (Cheltenham)
Page, John (Harrow West)
Warren, Kenneth


James, David
Page, Rt Hon R. Graham (Crosby)
Watt, Hamish


Jessel, Toby
Parkinson, Cecil
Weatherill, Bernard


Johnson Smith, G. (E. Grinstead)
Penhaligon, David
Welsh, Andrew


Jones, Arthur (Daventry)
Percival, Ian
Young, Sir G. (Ealing, Acton)


Jopling, Michael
Prior, Rt Hon James



Kaberry, Sir Donald
Rathbone, Tim
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Kershaw, Anthony
Ridley, Hon Nicholas
Mr Adam Butler and


King, Tom (Bridgwater)
Rifkind, Malcolm
Mr. Spencer Le Marchant.



Roberts, Michael (Cardiff NW)





NOES


Allaun, Frank
Davies, Denzil (Llanelli)
Hughes, Rt Hon C. (Anglesey)


Anderson, Donald
Davies, Ifor (Gower)
Hughes, Mark (Durham)


Armstrong, Ernest
Dean, Joseph (Leeds West)
Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)


Ashton, Joe
de Freitas, Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey
Hughes, Roy (Newport)


Atkins, Ronald (Preston N)
Delargy, Hugh
Irving, Rt Hon S. (Dartford)


Atkinson, Norman
Dempsey, James
Jackson, Colin (Brighouse)


Bagier, Gordon A. T.
Doig, Peter
Jackson, Miss Margaret (Lincoln)


Bates, Alf
Dormand, J. D.
Janner, Greville


Bennett, Andrew (Stockport N.)
Duffy, A. E. P.
Jay, Rt Hon Douglas


Bidwell, Sydney
Dunn, James A.
Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)


Blenkinsop, Arthur
Edge, Geoff
Jenkins, Rt Hon Roy (Stechford)


Booth, Albert
Edwards, Robert (Wolv SE)
Jones, Alec (Rhondda)


Boothroyd, Miss Betty
Ellis, Tom (Wrexham)
Jones, Barry (East Flint)


Bottomley, Rt Hon Arthur
English, Michael
Jones, Dan (Burnley)


Boyden, James (Bish Auck)
Evans, Ioan (Aberdare)
Kaufman, Gerald


Bray, Dr Jeremy
Evans, John (Newton)
Kerr, Russell


Brown, Ronald (Hackney S)
Ewing, Harry (Stirling)
Kilroy-Silk, Robert


Buchan, Norman
Fernyhough, Rt Hon E.
Lambie, David


Buchanan, Richard
Flannery, Martin
Lamborn, Harry


Butler, Mrs Joyce (Wood Green)
Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)
Lamond, James


Callaghan, Jim (Middleton &amp; P)
Ford, Ben
Lee, John


Campbell, Ian
Forrester, John
Lestor, Miss Joan (Eton &amp; Slough)


Canavan, Dennis
Fowler, Gerald (The Wrekin)
Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)


Cant, R. B.
Fraser, Rt Hon H. (Stafford &amp; St)
Lipton, Marcus


Carter-Jones, Lewis
Garrett, W. E. (Wallsend)
Litterick, Tom


Castle, Rt Hon Barbara
George, Bruce
Lomas, Kenneth


Clemitson, Ivor
Gilbert, Dr John
Loyden, Eddie


Cocks, Michael (Bristol S)
Golding, John
Luard, Evan


Cohen, Stanley
Gourlay, Harry
Mabon, Dr J. Dickson


Coleman, Donald
Graham, Ted
McElhone, Frank


Colquhoun, Mrs Maureen
Grant, George (Morpeth)
MacFarquhar, Roderick


Conlan, Bernard
Grant, John (Islington C)
McGuire, Michael (Ince)


Corbett, Robin
Hamilton, James (Bothwell)
Mackenzie, Gregor


Cox, Thomas (Tooting)
Hamilton, W. W. (Central Fife)
Mackintosh, John P.


Craigen, J. M. (Maryhill)
Hardy, Peter
Madden, Max


Crawshaw, Richard
Harper, Joseph
Marks, Kenneth


Crosland, Rt Hon Anthony
Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)
Marquand, David


Cryer, Bob
Hatton, Frank
Marshall, Dr Edmund (Goole)


Cunningham, G. (Islington S)
Hayman, Mrs Helena
Maynard, Miss Joan


Cunningham, Dr J. (Whiteh)
Heffer, Eric S.
Meacher, Michael


Dalyell, Tam
Horam, John
Mellish, Rt Hon Robert


Davidson, Arthur
Hoyle, Doug (Nelson)
Mendelson, John


Davies, Bryan (Enfield N)
Huckfield, Les
Mikardo, Ian







Millan, Bruce
Rooker, J. W.
Tomlinson, John


Miller, Dr M. S. (E Kilbride)
Roper, John
Tomney, Frank


Mitchell, R. C. (Solon, Itchen)
Rose, Paul B.
Tuck, Raphael


Murray, Rt Hon Ronald King
Ross, Rt Hon W. (Kilmarnock)
Wainwright, Edwin (Dearne V)


Newens, Stanley
Rowlands, Ted
Walker, Terry (Kingswood)


Noble, Mike
Sandelson, Neville
Wellbeloved, James


Ovenden, John
Selby, Harry
White, Frank R. (Bury)


Palmer, Arthur
Silkin, Rt Hon S. C. (Dulwich)
White, James (Pollock)


Park, George
Silverman, Julius
Willey, Rt Hon Frederick


Parker, John
Skinner, Dennis
Williams, Alan (Swansea W)


Pavitt, Laurie
Small, William
Williams, Alan Lee (Hornch'ch)


Pendry, Tom
Spearing, Nigel
Williams, Rt Hon Shirley (Hertford)'


Phipps, Dr Colin
Spriggs, Leslie
Williams, W. T. (Warrington)


Prescott, John
Stewart, Rt Hon M. (Fulham)
Wise, Mrs Audrey


Price, C. (Lewisham W)
Stott, Roger
Woodall, Alec


Price, William (Rugby)
Strang, Gavin
Wrigglesworth, Ian


Radice, Giles
Strauss, Rt Hon G. R.
Young, David (Bolton E)


Rees, Rt Hon Merlyn (Leeds S)
Summerskill, Hon Dr Shirley



Richardson, Miss Jo
Taylor, Mrs Arm (Bolton W)
TELLERS FOR THE NOES


Roberts, Albert (Normanton)
Thomas, Ron (Bristol NW)
Mr. David Stoddart and


Robertson, John (Paisley)
Thorne, Stan (Preston South)
Mr. John Ellis


Roderick, Caerwyn
Tierney, Sydney



Rodgers, George (Chorley)
Tinn, James

Question accordingly negatived.

Main Question put:—

Division No. 238.]
AYES
[4.55 p.m.


Allaun, Frank
Edwards, Robert (Wolv SE)
Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)


Anderson, Donald
Ellis, Tom (Wrexham)
Lipton, Marcus


Armstrong, Ernest
English, Michael
Litterick, Tom


Ashton, Joe
Evans, Ioan (Aberdare)
Lomas, Kenneth


Atkins, Ronald (Preston N)
Evans, John (Newton)
Luard, Evan


Bagier, Gordon A. T.
Ewing, Harry (Stirling)
Mabon, Dr J. Dickson


Bain, Mrs Margaret
Ewing, Mrs Winifred (Moray)
MacCormick, Iain


Bates, Alf
Faulds, Andrew
McElhone, Frank


Bennett, Andrew (Stockport N.)
Fernyhough, Rt Hon E.
MacFarquhar, Roderick


Blenkinsop, Arthur
Flannery, Martin
McGuire, Michael (Ince)


Boardman, H.
Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)
Mackenzie, Gregor


Booth, Albert
Ford, Ben
Mackintosh, John P.


Boothroyd, Miss Betty
Forrester, John
Madden, Max


Bottomley, Rt Hon Arthur
Fowler, Gerald (The Wrekin)
Marks, Kenneth


Boyden, James (Bish Auck)
Fraser, John (Lambeth, N'w'd)
Marquand, David


Bray, Dr Jeremy
Garrett, W. E. (Wallsend)
Marshall, Dr Edmund (Goole)


Brown, Ronald (Hackney S)
George, Bruce
Maynard, Miss Joan


Buchan, Norman
Gilbert, Dr John
Meacher, Michael


Buchanan, Richard
Golding, John
Mellish, Rt Hon Robert


Butler, Mrs Joyce (Wood Green)
Gourlay, Harry
Mendelson, John


Callaghan, Jim (Middleton &amp; P)
Graham, Ted
Millan, Bruce


Campbell, Ian
Grant, George (Morpeth)
Miller, Dr M. S. (E Kilbride)


Canavan, Dennis
Grant, John (Islington C)
Mitchell, R. C. (Soton, Itchen)


Cant, R. B.
Hamilton, James (Bothwell)
Murray, Rt Hon Ronald King


Carter-Jones, Lewis
Hamilton, W. W. (Central Fife)
Newens, Stanley


Castle, Rt Hon Barbara
Hardy, Peter
Noble, Mike


Clemitson, Ivor
Harper, Joseph
Ovenden, John


Cocks, Michael (Bristol S)
Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)
Palmer, Arthur


Cohen, Stanley
Hatton, Frank
Park, George


Coleman, Donald
Hayman, Mrs Helene
Parker, John


Conlan, Bernard
Heffer, Eric S.
Pavitt, Laurie


Corbett, Robin
Henderson, Douglas
Pendry, Tom


Cox, Thomas (Tooting)
Horam, John
Prescott, John


Craigen, J. M. (Maryhill)
Hoyle, Doug (Nelson)
Price, C. (Lewisham W)


Crawford, Douglas
Huckfield, Les
Price, William (Rugby)


Crawshaw, Richard
Hughes, Rt Hon C. (Anglesey)
Radice, Giles


Crosland, Rt Hon Anthony
Hughes, Mark (Durham)
Rees, Rt Hon Merlyn (Leeds S)


Cryer, Bob
Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)
Roberts, Albert (Normanton)


Cunningham, G. (Islington S)
Hughes, Roy (Newport)
Robertson, John (Paisley)


Cunningham, Dr J. (Whiteh)
Jackson, Colin (Brighouse)
Roderick, Caerwyn


Dalyell, Tam
Jackson, Miss Margaret (Lincoln)
Rodgers, George (Chorley)


Davidson, Arthur
Janner, Greville
Rooker, J. W.


Davies, Bryan (Enfield N)
Jay, Rt Hon Douglas
Roper, John


Davies, Denzil (Llanelli)
Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)
Rose, Paul B.


Davies, Ifor (Gower)
Jones, Alec (Rhondda)
Ross, Rt Hon W. (Kilmarnock)


Dean, Paul (N Somerset)
Jones, Barry (East Flint)
Sandelson, Neville


de Freitas, Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey
Jones, Dan (Burnley)
Silkin, Rt Hon S. C. (Dulwich)


Delargy, Hugh
Kaufman, Gerald
Silverman, Julius


Dempsey, James
Kilroy-Silk, Robert
Small, William


Doig, Peter
Lambie, David
Spearing, Nigel


Duffy, A. E. P.
Lamborn, Harry
Spriggs, Leslie


Dunn, James A.
Lamond, James
Stewart, Donald (Western Isles)


Edge, Geoff
Lestor, Miss Joan (Eton &amp; Slough)
Stewart, Rt Hon M. (Fulham)

The House divided: Ayes 185, Noes 6.

Stoddart, David
Tomney, Frank
Williams, Rt Hon Shirley (Hertford)


Stott, Roger
Wainwright, Edwin (Dearne V)
Williams, W. T. (Warrington)


Strang, Gavin
Walker, Terry (Kingswood)
Wise, Mrs Audrey


Strauss, Rt Hon G. R.
Watt, Hamish
Woodall, Alec


Summerskill, Hon Dr Shirley
Welsh, Andrew
Wrigglesworth, Ian


Taylor, Mrs Ann (Bolton W)
White, Frank R. (Bury)
Young, David (Bolton E)


Thompson, George
White, James (Pollock)



Tierney, Sydney
Willey, Rt Hon Frederick
TELLERS FOR THE AYES


Tinn, James
Williams, Alan (Swansea W)
Mr. John Ellis and


Tomlinson, John
Williams, Alan Lee (Hornch'ch)
Mr. J. D. Dormand.




NOES


Bidwell, Sydney
Selby, Harry
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Colquhoun, Mrs Maureen
Skinner, Dennis
Mr. Ian Mikardo and


Richardson, Miss Jo
Thomas, Ron (Bristol NW)
Mr. Stan Thorne.

Question accordingly agreed to.

Ordered,
That the Order of 12th May be supplemented by substituting the following paragraph for paragraph 2:—

Report and Third Reading

2.—(1) The Proceedings on Consideration and Third Reading of the Bill shall be completed in three allotted days and shall be brought to a conclusion at Eleven o'clock on the last of those days: and for the purposes of Standing Order No. 43 (Business Committee) this Order shall be taken to allot to the Proceedings on Consideration such part

of those days as the Resolution of the Business Committee may determine.

(2) The Business Committee shall report to the House their Resolutions as to the Proceedings on Consideration of the Bill, and as to the allocation of time between those Proceedings and Proceedings on Third Reading not later than 23rd June.

(3) The Resolutions in any report made under Standing Order No. 43 (Business Committee) may be varied by a further report so made, whether before or after 23rd June, and whether or not the Resolutions have been agreed to by the House.

(4) The Resolution of the Business Committee may include alterations in the order in which Proceedings on Consideration of the Bill are taken'.

Orders of the Day — SEX DISCRIMINATION BILL

As amended (in the Standing Committee), considered

New Clause 1

DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES

(1) In this section "discriminatory practice" means the application of a requirement or condition which results or could result in an act of discrimination which is unlawful by virtue of any provision of Part II or 111 taken with section 1(1)(b) or 3(1)(b).

(2) A person acts in contravention of this section if and so long as—

(a) he applies a discriminatory practice, or
(b) he operates practices or other arrangements which in any circumstances can call for the application by him of a discriminatory practice.

(3) Proceedings in respect of a contravention of this section shall be brought only by the Commission in accordance with sections 61 to 65 of this Act.—[Mr. John Fraser.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

5.8 p.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for Employment (Mr. John Fraser): I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. George Thomas): It would be for the convenience of the House to discuss at the same time amendment (a), leave out 'or could result'.

Mr. Fraser: When we set about the preparation of this Bill we had to answer two basic questions. The first was: what kind of discrimination should be outlawed? The second question was: how should the law be enforced? Our response to the first question was broad. We decided that the net of the Bill should be wide and that the mesh of the net should be fine. In other words, we were not prepared to attract only one area of relationships, for instance in employment, as our predecessors had been, but determined to extend the Bill by including enforcement provisions to education, goods, facilities and services. In other words, we decided that the Bill should have a comprehensive coverage in defining the areas

of discrimination which would be attacked.
We went even further than that. The Bill not merely outlaws overt, deliberate, intentional discrimination but, under Clause 1(1)(b) and Clause3(b)(i), invades those areas of unconscious discrimination where the sheer absence of thought militates against equal opportunities for men and women. We also dealt with the seemingly innocent devices which might have the same effect. We introduced into the Bill a second concept of discrimination—the concept of the effects test. If a person imposes an unjustifiable test, which has the effect, whether it was intended or not, of excluding women, that practice or habit of behaviour should also amount to discrimination. I believe that to be right, because it is no comfort to a woman who is denied an equal opportunity to say that it occurred only because the employer, the banker or whoever it might be had given the matter no thought.
Now, having introduced that concept of the innocent, perhaps unmeaning discrimination, we come to a problem which the clause is intended to solve. It is that the unintended discrimination may be so deeply entrenched or so overwhelmingly effective that it is practically invisible and, therefore, may not give rise to any single individual complaint. In other words, there may be an underworld of discriminatory practices of which no woman is aware. There may be no individual complaints and the discriminatory practice may, therefore, continue. The clause, therefore, defines the discriminatory practice and it gives the Equal Opportunities Commission the power to seek out those practices which might otherwise never see the light of day.
I come now to the second question which I posed at the beginning of my speech concerning how the law should be enforced. We believe that it is not enough to rely on individual enforcement. We need a powerful body like the Equal Opportunities Commission to do that, and the clause, therefore, seeks to give the commission power to seek out, investigate and prevent these discriminatory practices.

Mr. Greville Janner: Will my hon. Friend indicate the practical, invisible practice in respect of which there have been no complaints which he


intends to ban as a result of this remarkable clause?

Mr. Fraser: Perhaps I may give an example. My hon. and learned Friend is a member of the Bar. He may be a member of chambers where the taking of people into chambers is done on the old boy network. Perhaps it is done in the Wig and Pen Club, but I do not know whether that club has women members. Nevertheless, it is done in such a way that no woman is ever offered the opportunity to go into a set of chambers. This may be an extreme example, but perhaps the practice is operated by the head of the chambers or someone like that in such a way that it never gives a woman a chance to make an individual complaint. If that sort of practice were widespread it would be right that the commission should look out for it even though there is no individual complaint and should be able, as it will under later clauses, to issue a non-discrimination notice to bring the issue to an end. I hope that example will suffice for my hon. and learned Friend.
If we omit the new clause there will be a gaping hole in the Bill because we shall be enhancing that commandment "Thou shalt not be found out", because an employer who is not found out on an individual complaint could continue his discriminatory practices, and it would, in effect, constitute a defence to say that there was no individual complaint.
It is, therefore, right where these entrenched practices exist, which never come to the attention of an individual woman so that she may make an individual complaint, to give the commission the power to seek out these practices and issue a non-discrimination notice. It is not enough, as we have learnt in the case of race relations, to rely on individual complaints.

5.15 p.m.

Mr. Michael Alison: I have two simple points to make, and I hope that the hon. and learned Member for Leicester West (Mr. Janner), who is an old debating partner of mine, will apply his mind, particularly while considering the argument about the clause, to Amendment No. 3, which the Government will be moving later. The effect of that amendment is such as to make it

impossible for unintentional discrimination to arise unless there has been an individual complaint.
It is almost incredible that the Government should bring forward a new clause designed to have an omnibus, broadcast effect upon possible entrenched habits of discrimination of a generalised kind as operated by particular employers, when they explicitly argue that Clause 1(1)(b), which defines unintentional discrimination, should be amended to provide that such discrimination takes place only when something is demanded to the detriment of a complainant because the complainant cannot comply with that demand.
Unless there has been an individual complaint the whole of the operation of subsection (1)(b) is rendered inoperative by the Government's amendment. It is ludicrous that the Government should be bringing forward a clause with the object of enabling the Equal Opportunities Commission and all those concerned in these matters to make generalised discrimination notices or anything they like in the absence of individual complaints, when they are proposing an amendment to make the individual complaint the only basis upon which Clause 1 can operate. This is entirely contradictory and the Government must come clean about it.
The Government cannot have it both ways. They cannot say, on the one hand, that an individual complaint is necessary before the clause can operate and also say that they want the Bill to work in such a way that even when no individual complaints arise it is possible to determine that a discriminatory practice has taken place.
I must ask the Minister seriously to consider Amendment (a), in which we try to eliminate the hypothetical phraseology "or could result". I can give the Minister three cases in which a sudden hypothetical situation might arise. A firm might do one of three things. Let us assume that it is going to open another factory in another part of the country. It might require the willingness of workers of either sex to move to that part of the country. It might require employees, if it is going into a new line of production, to undergo a three-month course of residential training, and it might require women to be promoted to supervisory grades and that such women should have had industrial experience.
It may in practice be impossible for the majority of women to comply with any of these three requirements. For example, they might not be able to move to the North or wherever the factory was planned because their husbands were working in the South and that was where their homes were. They might not be able to go on a residential course of training because they were housewives with children and a home to look after. They might not be able to accept promotion to a supervisory grade because they were debarred by the Factories Acts from working on the factory floor.
As the Bill stands, as amended, none of the situations with which the majority of women might not be able to comply would have any operative effect unless an individual woman said "I cannot comply with this because it is to my detriment". Only when she has made an individual complaint, according to the Government's later amendment, will it be possible to consider whether the discriminatory practice is necessary and whether the majority of women should comply with it. It can be triggered off only if an individual woman makes an individual complaint.
If the hypothetical phrase "or could result" were left in the Bill, a hypothetical discriminatory practice could exist whenever a factory changed its working practice, removed to another part of the country or engaged in a new product process. A hypothetical possibility of discrimination would remain until the last individual woman who might possibly be involved had had a chance to register her individual complaint that it was to her individual detriment.
It is far too uncertain a proposal to encumber practically every employer, on any change of working practice or location of factory, with this new hypothetical misdemeanour of a discriminatory practice which cannot be said to be discriminatory or non-discriminatory until the last stage of a test case on the last woman's individual circumstances has been determined.
The clause is sweeping, ineffective and contradictory, but if it is allowed to go through I hope that the Minister will make it less hypothetical by accepting our amendment to it.

Mr. Greville Janner: I hope that the House will permit me to spend a moment or two in dealing with the argument put forward by my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State about the comprehensive coverage which the clause is intended to give. The very extent of that coverage requires us not merely to consider the situation of every woman but to bear in mind what is at present going on in the Committee dealing with the Employment Protection Bill. We are asked to accept a clause which is very wide at a time when equal rights for women are being pursued to such an extent that a woman will be less likely to be employed when she is in competition with a man for the same job. The clause worries me not only because it is too hypothetical—although that is a worry—but especially because of its effect when combined with other measures. The House deals with each measure in turn, but that does not mean that we should regard each measure in isolation.
Under the law as it stands, on 29th December women are to receive equal pay, which is quite right. It is about time they did, and most of us have campaigned for it. Already women are entitled to retire at 60, whereas men have to battle on until they are 65. That is wrong, in my view, but it cannot be helped. It is nevertheless a matter that employers must take into account.
Women are to obtain maternity benefits. They will be allowed six weeks on full pay each time they leave work to have a baby. That is quite right, and industry will absorb the cost. Women will be entitled to return to the same job if they decide that they want to come back at any time within 29 weeks of their confinement. Meanwhile the employer has to sack the replacement, which will be unfair unless the replacement was told when she was taken on that she would be sacked if and when the person she was to replace decided to come back. That will cause great difficulty.
Above all, employers who want to employ women—and they are the employers we want to bolster up—will be faced with a plethora of potential industrial tribunal procedures which will be devastating in their extent particularly if they are extended beyond individual


complaints into the realms of hypothetical uncertainty. In my experience—which is wide because I have been lecturing and talking to people concerned with personnel all over the country for several months—that is what is worrying people more than anything else. The people who are worried are those who are anxious that women should be employed on an equal basis and want to see extended the narrow footing which women already have in executive jobs.
I ask my hon. Friend to consider carefully whether the total result of the Bill at a time of high unemployment will not be that women—whom we are attempting to help—will find themselves discriminated against because such a high premium will be placed on the employment of men. When there is a choice between men and women for certain jobs, it will be so much easier and cheaper to employ men than women that I wonder whether women will not become so much more equal than men that it will be too easy to employ a man and too difficult to employ a woman.
I shall not vote against the clause or in favour of the amendment because if my hon. Friends, whom I greatly respect among the all too few women Members of Parliament, believe that this is the way to go ahead, it is their responsibility. Equally, I believe that it is my responsibility, although it may lead to some unhappiness amongst my friends and difficulties amongst those I love best, to point out that the Bill may be going so far as to produce exactly the opposite result to that which is intended by all concerned.

Mr. Dudley Smith: I owe the House an explanation for my failure to take part in the Second Reading debate. On that day I was returning from Government business abroad.
I was much concerned with a similar Bill when the Conservatives were in office. Although the Bill is different in many respects from that which we proposed, the essence is there and so is the good will. Surely, individual and collective complaints of sex discrimination must be of the essence of the Bill. Unless the Bill is founded on that principle it will not generate the understanding which we hope to get from the public.
Let us not deceive ourselves. The passing of the Bill will not overnight make everyone 100 per cent. in favour of it. If we accept the new clause without the amendment, the enforcement body will take on the role of hunting for trouble and looking around for every possible situation to exploit. Although that might assist and fill with enthusiasm Women's Libbers and extremists, it will undermine the confidence of people of good will who are prepared to do what they can to see that the Bill operates sensibly and favours women who are at present in certain respects discriminated against.
I agree with the hon. and learned Member for Leicester, West (Mr. Janner) that an extra liability will be put on industry at a time when it has many problems to deal with, among them equal pay. If industry finds itself harried by hypothetical cases it is likely to turn against the Bill.

Mr. Greville Janner: I did not say that I thought it would impose an extra liability on industry. I said that I was afraid that industry might not accept a woman when there was a male alternative, particularly in such areas as Leicester which I represent where a great many women are employed and where already, unhappily, there is a high level of unemployment.

Mr. Smith: I apologise for misunderstanding the hon. and learned Gentleman. I also agree with the argument that he has just put forward. The Bill will impose an extra burden on industry and it could well do without this clause, while at the same time showing the right attitude to the spirit of what is being proposed.
The example given by the Under-Secretary of State was particularly weak. I hope that he will advance far better examples. Other hon. Members will know better than I do the arrangements that are made in barristers' chambers, but let us consider the hon. Gentleman's example. I cannot imagine barristers' chambers getting away for long with a situation in which women are excluded. Surely after a short while there would be enough women barristers, or would-be women barristers, to raise such a case before the commission. The result would be that the situation could be investigated.
5.30 p.m.
If we are to get the public in the right frame of mind to accept the Bill, and if we are to create good will, we cannot have this hypothetical situation. If we do not adopt what my hon. Friend suggests I think that this part of the Bill will smack of authoritarianism. If we take the example of race relations, which, as a member of the Select Committee, I have been studying here and in other countries, and which we in the House have been studying in previous legislation, it is clear that they have been founded on the idea of the genuine complaint which is well founded and which can be remedied. If we start getting into the realms of hypothesis we are in for trouble.
I am sure that the Government intend the new clause to be accepted as a measure of good will, but they will find themselves up against a great deal of discrimination. It will arise because of the kind of legislation which has been drafted.

Mr. Ivor Stanbrook: The new clause illustrates the nonsense which is in the whole Bill, and particularly in the illustration which has been given to us by the Under-Secretary of State. If a set of barristers' chambers decide to have a meeting to consider a new recruit it may be that a score of members will discuss the merits of the new recruit. In many cases, if not in most cases, it is the black ball rule which applies. Any new recruit who happens to be a woman might be excluded because one or more members of the chamber prefer not to have her as a new member. It seems that the application of the new clause is to allow the commission to investigate precisely what went on at the meeting and what went on in the mind of the one person responsible for the exclusion of the recruit.
In that way the whole matter becomes a nonsense. It means that the commission will have to investigate details of individual cases when apparently no complaint has been made. It will have to do so in an atmosphere in which it will be difficult to obtain information.

Mr. Ian Gilmour: I take up what my hon. Friends have said about the example that has been given to us by the Under-Secretary of State. When the Minister was challenged by the hon. and learned

Member for Leicester, West (Mr. Janner), he said that it would be wrong if vacancies were filled at the "Wig and Pen". Is he saying that under the new clause every set of chambers which has a vacancy will have to advertise in the law journals, and that if they do not do so they will be guilty of discriminatory practice? Presumably the Minister must have something in his mind of the sort of practice that he envisages. I ask the Minister to give the House a plausible example. That is something that he has not done so far.

Mrs. Maureen Colquhoun: Does the hon. Gentleman not accept that the examples that have been debated this afternoon are so far from the position of ordinary women in this nation as to make the House of Commons appear absolutely ludicrous and completely out of touch? Does he accept that there are few women concerned with what is happening in barristers' chambers? The great majority are concerned with the realities in living their lives as human beings and in living their lives in a better way. So far the whole debate has been so shallow and inhuman, as it relates to women, that I feel that it was not worth coming into the Chamber to take part.

Mr. Gilmour: We welcome the return of the hon. Member for Northampton, North (Mrs. Colquhoun). I think that the hon. Lady has been ill. We are pleased to see her back. I agree with what she has said. The only example that has been given this afternoon is that produced by the Under-Secretary of State. I thank the hon. Lady for making my point so much better than I could make it. The hon. Gentleman has given a totally unreal example. I ask him to give a genuine example of what he has in mind. If he cannot do so, there can be no justification for the new clause.

Mr. John Fraser: I am beginning to regret that I responded spontaneously to the attack of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Leicester, West (Mr. Janner). Perhaps the Bar example was far removed from the experience of most women, but it might not have been so far removed from the experience of my hon. and learned Friend. If it did not commend itself to the House I shall try to provide some other examples.
It may be that someone who advertises appointments requires that a person filling a vacancy shall have been an ex-Service man. If, for the sake of argument, this requirement is unjustifiable, having regard to the nature of the job, and far fewer women than men can apply for it, the application of the requirement would come under the new clause in terms of discriminatory practice.
There may be other examples. I have in mind an employer who refuses to promote people unless they have had a period of continuous service. It may be that the women working in that employer's factory are prone to be away from work for a number of months because they have children. For the sake of argument, it may be that the continuous service requirement is not justifiable. It may be that the women never complain about it and chose to accept it. Under those circumstances the Equal Opportunities Commission can use its influence and its powers to issue a non-discrimination notice and to change that particular practice.

Mr. Alison: The hon. Gentleman is still not addressing himself to the fact that, as he is proposing to amend the Bill, Clause 1(1)(b), which is specified and referred to in the new clause, will in future provide that a woman has to make an individual complaint before the matter becomes operative.

Mr. Fraser: I have the defect that I deal with only one point at a time. I intended to come to that point. As I have said before, the Bar example may be somewhat extreme. Indeed, I think that I conceded that it was when I put it before the House. However, there may be other instances where the promotion or appointment of people to important executive posts takes place under arrangements where no woman ever gets to learn of the vacancy. It is that kind of practice that we want to allow the commission to investigate. If that is not the position we shall be putting a premium on the employer not being found out and not inviting an individual complaint.

Mr. Clement Freud: I do not want to talk about hypothetical situations any more than is necessary, but is the Minister suggesting that there would

be an instance of discrimination if a woman tried to join the Corps of Commissionaires and was not accepted? It would seem to me that an ex-Service man when specified is specified either for bravery or for his decoration ability.

Mr. Fraser: The essential test is whether the requirement is justifiable. The issue is not simply that the requirement is one that cannot be complied with by women. To make out a case one has to prove that the requirement is not justified. There may be some confusion when the requirement to be an ex-Service man or an ex-policeman is justifiable. If it is a justifiable requirement, that is the end of the matter. However, if the requirement is not justifiable and if it discriminates against women, there will be a discriminatory practice under Section 1(1)(b) or Section 3(1)(b).

Mr. A. P. Costain: The Minister is getting into deeper water. Let us say that the employer wants to employ his quota of disabled ex-Service men and it turns out that there are not enough disabled ex-Service women, does the position that he has outlined still apply?

Mr. Fraser: Again the answer I have given is that there is always the test that the requirement is justified.

Mr. Greville Janner: Mr. Greville Janner rose——

Mr. Fraser: May I deal with my hon. and learned Friend's first point before he makes a new point. He said that we should not agree to the clause because women are favourably treated under a series of Acts of Parliament and that we should not add to this provision. Frankly, I cannot understand his argument. We have always said that the Bill is an essential complement to the Equal Pay Act. If equal pay means that employers may wish to discriminate against women because they are entitled to equal pay, the Bill is an essential complement to that Act to ensure that discrimination does not take place. I did not follow my hon. and learned Friend's logic.
The hon. Member for Barkston Ash (Mr. Alison) said that the clause cannot apply because there has to be an individual complaint to establish unintentional discrimination under Clauses 1 (1)


(b) and 3 (1) (b). It is right that if a complaint is brought under either provision there must be an individual complaint. That is the reason why in drafting the clause we used the words "could result" in the second line and used the word "can" towards the end of the first line of para (b). Therefore, I am surprised that the hon. Gentleman wants to take out the word "could" since it is essential to the working of the clause. Without that word the provision could not operate at all.
The hon. Gentleman said that by using the word "could" we might create a wide and hypothetical situation. On that point, the hon. Gentleman's argument has some merit. It could import too wide a risk that employers and others might be charged with discriminatory practices. Therefore, if the House will accept the clause as drafted, my colleagues and I will look at the wording to see whether there is that wide connotation. I hope that, with that explanation, the House will accept the clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time and added to the Bill.

New Clause 2

EXCEPTION FOR VOLUNTARY BODIES

.—(1) This section applies to a body—

(a) the activities of which are carried on otherwise than for profit, and
(b) which was not set up by any enactment.

(2) Sections 29(1) and 30 shall not be construed as rendering unlawful—

(a) the restriction of membership of any such body to persons of one sex (disregarding any minor exceptions), or
(b) the provision of benefits, facilities or services to members of any such body where the membership is so restricted,
even though membership of the body is open to the public, or to a section of the public.

(3) Nothing in section 29 or 30 shall—

(a) be construed as affecting a provision to which this subsection applies, or
(b) render unlawful an act which is done in order to give effect to such a provision.

(4) Subsection (3) applies to a provision for conferring benefits on persons of one sex only (disregarding any benefits to persons of the opposite sex which are exceptional or are relatively insignificant), being a provision which

constitutes the main object of a body within subsection (1).—[Dr. Summerskill.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

5.45 p.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Dr. Shirley Summerskill): I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Speaker: With this clause, it will be convenient to take Government Amendment No. 43.

Dr. Summerskill: The effect of the new clause is to widen the exception from Clauses 29 and 30 which subsections (3) and (4) of Clause 33 afford to a voluntary body in respect of those facilities and services which it is the main object of that body to provide on a single-sex basis. The wider exception which the new clause affords includes in its subsections (3) and (4) that which subsections (3) and (4) of Clause 33 provide and the definition in subsection (1) of the new clause of the bodies to which the wider exception applies—for example, to non-profit making, non-statutory bodies—is precisely the same as that contained in subsection (4) of Clause 33. Amendment No. 43 has accordingly been tabled to delete subsections (3) and (4) of Clause 33, which are no longer required. The extent to which the new clause widens the voluntary bodies exception from Clauses 29 and 30 is to be found in subsection (2).

Mr. Greville Janner: Will my hon. Friend be kind enough to explain why voluntary bodies should be entitled to discriminate when others are not entitled to do so?

Dr. Summerskill: I wonder whether my hon. and learned Friend will wait until the argument develops a little before putting his points?
The House will recall what was said in paragraph 67 of the White Paper:
There is also a need to make provision for some single-sex institutions and organisations whose objects and activities are designed for members of one sex. Many such institutions and organisations have charitable status or are private clubs and would, therefore, not be affected by the Bill in any event. However, the Bill will not affect other single sex voluntary associations (except those connected with employment and related matters).
The widening of the voluntary bodies exception, which, hon. Members will note, does not apply to the employment and related provisions of the Bill but only to


Clauses 29 and 30, is to give full effect to that undertaking in the White Paper. The Government believe that voluntary bodies should be able to avail themselves of an exception not only as regards the facilities and services which it is their main object to provide on a single-sex basis, but also as regards their essential character as organisations whose membership is confined to one sex.
There are two kinds of facilities and services which voluntary bodies may provide. One kind consists of facilities and services which may be available only to members—including, in a sense membership itself; the other kind consists of those which may be provided to nonmembers. There will often, of course, be a relationship between membership and the kind of facility or service which an organisation provides to non-members. A voluntary body which exists, for example, to help women in some way may well have, and may well wish to have, a membership which is confined to women. If Parliament were to say to such a body that, even though it may continue to restrict the help which it affords to women who are not members, it may not confine its membership to women, we should run the risk, which I believe we should find unacceptable, of discouraging worthwhile voluntary activities of this kind.
The new clause would also safeguard the position of voluntary bodies, membership of which is open to the public or a section of the public, but only to women or to men, as the case may be. Organisations of this kind may exist for a variety of reasons, or serve a variety of causes, which may or may not in themselves require membership to be confined to one sex. However, they do not operate in the employment field or affect people's livelihoods. The Government take the view that if a single-sex body is a genuinely voluntary organisation there is no real justification—except, as I said in the employment field—for affecting its essential character as a single-sex body.
I hope that I have said enough to persuade the House of the need for the clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time and added to the Bill.

New Clause 3

COMMUNAL ACCOMMODATION

'(1) In this section "communal accommodation" means residential accommodation which includes dormitories or other shared sleeping accommodation which for reasons of privacy or decency should be used by men only, or by women only (but which may include some shared sleeping accommodation for men, and some for women, or some ordinary sleeping accommodation).

(2) In this section "communal accommodation" also includes residential accommodation all or part of which should be used by men only, or by women only, because of the nature of the sanitary facilities serving the accommodation.

(3) Nothing in Part II or III shall render unlawful sex discrimination in the admission of persons to communal accommodation if the accommodation is managed in a way which, given the exigencies of the situation, comes as near as may be to fair and equitable treatment of men and women.

(4) In applying subsection (3) account shall be taken of—

(a) whether and how far it is reasonable to expect that the accommodation should be altered or extended, or that further alternative accommodation should be provided; and
(b) the frequency of the demand or need for use of the accommodation by men as compared with women.

(5) Where failure to offer or provide the use of communal accommodation is an act of sex discrimination under Part II, subsection (3) is no defence unless such arrangements as are reasonably practicable are made to compensate for the detriment.

(6) Nothing in Part II or III shall render unlawful sex discrimination against a woman, or against a man, as respects the provision of any benefit, facility or service if—

(a) the benefit, facility or service cannot properly and effectively be provided except for those using communal accommodation, and
(b) in the relevant circumstances the woman or, as the case may be, the man could lawfully be refused the use of the accommodation by virtue of subsection (3).

(7) Section 25 shall not apply to sex discrimination within subsection (3) or (6).

(8) This section is without prejudice to the generality of section 33(1)(c).—[Dr. Summerskill.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Dr. Summerskill: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The clause would afford a qualified exception to the substantive provisions of the Bill in relation to the provision of


what the clause terms "communal accommodation". As the Bill stands, discrimination in the provision of accommodation is caught principally by Clause 6 relating to discrimination in employment, Clause 22 to discrimination in education, and Clause 29 to discrimination in the provision of goods, services and facilities to the public or a section of the public.
The clause is designed to resolve the potential conflict which arises as regards the provision of communal accommodation between on the one hand the principle of non-discrimination and on the other hand considerations of privacy and propriety. What we have tried to do in the clause is to resolve the conflict without providing a large loophole in the Bill in regard to the important matter of accommodation.
It is important to strike the right balance in this because accommodation is too important a commodity to be placed wholly outside the Bill through the operation of an unqualified propriety and privacy exception. But the unqualified application to it of the principle of nondiscrimination will produce, at best, absurd or wrong results and, at worst positive mischief in the form of the closing down or under-utilisation of what is usually a scarce resource.
To deal with these problems we are proposing in the clause a qualified propriety and privacy exception for communal accommodation which is designed to ensure that men and women seeking such accommodation are treated as fairly and equitably as circumstances allow. I commend the clause to the House.
As a supplementary explanation, subsections (1) and (2) define communal accommodation, and sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) spell out the solution. Subsection (4) provides that in determining whether the provider of communal accommodation has treated men and women as fairly and equitably as possible, the court or tribunal should take account, first, of whether and how far it is reasonable to expect the accommodation to be altered or extended, and, secondly, what the respective demands from men and women for the accommodation are and how the demands may fluctuate over time.
Because of the special importance of equal opportunities in the employment field, the Government have thought it right to be somewhat tougher in this respect. Subsection (5) accordingly provides that the defence in subsection (3) is not available in respect of discrimination under Part II of the Bill unless such arrangements as are reasonably practicable are made by the provider of the accommodation to compensate the members of the sex to whom the accommodation cannot be made available. An employer who provides communal accommodation for his male employees will be able to continue to do so provided he does his best, for example, to find alternative accommodation for his women employees or, where the accommodation is subsidised, to provide them with an appropriate lodging allowance.
To some extent, communal accommodation is already dealt with in the Bill. Clause 33 (1)(c) provides a propriety and privacy exception from Clause 29. Similarly, Clause 26(2) excepts single-sex boarding accommodation in a co-educational school, but it does not apply where the school provides boarding accommodation for both sexes.
There is no communal accommodation exception, however, in Part II. Thus it would, as the Bill stands, be unlawful for an employer to make communal accommodation available to his male employees but not to his female employees, even for reasons of propriety and privacy. Clause 7(2)(c), however, enables him to refuse a woman or man a job where sharing communal accommodation is an essential concomitant of the job and where he cannot be expected to extend or alter the accommodation.
The House will appreciate from what I have said that the Bill does not at present deal comprehensively with the difficulties to which communal accommodation gives rise. I hope the House will agree that it should do so, and agree to the clause, which, I think, deals with the difficulty in the best way possible. I commend the clause to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time and added to the Bill.

New Clause 4

EMPLOYMENT EXEMPTION ORDER

(1) Where at any time the responsible body for an establishment falling within column 1 of the table in section 22 has determined in good faith to secure or preserve a reasonable balance of men and women employed in the establishment, the responsible body may apply to the Commission for an order (an "employment exemption order") authorising discrimination in respect of employment for the period specified in the order.

(2) In determining for the purposes of subsection I above whether a balance is reasonable regard shall be had to all the circumstances and, in particular, to the need to preserve and to increase the opportunities for employment available to women.

(3) During the period specified in the employment exemption order section 6(1)(a) or (c) shall not apply to any employment for the purposes of the establishment specified in such order.

(4) Subsection (3) does not apply if the responsible body contravenes any condition of the employment exemption order.

(5) Except as mentioned in subsection (3) an employment exemption order shall not afford any exemption from liability under this Act.—[Mr. Lane.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. David Lane: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I hope I am in order in inviting the House to join me in congratulating you, Mr. Speaker, on the honorary Doctorate of Law recently conferred on you by the university in my constituency.

Mr. Speaker: I thank the hon. Gentleman, but I am not quite certain how that comes under the heading "Employment exemption order".

Mr. Lane: I was trying to relate it in my next sentence, because it happens that in Cambridge University, and possibly in other places also, there is concern that in one particular respect the Bill may have an effect contrary to what is intended, unless it is made slightly more flexible in the way that the clause is intended to achieve.
The central purpose of the Bill, as I understand it, is to increase employment opportunities for women. The objective of the authorities of Cambridge University, and possibly other educational establishments, is precisely the same—that is, to widen opportunities for employment for women in academic posts;

but the fear is that they will be unable to do so in the years immediately ahead because the Bill will be too rigid in its application.
To explain the background, this is a problem on which the colleges in Cambridge have been in touch with the Department for some time. It was discussed briefly in Standing Committee on 6th May—columns 258 onwards. There was subsequently a meeting at the Department which my constituents greatly appreciated, and I have now had a letter from the former Under-Secretary, the hon. Member for Durham, North-West (Mr. Armstrong), giving the Government's latest view. But the arguments in the hon. Member's letter are not convincing, and I believe that the Government are still not facing up to the main concern here—the aim to have a balance of the sexes in the teaching and tutorial staff during the transitional period while many colleges in the university, which were previously single-sex colleges, are going co-residential.
I do not want to go into detail as I did in Standing Committee, although I stick to all the points I made there. Summarising briefly, most academic posts in the colleges in Cambridge, and possibly other universities, are covered by the employment provisions of the Bill, but they are not at present covered by any of the exceptions in Clause 7. In other words, no discrimination in either direction is to be permitted. The main problem arises in former single-sex colleges in the process of becoming coeducational. The policy in Cambridge is that these colleges should be free to aim at a balance of the sexes among their senior members as well as their junior members, and this seems a commonsense objective which I do not think anyone here would dispute.
Experience has shown that it is not possible to achieve this balance at the senior level through open competition, because the pool—if I may use that expression—of suitably qualified women for teaching and research posts is, regrettably, limited. As a consequence, the Bill, if it is not amended, would tend to freeze the present imbalance until such time, in the fairly distant future, as the improvement of the educational and social opportunities for women has considerably expanded the pool. This


"freezing" situation would surely contradict the basic co-educational aims of the Bill, which all of us, I think, totally support.
So I am urging that an exception should be introduced which would enable men's colleges—and I emphasise men's colleges—turning co-educational to discriminate in favour of women for a limited period. The solution I propose in the clause is to import into the area of employment covered by the Bill a provision similar to Clause 27, which deals with the area of admission of pupils during a similar transitional period.
I think that the drafting and effect of the clause are clear. It is narrowly drawn to deal with what is admittedly a narrow problem, on a transitional basis and with ample safeguards written in. To some extent, too, it follows the American model anti-discrimination Act.
Possibly the Government are nervous about agreeing even to this slight increase in flexibility. They may fear that if they admit a new exception in this case, others may press for similar exceptions or, indeed, take advantage of this one. But if there are parallel situations to the one that I have described outside education, where it may be in practice difficult to get a fair balance of the sexes without transitional scope for discrimination in favour of women, I urge the Government to consider more exceptions to cover those situations, too.
I hope that the Government will accept my clause. If they will not or if they see drafting difficulties, I hope that the Minister will at least undertake to look further into this genuine worry before the Bill is considered in another place.
We shall miss the hon. Member for Durham, North-West, who was always very courteous inside and outside this House in dealing with problems in education, even if we did not always agree with him. In welcoming the hon. Lady, I look forward to a sympathetic reply from her and the fullest undertakings that she can give me.

6.0 p.m.

Mr. Greville Janner: I venture to intervene, although I have not achieved a doctorate in that university, but only a mere Bachelor of Arts plus a small sum

of money—hence what the Americans call "a master's", which is very impressive.
I have always believed it right in an education establishment or anywhere else to pick the best candidate for any job. If there is no woman candidate good enough, then no woman will get the job. On the other hand, if there is a woman who is good enough, she should get the job. There is no "reasonable balance" in respect of the sexes. What is reasonable always depends on who happens to hold the scales.
I suggest that at a university or anywhere else the time has come for applicants for jobs to be treated on their merits. There is no reason why there should be an interim period. The great universities which are advancing in introducing women into the men's colleges slowly, but surely and effectively, should do so as speedily as possible in the realms of the top table and the upper crust. There is no need for an interim period or for a reasonable balance. From here on, the best person to apply should get the job. To quote the curious words of the margin note to Clause 7, there should be an exception only
where sex is a genuine occupational qualification.
I have not heard before that sex is a genuine occupational qualification for being a don.

The Under-Secretary of State for Education and Science (Miss Joan Lestor): I am grateful to the hon. Member for Cambridge (Mr. Lane) and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Leicester, West (Mr. Janner) for what they have said. I have had dealings in the past with the hon. Member for Cambridge. I hope that he will find me as courteous and as sympathetic to what he says as he found my predecessor.
Looking back on the debate in Committee, I see that the hon. Gentleman drew attention to the report on the admission of women members of the university prepared by the Standing Sub-Committee on the Admission of Women. I have looked at the report, and I know that since then officers of my Department have discussed the matters raised in it about


women on the academic stall at Cambridge with the Chairman of the Colleges' Committee and the Chairman of the Standing Sub-Committee. Careful consideration has been given to what has been said.
As the hon. Gentleman said, the argument has been advanced by the Cambridge colleges indicating clearly that their concern is with the position of Fellows. However, the hon. Gentleman's amendment applies to all the establishments set out in Clause 22. Therefore, it would apply to all schools and colleges maintained by local education authorities, to all independent schools, to special schools not maintained by local education authorities and to establishments designated by the Secretary of State as well as to universities.
We have provided in Clause 26 an exception for single-sex educational establishments, but we see no justification for single-sex staffing in a single-sex establishment. Although there may be, as is the custom, more women teachers in a girls' school and more men teachers in a boys' school, there is no educational justification for saying that girls should be taught by women or boys by men. Clause 7(1)(e) provides for the reservation for men or women of those positions providing individuals with personal services promoting their welfare or education which could most effectively be carried out by men or women. For example, it is clearly important that in a mixed school there should be a number of women teachers undertaking a pastoral role. But many subjects can be taught equally well by men or women, and we see no sound reason for attempting to establish or preserve a numerical balance between the two sexes.
I appreciate that the amendment speaks of "a reasonable balance", but this immediately raises the problem of what is "reasonable". Any form of quota would be against the spirit of the Bill.
The employment provisions of the Bill will apply to all universities. Men's colleges will not be able to discriminate against women any more than women's colleges will be able to discriminate against men. I recognise that the report of the Cambridge Standing Sub-Committee concluded:
… it seems unrealistic to suppose that the men's colleges would appoint enough women

to compensate for the loss of opportunities in women's colleges.
This is a judgment that we respect, but, as the number of men's colleges clearly exceeds the number of women's colleges, it seems incontestable that the total employment opportunities for women in the Cambridge colleges will be widened and not diminished by the Bill.
In the light of those comments, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will accept that we have gone into this matter in some depth and with an understanding of what he is trying to achieve. However, I hope, too, that he will feel able to withdraw his clause and accept the situation as we see it.

Mr. Lane: With the leave of the House, may I say that I am grateful for the care which has been taken by the Minister and her advisers? However, I cannot help feeling that they have still not got the real point, which concerns the transitional period.
I shall not delay the House, nor shall I seek to divide it on this clause. However, I should be grateful if the hon. Lady would at least undertake to look further at this point between now and the Bill's arriving in another place. I shall be glad to meet her to discuss this matter, rather than taking up more time on the Floor of the House.

Miss Joan Lestor: I should be happy either in correspondence or in discussion to take up further the hon. Gentleman's point about the transitional period. I cannot give any undertaking, of course, but if the hon. Gentleman cares to pursue it further with me I shall be happy to do so.

Mr. Lane: On that understanding, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 5

CODES OF PRACTICE, GUIDELINES AND RULES OF PRACTICE

(1) The Commissison may issue codes of practice containing such practical guidance as the Commission thinks fit for the purpose of eliminating discrimination and promoting equality of opportunity.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) above, the Commission shall in


one or more codes of practice, guidelines or rules of practice provide practical guidance on the following matters, that is to say—

(a) the steps which employers may take so as to prevent acts of discrimination by their employees;
(b) the content of advertisements, so as to avoid the publication of discriminatory advertisements under section 35 above;
(c) the steps by which bodies responsible for educational establishments (as set out in section 22 above) may avoid discriminatory practices and prevent acts of discrimination in their establishments;
(d) the use and presentation of printed, audio and visual materials that tend to discriminate between the sexes to the detriment of either sex.

(3) When the Commission proposes to issue a code of practice, it shall prepare and publish a draft of that code, shall consider any representations made to it about the draft and may modify the draft accordingly.

(4) If the Commission determines to proceed with the draft, it may thereupon issue the draft as a code of practice with recommendatory effect.

(5) A failure on the part of any person to observe any provision of a code of practice shall not of itself render him liable to any proceedings; but in any proceedings brought under this Act any code of practice issued under this section shall be admissible in evidence, and if any provision of such a code appears to the tribunal or court to be relevant to any question arising in the proceedings it shall be taken into account in determining that question.

(6) If the Commission wishes the draft to have a binding effect, it shall after a period of no less than six months from the date of publication of the draft as a Code of Practice, transmit the draft as Rules of Practice to the Secretary of State who shall, if he approves of it, lay it before both Houses of Parliament.

(7) If within the period of 40 days beginning with the day on which a copy of the draft is laid before each House of Parliament, or, if such copies are laid on different days, whichever is the later of the two days, either House so resolves no further proceedings shall be taken thereon, but without prejudice to the laying before Parliament of a new draft.

(8) In reckoning the period of forty days referred to in subsection (7) above, no account shall be taken of any period during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or during which both Houses are adjourned for more than four days.

(9) If no such resolution is passed as is referred to in subsection (7) above, the Commission shall issue the Rules in the form of the draft and the Rules shall come into effect on such day as the Secretary of State may appoint by order made by statutory instrument.

(10) An order under subsection (9) above may contain such transitional provisions or savings as appear to the Secretary of State to be necessary or expedient in connection

with the Rules of Practice thereby brought into operation.

(11) The Commission may from time to time revise the whole or any part of a Code of Practice or Rules of Practice issued under this section and issue that revised Code or revised Rules, and subsections (3) to (10) above shall apply (with appropriate modifications) to such a revised Code or revised Rules as they apply to the first issue of a Code or Rules.—[Miss Richardson.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Miss Jo Richardson: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Much was said in Committee about the need to try to change the Bill in various aspects and about how we should seek by the Bill to change the existing attitudes towards women and the conditioning to which women have always been subjected, and always seem to be subjected from birth, that their rôle is one thing and that the male rôle is another.
The Bill goes some way towards setting certain legal guidelines, but I should like the Government to accept that we ought to go somewhat further. Therefore, I propose that we should insert a clause laying upon the Equal Opportunities Commission the duty to devise codes of practice, guidelines and rules of practice.

Mr. Greville Janner: The amendment provides that the commission "may issue codes of practice" and gives it power to do so. The requirement strengthens my hon. Friend's case very much.

Miss Richardson: I thank my hon. and learned Friend very much. We need correction on these matters. This is such a lawyers' bill that it is difficult to see one's way through it. I shall try to avoid the same trap.
I want to go further and give the commission the right to issue codes of practice and I would hope that it would take advantage of that right. I want it to have a look at the four matters listed in the clause. I want it, for example, to consider providing guidance on
the steps which employers may take so as to prevent acts of discrimination by their employees".
I want it to issue guidance on
the content of advertisements, so as to avoid the publication of discriminatory advertisements under section 35 above";


also on
the steps by which bodies responsible for educational establishments (as set out in section 22 above) may avoid discriminatory practices and prevent acts of discrimination in their establishments";
and on:
the use and presentation of printed, audio and visual materials that tend to discriminate between the sexes to the detriment of either sex".
Under both the guidelines and the rules of practice of the Equal Opportunities Commission it would be obliged, before taking any action to publish the draft, to consult any interested parties and get their comments and observations and take these into account.
This would affect many employers and many bodies responsible for educational establishments, and those who are responsible also for providing goods, facilities and services; and also let us not forget such things as newspapers which, as we see every day, often tend to classify, by columns of advertisements, sex distinction. After the passage of this Bill they will be uncertain as to what might or might not constitute an unlawful act. It is, therefore, right and proper and only fair that they should receive guidance, and the EOC is the proper body to give it. In doing so the EOC will, in my opinion, be fulfilling its strategic rôle in carrying out the provisions of this Bill.
There is some interesting information on this question of guidelines which some hon. Members may have read in the Department of Employment Manpower Paper No. 12, "Women and Work, Overseas Practice", which lays down guidelines, issued and brought up to date in 1972 by the United States Equal Employment Opportunities Commission. Those guidelines cover very specifically a number of fields including such things as making it unlawful to have separate lines of progression and separate seniority systems in firms, discrimination against married women, and so on. There is a whole list of these in this booklet.
Following the issue of those guidelines some individual firms in the United States have themselves issued guidelines. For example, the firm of McGraw-Hill, the book publishing company, has issued guidelies for its authors and staff members about the kind of language which

ought to be used, not only so that they live within the law but also so that they recondition the public in how women should be thought of. It lists, for example, that instead of saying "Johnnie is a smart lawyer and his wife Betty is a striking brunette" they should say "Johnnie is a shrewd lawyer and Betty is a brilliant musician", or should use, in describing a couple, some phrase which does not divide the sexes in the way they are so frequently divided today. We can take a lesson from what the AEOC has done.

Mr. Dudley Smith: Does the hon. Lady realise that it is rather more important in the United States because the law that she is discussing also governs racial discrimination?

Miss Richardson: That is perfectly true, and I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for drawing the attention of the House to that. Nevertheless, it is important in this country, too. It is important that we should try to lay down guidelines as well so that we can start reconditioning on racial lines as well. I would be in favour of that.
I hope, therefore, that the Government will accept that this new clause could be a very important one which could considerably strengthen the role of the Equal Opportunities Commission and would help in the underlying purpose which, I hope, the Government have.

Mr. Greville Janner: May I first apologise to my hon. Friend for my intervention? It was intended to be helpful, because I regard this as a most sensible and useful clause in the direction of the mainstream of the kind of approach in many measures which have recently gone through the House, starting with the Highway Code, breach of which is not a breach of either criminal or civil law but may lead to a person who has broken it finding the code quoted against him in evidence. Then there was the Code of Industrial Relations Practice which is still effective and most useful in industrial tribunals in disputes over unfair dismissal, and which may be replaced by similar codes produced by the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service and its Council to be brought in under the Employment Protection Bill. Again, and finally, there are further codes, of which there are three


in existence, relating to noise, lead, and vinyl chloride under the Health and Safety at Work etc Act. There will be others.
This guidance goes a little further. It has a little power behind it because it may be quoted in evidence. It is not a new regulation breach of which could lead to prosecution. It is a useful form of help with some muscle provided by people whose job it is to look into the real problem. This is a sensible, helpful approach, and I hope that when my hon. Friend replies to the debate she will find some way, if not to include this clause precisely in its present wording to provide at least a similar clause allowing the new commission to provide codes of practice and giving it power to do so, even if it is a power which is used sparingly.

6.15 p.m.

Mr. Ronald Bell: I do not wish to take up time on the new clause because I have no doubt that it will not be accepted. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to allow it to pass without some questioning and without some reflection on its desirability. The hon. and learned Member for Leicester, West (Mr. Janner) said it would be merely mandatory. That was not his word but that is what he meant. I see in subsection (6) that there is some reference to its having binding effect after being laid before Parliament and approved by resolution of both Houses.
In so far as the proposed guidance is related to offences under the Act one can see that this would be a mere gloss, and while I would object to the Act altogether and would regret that, those who accept the main policy of the Act would not see any particular objection. But this proposal goes a good deal further than that. It refers to:
the use and presentation of printed, audio and visual materials that tend to discriminate between the sexes…".
In moving the amendment the hon. Member for Barking (Miss Richardson) referred to the practice of the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission in the United States, which had apparently persuaded one large publishing firm to request its authors to use certain language and certain attitudes. I believe that this is a most dangerous and, indeed, evil incursion by legislative bodies into the fields of individual behaviour in the hold-

ing of individual opinions and artistic expression, according to the individual opinion of the author or artist. It is not the business of the British Parliament to prescribe attitudes to artists, even in a recommendatory form, still less a form which can be given in evidence in court and might in certain circumstances be binding.
If the hon. Lady gives this some thought she will see that what she is proposing is a form of authorised brainwashing. She does not like certain attitudes which a great many people hold. So she proposes to use the power of the legislature and public money to alter those attitudes to those of which she approves. The changing of attitudes is not a matter for legislature. It is a matter for the free flow and interplay of human thought. It moves along gradually.
The idea that existing attitudes are due to some evil period in human history and that we shall return to a golden age as a result of these recommendations is nonsense. These attitudes are not due to a cycle of deprivation. They are attitudes which have developed gradually throughout the development of the human race. It is not for me at this point to argue whether they are right or wrong. I merely make the point that this is how they have come about. It is absolutely wrong to use legislative proposals and taxpayers' money to try to limit, control, twist or pervert the expression of opinion, literal or visual, by such means.

Mrs. Colquhoun: I find myself in the uneasy situation of being in agreement with the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Bell) who mentioned at the beginning of his comments that the new clause was not likely to be accepted by the Government. It is not possible for an hon. Member to have sat on the Committee dealing with this Bill and to have failed to realise that the Government were incapable of accepting responsible and well thought out amendments. I am interested to see whether on the Floor of the House the Government are capable of accepting logical and reasonable amendments. I fear that they are not.
The Government's attitude does not mean that we back benchers should not


be prepared to fight and fight again for what we believe in. We believe in making this a better Bill in many ways. We want to make it less of shabby window-dressing for this hideous International Women's Year to which the Government have devoted themselves and through which, in the last analysis, they will let down the ordinary working women of the nation.
I am glad that my friend Betty Lockwood has been appointed chairman of the Equal Opportunities Commission. This gives me much more hope than I initially had. We did not know whom the Government would appoint. It has been a great relief to Labour women to know that we have someone there who genuinely cares about other women. Nevertheless, the Government ought to be ashamed about the number of first-rate amendments and ideas they have constantly turned down.
This clause deals with guidelines and practice, and, although it may look bureaucratic at first sight, it contains a lot of good common sense. The EOC should be able to lay down guidelines. My only fear has to do with how the lawyers will interpret them, with respect to those lawyers who are Members of the House.
I draw the attention of the House to something of some importance which ought to be included in the Bill and which is not. I refer to the question of sexual orientation and the kind of discrimination that society dredges up. I particularly refer the House to subsection 2(c) of the clause dealing with
the steps by which bodies responsible for educational establishments … may avoid discriminatory practices and prevent acts of discrimination in their etablishments.
I have recently been dealing with a case of discrimination against a young midwife in Milton Keynes. She had been precluded from following through a course of further education and training on the grounds that she was homosexual. That is the kind of case with which this Bill should have dealt very firmly. It is hypocritical that society in 1975 should say that anyone's sexual habits have anything whatever to do with ability to do his or her job or to be trained. I was

glad to receive a letter from the chairman of the Buckinghamshire Area Health Authority confirming that
as an authority we affirmed that our policy is one of no discrimination against homosexuals in employment".
This is a perfectly proper attitude for an area health authority to take and it is important that it should have been said.

Mr. Ronald Bell: Is the hon. Lady seriously arguing that sexual orientation is irrelevant and that there is no objection to the employment of a homosexual as a master in a boys' preparatory school?

Mrs. Colquhoun: We must refer the hon. and learned Member as the first case study to the Equal Opportunities Commission so that his hidden orientation can be revealed, probably by a psychologist.
I do not wish to continue to try to add to the Bill something that has been left out. I did want it recorded in the Official Report that it is important for there to be a change in attitude in society on these matters. There should be much less hypocrisy. I wanted to make the point very clearly that I am not only fed up with the Labour Government and their Sex Discrimination Bill but I am also utterly disappointed by their inability to bring any new and radical thinking to women's role in society. In their woolly-minded, waffly way they believe that they are doing so when they are doing nothing of the kind. In the last analysis, what they will do is alienate women outside this House. Politicians will once again be revealed for the hypocrites that they sometimes tend to be.

Mr. Dudley Smith: The hon. Member for Northampton, North (Mrs. Colquhoun) must be aware that her castigation of the Government will be echoed by a large number of people in and out of this House. As I said earlier, I did not have the advantage of being a member of the Committee dealing with this Bill. I have a certain amount of sympathy with the hon. Lady's point about hon. Members putting forward a number of useful amendments—not necessarily this one—which are rejected by the Government. It is too much of a common practice for Governments to reject wholesale useful amendments put forward in Committee.


This reduces the proceedings to a farce. I hope that in future all Governments will pay more heed to useful amendments.
That is not to say that I support this new clause. Codes of practice are very much in vogue these days. I plead guilty, as must many members of the Opposition, to being responsible for trying to implement a number of codes of practice when I was a member of the last Conservative Government. There is a danger that we can have too many codes. They impose a burden on those who have to implement legislation. In my view the Bill is a code of practice for those who will have to work it.
6.30 p.m.
My hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Mr. Lane) spoke earlier about educational concern in Cambridge. I am sure that educationists are very interested in the Bill and how they will deal with its concept. Presumably, the advertising and newspaper industries are considering the Bill's implications so that they will know how to advise their members. I should be surprised if many responsible worthwile sectors in our public life were not already drawing up their own codes of practice about how they should meet this part of the Bill.

Mr. Greville Janner: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the importance of a code of practice, as opposed to a law or a regulation, is that it does not have the effect of enabling a person to be punished for a breach, but it can be used against him in any proceedings, whether civil or criminal? The hon. Gentleman said that the Bill is a code of practice. If he means that it will change the atmosphere, that is right, but if he means that it is a code of practice, it is not a technicality to point out to him that the amendment attempts to introduce a code of practice in the technical sense of that term, to enable guidance to be given in a form which can be enforced, rather than a mere recommendation, and otherwise than through a criminal penalty.

Mr. Smith: I appreciate that point of view. However, one of the points I was making was that, even without the code being flouted by a criminal act, we could have too many codes of practice. Some, which have already been implemented in our law, deal specifically with rigid,

technical subjects—for example, noise and industry. Indeed, there is the code of practice in the Industrial Relations Act which we recently brought forward.
I believe that the canvas in this case is far too wide for a uniform code of practice to apply to all the various sectors mentioned by the hon. Lady. One example is advertising, where the Bill would have an extremely important effect once it became law.
If it does its job properly, the commission will give guidance gratuitously anyway. I hope and believe that many sectors will be seeking their own codes of practice and giving instructions to their members and associates about how to operate under the Bill.
I can understand and appreciate some of the sentiments expressed by the supporters of the clause. I am sure that they are endeavouring to be helpful, but I agree with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Bell) that there are undoubtedly some sinister implications which may not have been exactly understood or have come to their notice. If we are to implement something that would hamper freedom of expression, we must look at the matter seriously. There are dangers that my hon. Friends have suggested. In those circumstances I hope that the Government will not accept the clause.

Mr. Costain: The hon. Member for Crewe (Mrs. Dunwoody) has expressed very clearly—

Miss Richardson: My hon. Friend the Member for Crewe is not present. I represent Barking.

Mr. Greville Janner: The hon. Gentleman is barking up the wrong tree.

Mr. Costain: The hon. Lady expressed an opinion which has been expressed in various parts of the country. What she has overlooked is that the Bill is produced mainly so that it can be used at the next General Election to show what the Labour Party has done for the public. I am sure that the hon. Lady's wise words this afternoon helped to put the matter into perspective.
The hon. and learned Member for Leicester, West (Mr. Janner) spoke of the code of practice having no legal effect, but being used in evidence in a case.


What worries me about the clause is the steps employers might take to prevent acts of discrimination by their employees. I should like the Minister to explain what the Government interpret this to mean.
There are many cases, particularly in some of the heavier industries, where employees are against employment of the other sex for many reasons. If a code of practice advises employers what they should do to stop discrimination of that kind, and their action, taken on that advice, is contrary to trade union practice and a strike follows, what advice will the code of practice give then?
There are a number of anomalies in the clause. I should like an explanation. Are the Government considering accepting the clause?

Dr. Summerskill: I should like to assure my hon. Friend the Member for Barking (Miss Richardson) that we have given careful consideration to the clause.
As I see it, the clause in subsections (1) to (5) suggests codes of practice with recommendatory effect, whereas in subsections (6) to (10) they have binding effect. Subsection (2) makes it mandatory on the commission to issue such codes of practice in specified areas, as opposed to subsection (1), which enables the commission to issue codes of practice.
First I should explain that, as has been recognised by the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Mr. Smith), the commission will, if it so wishes, be able, under the Bill, to issue voluntary codes or guidelines setting out good procedures and practices. There is no need to specify this power in the Bill. Such guidelines may be quoted in proceedings but they would have no binding effect.
I am doubtful about the practicability of the clause, and whether there is a role for statutory codes in the Bill, or that the employment precedents which were cited by Opposition Members are particularly relevant.
Under the Bill the commission has statutory authority to issue codes of practice by virtue of Clauses 47 and 48, whereas in the absence of Part I in Schedule 1 to the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 the Secretary of State would not have a statutory autho-

rity to issue codes of practice as respects industrial relations.
We believe that provisions such as subsection (5) of the new clause, which I believe is modelled on paragraph 5 of Part I of Schedule 1 to the Trade Unions and Labour Relations Act, and Section 17 of the Health and Safety at Work Act, are of value only in relation to a provision of a code dealing either with a relatively simple question which is directly posed in the legislation—for example, whether dismissal was unfair—or another relatively simple question, whether the employers' arrangement constituted a safety risk which could be assessed by experts with a fair degree of certainty.
A code of practice for equal opportunity employers would not, however, help a court or tribunal in deciding the relevant question under the Bill, which will normally be whether the defendant who had treated a woman less favourably than a man did so on grounds of sex or on other grounds. We do not believe that a practical and workable code can be devised directed to this particular purpose. If it is the intention of the sponsors of the amendment that the commission should be able to require firms to follow the provisions in such rules of practice, the clause constitutes a marked enlargement of the non-discrimination notice procedure in our Clause 61. As this stands at present, the commission may issue a notice requiring a person not to commit an unlawful act, a breach of an equality clause or an unlawful act of the kind specified in Amendment No. 61, but not to require such a person to take other kinds of positive action. Therefore, there is a marked difference between these proposals and the proposals in the Bill.
We see difficulty in providing that any such guidance or code should have the force of law. Guidance and recommendations of this kind may he helpful in a general way, but compliance with a code of practice which is, and must be, couched in general and readily understandable terms cannot replace the need to comply with the Bill itself. It win not necessarily be true in a particular case that a person who complies with a code drafted in general terms has not carried out an act of unlawful discrimination. It would not, therefore, constitute a successful defence. Nor would the fact


that someone had not complied with the code necessarily mean that he had committed an unlawful act, as defined in the Bill. There are situations in which a code of practice having statutory backing is useful, but the circumstances here are not on all fours. Those parts of the industrial relations code of guidance relating to industrial dismissals are directed to helping the tribunal to decide the crucial question, which is whether the dismissal was unfair. There is no parallel between that situation and

Division No. 239.]
AYES
[6.40 p.m.


Allaun, Frank
Hayman, Mrs Helene
Roderick, Caerwyn


Bidwell, Sydney
Heffer, Eric S.
Rooker, J. W.


Butler, Mrs Joyce (Wood Green)
Hoyle, Doug (Nelson)
Skinner, Dennis


Canavan, Dennis
Janner, Greville
Taylor, Mrs Ann (Bolton W)


Cook, Robin F. (Edin C)
McCartney, Hugh
Thomas, Ron (Bristol NW)


Cryer, Bob
McMillan, Tom (Glasgow C)
Thorne, Stan (Preston South)


Davies, Bryan (Enfield N)
Madden, Max
Wise, Mrs Audrey


Edge, Geoff
Maynard, Miss Joan



English, Michael
Mikardo, Ian
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Evans, John (Newton)
Noble, Mike
Mrs. Maureen Colquhoun and


Flannery, Martin
Prescott, John
Miss Jo Richardson.


George, Bruce
Price, C. (Lewisham W)





NOES


Anderson, Donald
Fookes, Miss Janet
Mackintosh, John P.


Atkins, Ronald (Preston N)
Ford, Ben
Marks, Kenneth


Bagier, Gordon A. T.
Forrester, John
Marshall, Dr Edmund (Goole)


Bates, Alf
Fowler, Gerald (The Wrekin)
Meacher, Michael


Beith, A. J.
Fraser, John (Lambeth, N'w'd)
Mellish, Rt Hon Robert


Bell, Ronald
Freud, Clement
Millan, Bruce


Bennett, Andrew (Stockport N.)
Gilbert, Dr John
Miller, Dr M. S. (E Kilbride)


Blenkinsop, Arthur
Ginsburg, David
Mitchell, R. C. (Soton, Itchen)


Boardman, H.
Golding, John
Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)


Booth, Albert
Gourlay, Harry
Murray, Rt Hon Ronald King


Boothroyd, Miss Betty
Graham, Ted
O'Halloran, Michael


Bottomley, Rt Hon Arthur
Grant, George (Morpeth)
Ovenden, John


Bray Dr Jeremy
Grimond, Rt Hon J.
Owen, Dr David


Buchan, Norman
Hamilton, James (Bothwell)
Paisley, Rev Ian


Buchanan, Richard
Hardy, Peter
Park, George


Callaghan, Jim (Middleton &amp; P)
Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)
Parker, John


Campbell, Ian
Hatton, Frank
Pavitt, Laurie


Cant, R. B.
Hooson, Emlyn
Pendry, Tom


Carter-Jones, Lewis
Horam, John
Penhaligon, David


Clemitson, Ivor
Howells, Geraint (Cardigan)
Price, William (Rugby)


Cocks, Michael (Bristol S)
Hughes, Rt Hon C. (Anglesey)
Rees, Rt Hon Merlyn (Leeds S)


Cohen, Stanley
Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)
Rees-Davies, W. R.


Coleman, Donald
Hughes, Roy (Newport)
Roberts, Albert (Normanton)


Conlan, Bernard
Jackson, Colin (Brighouse)
Roberts, Gwilym (Cannock)


Cook, Robin F. (Edin C)
Jackson, Miss Margaret (Lincoln)
Rodgers, George (Chorley)


Cox, Thomas (Tooting)
Jay, Rt Hon Douglas
Roper, John


Craigen, J. M. (Maryhill)
Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)
Ross, Stephen (Isle of Wight)


Crawshaw, Richard
Jenkins, Rt Hon Roy (Stechford)
Sandelson, Neville


Cunningham, Dr J. (Whiteh)
John, Brynmor
Selby, Harry


Dalyell, Tam
Jones, Alec (Rhondda)
Silkin, Rt Hon S. C. (Dulwich)


Davidson, Arthur
Jones, Barry (East Flint)
Silverman, Julius


Davies, Ifor (Gower)
Jones, Dan (Burnley)
Small, William


Dean, Joseph (Leeds West)
Kaufman, Gerald
Spearing, Nigel


da Freitas, Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey
Kilroy-Silk, Robert
Spriggs, Leslie


Delargy, Hugh
Lamborn, Harry
Stanbrook, Ivor


Dempsey, James
Lamond, James
Steel, David (Roxburgh)


Doig, Peter
Lawrence, Ivan
Stewart, Rt Hon M. (Fulham)


Dormand, J. D.
Lee, John
Stoddart, David


Duffy, A. E. P.
Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)
Stott, Roger


Dunn, James A.
Lipton, Marcus
Summerskill, Hon Dr Shirley


Ellis, Tom (Wrexham)
Litterick, Tom
Tierney, Sydney


Ennals, David
Lomas, Kenneth
Tinn, James


Evans, Ioan (Aberdare)
Mabon, Dr J. Dickson
Tomlinson, John


Faulds, Andrew
McCusker, H.
Tuck, Raphael


Fernyhough, Rt Hon E.
McElhone, Frank
Wainwright, Edwin (Dearne V)


Fitch, Alan (Wigan)
McGuire, Michael (Ince)
Wainwright, Richard (Colne V)


Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)
Mackenzie, Gregor
Walker, Terry (Kingswood)

trying to decide whether a woman has been discriminated against on ground of sex.

The Bill is extremely comprehensive. We have given strong powers to the Equal Opportunities Commission. I cannot recommend that the House should accept the clause.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time:—

The House divided: Ayes 31, Noes 150.

Ward, Michael
Williams, W. T. (Warrington)



White, Frank R. (Bury)
Woodall, Alec
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


White, James (Pollack)
Wrigglesworth, Ian
Mr. Joseph Harper and


Williams, Alan (Swansea W)
Young, David (Bolton E)
Mr. John Ellis.


Williams, Alan Lee (Hornch'ch)

Question accordingly negatived.

New Clause 6

BURDEN OF PROOF

In determining for the purposes of any provision of this Act whether the complainant has been discriminated against on grounds of sex or marital status, it shall be for the respondent or defendant to show what was or were the reason or reasons for the act or acts complained of and that it or they were completely sufficient reason or reasons for the act or acts complained of.—[Miss Richardson.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Miss Richardson: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: It will be for the convenience of the House if we discuss at the same time Amendment No. 63, in Clause 57, in page 33, line 30, at end insert:
'and it shall be for the respondent to show that any act complained of is not discriminatory'.
Amendment No. 64, in Clause 60, in page 35, line 16, at end insert:
'and it shall be for the respondent to show that any act complained of is not discriminatory'.
and Amendment No. 65, in page 35, line 26, leave out from 'made' to end of subsection and insert:
'if the respondent proves that the requirement or condition in question was not applied with the intention of treating the claimant unfavourably on the ground of his sex or marital status as the case may be.'.

Miss Richardson: This is one of the most important clauses discussed this evening because it concerns the burden of proof. As the Bill now stands, the burden of proof is placed unfairly and quite unreasonably on the woman complaining of discrimination.
When the complaint is brought before a tribunal or a court the respondent is, in most cases, likely to be a substantial organisation with large resources. However, the complainant is likely to be a solitary figure who could well not be used to this kind of procedure, and nervous about legal proceedings and

what has to be done. Indeed, once or twice I have attended insurance tribunals—and these are not the kind of courts and tribunals to which we are referring—when a woman's benefit has been withdrawn and when women have often had to appear, without any help, before a nerve-racking array of people in circumstances in which I would have been very nervous. In a case such as this, it would be wholly unfair to put the onus of proof upon the complainant.
Although we do not always like it, we know that there are many women in this country who are more timid than men, and who have been brought up to believe that they should be more timid than men. It is part of the whole unhappy concept of their training and their conditioning, which even now still exists among some Conservative Members who wish to retain the status quo, who believe that we have been brainwashed into suggesting anything different, and who want women to believe that it is not their proper role to adopt aggressive attitudes, to stand up for their rights and to argue their case.
Therefore, it would be a major personal achievement for any woman to take on the big organisations and to take a matter to court single-handed. If she has to bear the whole onus of proof, it is unlikely that she will ever have the courage to bring the case, and, therefore, the heart of the Bill will, perhaps, be rendered useless.
We must accept the practicalities of the situation. Money, information, legal resources and expertise are more freely available to big organisations than to the individual. The burden of proof must thus be on the side of the big battalions. This is the principle which is followed in criminal cases—a person is assumed innocent till he is proved guilty.
The Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974, Schedule 1, paragraph 6, which deals with dismissal, provides that
it shall be for the employer to show
that a dismissal was not unfair. When the Government drafted that Act perhaps they had men in mind rather than women—whom they have in this case. In the Equal Pay Act 1970, Section 2(6),


which deals with material differences between a woman's case and a man's case, says that
then it shall be for the woman's employer to show …".
The same provision appears in the new Section 1(3) of that Act, which is made by Clause 8 of the Bill. It says that
… if the employer proves …".
In this context all of these measures lay the burden of proof upon the employer. Clause 43(3) of the Employment Protection Bill sets out precisely the same principle.
I cannot understand why the Sex Discrimination Bill should be left out in the cold in this area and why it should be discriminated against in this way. My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary argued in Committee that the reason why it was being rejected by the Government was that it was too difficult for respondents to prove a negative. Is this not precisely what the complainant is being asked to do? Will she not be obliged to show that there was no good reason why she should not have got the job, the promotion, the loan or whatever it is? I absolutely agree that it is difficult to prove a negative. That is all the more reason why, if someone has to prove a negative, the big guns should have a duty to prove it and not the person who is standing in isolation.
In practice, how can a woman have access to all the information which she would need to go to court or to a tribunal in a case such as this? She may need legal aid. There may certainly be highly technical data which she needs and she, perhaps, would not know how to go about obtaining it. The records to which she would want to have access are likely to be in the offices or the hands of the respondent or defendant. In some cases, perhaps he may not have access to them very easily, but it is much easier for him to get hold of them than for her. Therefore, if she is forced to bring the case herself, how can she support the case? The fact is that she cannot, and the result in practice will be that she will not bring any case. Therefore, a very important part of the Bill will be lost.
I hope, therefore, that the Government have thought very seriously about this matter. It has been discussed on many occasions. I hope that they will consider

that there is a very strong case, not only in justice in putting the onus of proof upon the respondent or the defendant, but also in simply bringing it into line with other legislation that we have had recently. I hope that the Government will be willing to look sympathetically upon the clause.

7.0 p.m.

Mr. Greville Janner: In spite of the unkind words of my hon. Friend the Member for Barking (Miss Richardson) about lawyers, may I say that she is a great loss to the legal profession?
All that I wish to do is to add two or three questions to hers. First, under the Redundancy Payments Act 1965, where a person is dismissed he has to prove that he has been dismissed, and then there is a presumption of redundancy which it is for the employer to disprove if he can. Then we move on to the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, under which the burden of proof was quite deliberately shifted by us, by a Labour Government, from where it was—which was nowhere—on to the employer, who must now prove that the dismissal was fair.
The reason for this was essentially the reason given by my hon. Friend the Member for Barking—namely, that the parties are not on equal terms when they come before an industrial tribunal. There is no legal aid at an industrial tribunal, and the employer generally is in a very much stronger position.
Under the Equal Pay Act the same applies, as it will under the Employment Protection Bill. It is not simply that the respondent must prove that the dismissal was, for example, unfair. The first stage, the basic proof initially, rests upon the individual complainant to show, in one case, that he has been dismissed, and in this case that there was a discriminatory practice. Only if it is shown that there was a discriminatory practice does the burden of proof then shift, under the new clause, on to the employer or the person who is alleged to have discriminated to show that there was a reason other than sex, which is banned by the Bill.
Under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act it is exactly the same principle. Where it is shown that there is an unsafe practice, the burden of proof then—and


only then—shifts to the accused to show that it was not practicable or reasonably practicable for him to do likewise.
The present Government have rightly accepted the principle in the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act—which, incidentally, was originally introduced by the previous Conservative Government. The Government have accepted it in the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, over and above and by way of change from the Industrial Relations Act, and they have included it in the Equal Pay Act and in the Employment Protection Bill. Therefore, I do not understand why the Government should be doing something different here.
It may be that there is some strange, invisible explanation which is not apparent, despite complaints. If so, perhaps my hon. Friend the Minister will give that explanation. But it seems very unfair that this principle applies in all other legislation but not in this Bill. We need a very good reason in order to accept what would appear to be a discriminatory practice on the part of the Government as regards women in this Bill, when as regards everyone else in all other legislations the burden of proof is placed squarely upon the employer or upon the person alleged to have acted wrongly once a wrongful act has been proved.

Dr. Summerskill: As we are discussing the new clause with Amendments Nos. 63, 64 and 65, I should like to speak first to Amendment No. 65.
Since the Committee stage of the Bill I have been giving very careful consideration to the whole subject of the burden of proof, and particularly as we have before us a new clause and three amendments all dealing with the same subject. I appreciate the problems described by my hon. Friend the Member for Barking (Miss Richardson) of the woman who is pitted against perhaps a very powerful employer, who can call to his aid a great many people, when she may be alone in fighting her battle. The Government do not accept as a general proposition that the evidential burden in proceedings under the Bill should be placed on the respondent, but it has been put to me—and I am now disposed to accept—that in sub-

section (3) of Clause 60 we are dealing with a different situation.
The amendment is not concerned to reverse the normal evidential burden on the complainant to show that the respondent has committed an act of unlawful discrimination against her—in the case of an act of indirect discrimination—but to ensure that when it comes to determining whether the indirect discrimination was intentional and, hence, whether the complainant should receive damages or compensation, it should be for the respondent to show that the indirect discrimination which he has been found by the court or tribunal to have committed was committed unintentionally.
It is important to appreciate that we are dealing with a situation in which a court or tribunal has already found that the respondent applied to the complainant an unjustifiable condition or requirement with which she could not comply and with which a smaller proportion of women than of men can comply.
Given this, I am inclined to think that we should accept that it should be for the respondent to show, on the question whether damages or compensation should be awarded, that he had no intention to treat the women less favourably than members of the opposite sex.
Damages or compensation ought not to be available unless there was such an intention. But I am disposed now to agree with my hon. Friend in relation to Amendment No. 65, that it is likely to be considerably more difficult for the complainant to prove an intention, assuming that there was an intention, than for the respondent to prove that he did not have an intention, where it does not exist.
It is usually regarded as too onerous a burden for a person to have to prove a negative, as I have said in the past. But I would be prepared to concede that in moving the amendment to Clause 60(3) in Committee to put the evidential burden back on the complainant, we may have overestimated the difficulty of proving this particular kind of negative in the situation to which Clause 60(3) relates.
My point is this. Whether or not a condition or requirement which is discriminatory in its effect is justifiable is a matter on which a court or tribunal will


have to make up its mind in deciding whether the respondent committed an act of indirect discrimination. We must recognise, however, that even if the court does not accept that the reasons with which the respondent has sought to justify the condition or requirement are sufficient to make them objectively justifiable, the respondent will nevertheless be able, when it comes to deciding whether he should pay damages or compensation, to argue that these reasons—and not an intention to treat women or men less favourably—were, in fact, the reasons why he applied the conditions or requirement.
The question which the court or tribunal then has to decide is whether it believes the respondent, and once the respondent has put these reasons forward, provided that they are plausible, it will be for the complainant to show that the respondent applied the condition or requirement with a discriminatory intention.
I conclude by saying, contrary to what I said in Committee—and I am grateful to have had this opportunity to reconsider this very difficult question—that, for the reasons which I have sought to explain, we can afford to accept the reversal of the evidential burden on the issue of damages for indirect discrimination.

Mr. Greville Janner: I greatly welcome this movement in the right direction. However, does my hon. Friend not agree that exactly the same principles she has so eloquently proclaimed in the case of indirect discrimination apply equally and with just the same force in the case of direct discrimination?

Dr. Summerskill: We discussed this matter in Committee and have since reconsidered it. In Committee we decided that there was a distinct difference—whatever we may have felt about the burden-of-proof argument—between indirect discrimination and direct discrimination.
I recommend that the House should support Amendment No. 65.

Mr. Alison: The Minister has made an important concession. However, I am still in some doubt as to whether she has interpreted Clause 1(1)(b), which refers to indirect discrimination, correctly in the context of the intention.
The later Government amendment will trigger off the operation of this subsection in the event of an individual having a complaint to make that she was not able to comply with the requirement and that it was to her detriment. Intention must, therefore, arise only in the case of an individual. Is it likely that the employer can show, or not show, that he had an intention in regard to an applicant? Is that likely to be provable? It must centre round the applicant. The generality of the provisions does not apply. The matter of an intention cannot be included in a provision with which the majority of women cannot comply. Intention can only arise under Clause 1(1)(b), as amended, in respect of an individual complaint.
I cannot see how the employer can be expected to prove intention, one way or the other, convincingly, except in the context of the individual employer. Surely all he can say, when an individual applicant claims that she cannot comply with a provision which is to her detriment, is "I did not intend it to affect her in this way". By definition he cannot have any intention to discriminate against her. She does not know who he is till she comes for the first time to make her application. The intention must relate to the clause as amended, and to the person who alone can trigger off the indirect discrimination clause. The employer cannot know who that person is till she makes the individual complaint. By definition he cannot have any intention one way or the other.
I cannot see that we have made much progress by placing the burden of proof upon the employer in the matter of intention in this context. I hope that the hon. Lady will be able to deal with that point.

Dr. Summerskill: It is the intention of the amendment that the indirect discrimination should be shown to be intentional. If it was not intentional, the complainant cannot receive damages or compensation. We are reverting to a discussion on the meaning of indirect discrimination. We shall come to that later. As regards the burden of proof, it must be shown that the indirect discrimination was intentional. The complainant can receive damages or compensation only if that is proved.

7.15 p.m.

Mr. Alison: The hon. Lady has not addressed herself to the problem which arises in Clause 60(3), which states that
no award of damages shall be made unless the requirement or condition in question was applied with the intention of treating the claimant less favourably …
There cannot be any intention proven one way or the other where Clause 1(1)(b) will only be triggered by an individual coming forward and saying that she was not able to comply. The employer cannot have any intention in respect of an individual of whom he has never heard and who is one out of 35 million women in the community. He cannot know who is the individual who will trigger off this provision till she makes the complaint that she was not able to comply with it. The employer may never have heard of her before. How can he have an intention with regard to her? That is a paradox.

Mr. Ronald Bell: My instinct is to agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Barkston Ash (Mr. Alison) in resisting the concession which the Minister proposes to make. However, I cannot agree with my hon. Friend on the narrow point. Clause 1(1)(b) says:
he applies to her a requirement or condition which applies or would apply equally to a man …".
I envisage the position whereby an employer advertises a job. He states the requirements, which he applies equally to male or female applicants, but they favour, by their nature, male applicants. When the employer considers the applicant he applies those conditions to her. Therefore, I do not think that the Minister is in the difficulty described by my hon. Friend.
I have a slight hesitation here. I see a valid difference between putting the burden on a respondent on the general question of the discriminatory act. The hon. and learned Member for Leicester, West (Mr. Janner) was wrong. The complainant does not establish a discriminatory practice. She says "I was not given the job". That may prove an act or a practice. It does not prove whether it is discrimination. To put the burden on the respondent would be unfair. Once the principle is established, it is not without precedent that we should

put the burden on the respondent to bring himself within an exception.

Mr. Greville Janner: Does the hon. and learned Gentleman agree that, provided the individual complainant proves a discriminatory act, it is reasonable and and fair for the burden of proof to shift on to the employer to show that it was reasonable or that there was a defence to what otherwise would be an offence under the Bill?

Mr. Bell: I thought that the Under-Secretary had proposed that. I was not demurring on the principle. I was somewhat exceptionally tending to support my lion. Friend, but I was coming to my own reservation on the matter. This is not an important point and we should not waste time on it. I am unhappy because Clause 1(1)(b) is an extreme extension of the law. It is an extension about which many people have a great deal of doubt and hesitation, as I have.
I am not stating my general objection to the Bill. However, as a lawyer, I am unhappy about it. I am worried that a nebulous extension of the intention of the Bill should become the subject of the shifting of the burden of proof. I hope that the hon. Lady will give this further thought. She has committed herself with the Secretary of State.
I am not so foolish as to assume that she will, as a result of my short intervention, withdraw her recommendation, but I hope that when the Bill goes to another place further thought will be given to this matter. It is rather an extreme action to shift the burden of proof under a clause like Clause 1(1)(b), which is itself something of a novelty in legislation.

Mrs. Colquhoun: It is a charming parliamentary custom for one to be grateful for small concessions, but I have never really believed in accepting that particular quaintness of this House. The concession amounts to very little. I should like my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary to say clearly and distinctly why the Government ignored paragraphs 86 and 87 of the White Paper which proposed that the burden of proof should rest with the respondent or defendant in cases of discrimination. These proposals were widely welcomed by pressure groups and experts interested in the legislation,


and the groups ranged from organisations representing millions of women to academic and professional organisations. They included the National Labour Women's Advisory Committee, the National Joint Council of Working Women's Organisations, the National Council for Civil Liberties, the Fawcett Society, Women in Media, the working party of the British Sociological Association, Woman's Rights Campaign and Status of Women in the Professions. These people are most disappointed at the failure of the Government to translate the intentions of the White Paper into the terms of the Bill.
I would have hoped that the Government would have taken account of this important and fundamental amendment because without it the Bill is reduced to the kind of farce I spoke about in Committee and have described in the House today. It is my duty to warn the Government that if they do not accept the clause they will do the Bill a great disservice because it has no teeth or meaning without it. It is a spurious measure without it and will continue to be revealed as such.
Will my hon. Friend also confirm the situation in regard to legal aid for women appearing before tribunals? This is another matter which must be set out clearly in the Official Report.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. That may be an important question but it is not related to the new clause on which the hon. Member is speaking.

Mrs. Colquhoun: I apologise for straying, Mr. Deputy Speaker.
I hope that the Minister will spell out exactly what her proposition amounts to in terms which ordinary women outside will understand when the facts appear in the media. I am getting sick and tired of not being able to understand the Government's intentions. Do they accept or not the importance of the clause? Yes or no?

Miss Richardson: I hope that the Under-Secretary will speak again. Before she does I want, while expressing how grateful I am for her "acceptance" of the amendment on indirect discrimination, to say how bitterly disappointed I am at

the Government's rejection of the burden of proof of direct discrimination.
Between now and the time when the Bill goes to another place, will my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary consider once more extending the measure to cover direct discrimination, if only to conform with other Acts of Parliament? If the Government do not accept the justice of doing so there would at least be a logical case for keeping the Bill on all fours with other Acts. I hope that she will consider this point further in order that we may have a decent Bill.

Dr. Summerskill: I can assure my hon. Friends that the Government have given continued consideration to the difficult problem of burden of proof from the time the White Paper was first being compiled. There even seems to be a difference of view among lawyers themselves on this point, as we have seen in the House today. Two hon. and learned Gentlemen appear to have differed on this difficult point.
I have stated that the Government will accept Amendment No. 65. My hon. Friend the Member for Northampton, North (Mrs. Colquhoun) asked me to clarify it. Her name is among those attached to the amendment, and I should have thought that she would have been in no doubt about what it meant.

Mrs. Colquhoun: I was referring to new Clause 6.

Dr. Summerskill: My hon. Friend the Member for Barking (Miss Richardson) who moved new Clause 6 made a very clear speech about its effects. I think her argument was perfectly clear. I can only say that we have considered this very carefully. We have weighed up the new clause and the three amendments in the light of the Bill as it stood when it left Committee. We have decided to accept Amendment No. 65.

Question put and negatived.

New Clause 7

USE OF PUBLIC MONEY

(1) It shall be a condition in the award of any contract, loan or grant or guarantee by the Government or by the board of any corporation, the members of which are appointed by the Crown, that the contractor shall comply


with the provisions of this Act and of the Equal Pay Act 1970, and failure so to comply shall result in the withdrawal of the contract, loan, grant or guarantee and the withholding of further contracts, loans, grants or guarantees.

(2) It shall be a condition of all such contracts, loans, grants, or guarantees that the contractor or beneficiary shall at all times display for the benefit of those employed by, contracting with, or using the services of the contractor or beneficiary posters and other information concerning the provisions of this Act and of the Equal Pay Act 1970 in places where such persons will be able to read and study them.

(3) The contractor shall be responsible for the observance of this resolution by subcontractors employed in the execution of work to which the contract, loan, grant or guarantee applies, and shall notify the department or board of the names and addresses of all such sub-contractors.

(4) The Equal Opportunities Commission shall be responsible for ensuring the observance of this section by contractors to whom this section applies and may, where they think fit, and shall, where required by the Secretary of State, conduct a formal investigation under section 51 of this Act of any contractor or sub-contractor to whom this section applies.—[Miss Richardson.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Miss Richardson: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With it we shall also discuss Amendment No. 74, in Clause 65, page 38, line 43, at end insert:
'(2) Persons or organisations against whom such an order or injunction is granted shall not be eligible for grants of any kind from public funds or for tendering for any contracts paid out of such funds, notwithstanding any other enactments prior to this Act, for a period to be decided by the Secretary of State.'

Miss Richardson: I seem to be speaking yet again and I hope that hon. Members will not get sick of the sound of my voice. [HON. MEMBERS: "Never."] Some of the amendments are in the names of other hon. Ladies who were members of the Standing Committee but who are away on Government business since they were not expecting the Bill to come to the Floor of the House this week.
In effect the clause seeks to give additional enforcement power to the Government, to the Equal Opportunities Commission and to employers and the unions. It would mean that the Government or the commission would have the power not to give contracts to firms which were discriminating against women. Such a provision would bring the treatment

of discrimination on grounds of sex into line with the treatment of discrimination on grounds of race, colour, national or ethnic origin. The fair wages resolution was extended by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, who was the Secretary of State in 1969, to cover race. The inclusion of race in the fair wages resolution as a non-discrimination clause in Government contracts has proved not very effective because of the absence of any provision for monitoring compliance.
Though there is nothing to prevent the Equal Opportunities Commission, as the Bill stands, from investigating any Government contractor, subsection (4) is important because it spells out the commission's duty to do so. It also draws attention to Section 51 powers which will be relevant in such cases.
The effect might be that the EOC would set up a special government contracts department to investigate contractors and, where the law was being breached, recommend the withdrawal of the contract or loan. That is the nub of the matter. When we have legislation, why should we award contracts to firms which are not complying with that legislation? We should use this sanction and examine carefully the firms which are bidding for contracts.
7.30 p.m.
I hope that the House will forgive me for referring once again to United States legislation. In the United States, to be eligible for federal contracts or sub-contracts a firm must show not just that it does not discriminate against women in recruitment, promotion and so on, but that it is taking active steps called affirmative action, to put right the under-representation of women. When a firm is bidding for a large contract in the United States it must produce as part of the bid its affirmative action programme to show that it is putting right any under-representation which may exist. With smaller contracts firms have 120 days in which to produce this programme, and the programme must relate to recruitment, training and access to management positions.
Perhaps in the future we shall need to put a similar provision into this legislation, but I am not asking the Government to go that far, but the least we


can do is to adopt the clause, which provides:
It shall be a condition in the award of any contract … that the contractor shall comply with the provisions of this Act".
Heaven knows, the Bill is limited enough, and such a provision would do much to assure women that the Government seriously intend the Bill to be obeyed.

Mr. Greville Janner: Without the clause the Bill has no teeth. With the clause it will be obeyed. It would take a very strong reason for the House to reject the clause, and I hope that it will be accepted.

Dr. Summerskill: My hon. Friend the Member for Barking (Miss Richardson) has given an eloquent explanation of the necessity for the clause. I am particularly struck by subsection (1), which states:
that the contractor shall comply with the provisions of this Act and of the Equal Pay Act 1970, and failure so to comply shall result in the withdrawal of the contract, loan, grant or guarantee and the withholding of further contracts".
The clause makes no allowance for the other duties and obligations of Government Departments or boards which place contracts or provide finance. It would put the Government in a very difficult, if not impossible, position if they suddenly had to withdraw a major contract placed with a vitally important firm—perhaps a key firm in our economy—or ceased to provide finance to a local authority. It would put everyone in a difficult position if the Government were suddenly to be debarred from paying rate support grant to a local authority. I understand that any of those results might be consequential upon the inclusion of the clause in the Bill.
The clause raises several difficult points of principle. Furthermore, it imposes additional statutory penalties on one small group of people who might be found to have broken the law. In effect, it would place in a statutorily enshrined double jeopardy those who tender for contracts from Government Departments or a wide range of public bodies or who rely on finance from public funds. There is no discretion, and on procedure for review. There is no procedure for appeal, and no procedure for clearing up the confusion that would result from the sudden imposition of a procedure of this

kind. There is no procedure for carrying out the other purposes which the Government Department or public body seeks to carry out by means of the contract or by means of the provision of finance.
The use by the Government of their influence as a provider of funds and contracts is more properly covered by administrative action than by statutory sanctions. We think that in using their influence the Government should look both to the positive and to the negative sides of the situation.
The House will be aware that consideration was given to this problem in relation to Government contracts following the passing of the Race Relations Act 1968, and that certain administrative action has already been taken. A requirement has been incorporated in the standard conditions of Government contracts that the contractor should conform to the provisions of the 1968 Act relating to discrimination in employment. My right hon. Friend, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer, gave the assurance that Government Departments would be prepared to withhold contracts from firms practising racial discrimination in employment. We shall consider, once the Bill becomes law, in the light of practice and experience in the race relations field, extending the same condition in Government contracts to sex discrimination. The Equal Opportunities Commission will, of course, have its own powers of investigation and will, we hope, seeks ways of publicising and following up good employment practices.
In the light of these comments, I hope that my hon. Friend will feel able to withdraw the clause.

Question put and negatived.

New Clause 8

EXEMPTION OF EMPLOYMENT IN SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT

None of the provisions of this Act shall apply to employment on ships registered at a port of registry in the United Kingdom nor to employment on aircraft or hovercraft registered in the United Kingdom.—[Mr. Ronald Bell.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Ronald Bell: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Myer Galpern): With this we are taking Amendment No. 20 in page 8, line 37, leave out Clause 10.

Mr. Bell: I made clear at an earlier stage that I regard the Bill as a preposterous measure, and on the whole the attitude I have taken is that it is a waste of time to try to improve it. All I have done is to pick out a few of the more egregious absurdities and draw the attention of the House to them. As I said in the Second Reading debate, we make ourselves foolish when we give our time to the consideration of such proposals as these.
The effect of the clause is to say that the Bill shall not apply to ships and aircraft, although I am concerned primarily with ships. The General Council of British Shipping said that it did not mind the Bill provided that certain amendments were made. The Government are proposing an amendment relating to accommodation on board ship which goes some way to meet the council's case. I speak not for the council but simply on my own behalf in saying that I regard the application of a Bill which prohibits discrimination between men and women as particularly absurd in relation to service on board ship.
Of course, women have for a long time been employed in ships in various capacities, but a ship has different kinds of people in its crew doing different sorts of things. The idea that a woman is just as suitable as a man for doing all tasks is ridiculous. I know that since the days when I served on ships during the war there has been a high degree of mechanisation, but it remains true that deckhands have to do a good deal of hard physical work.
It is obviously sensible that shipowners should discriminate between men and women in choosing crew members to act as seamen. I do not see why there should be a provision in an Act of Parliament to stop them from doing so. If things so change on board ship that it ceases to matter whether members of the crew in all capacities are male or female, I am sure that the shipowners will quickly adopt the position that they do not mind who it is, subject to the question of accommodation, a matter which is dealt with in the Bill.
At the moment the Bill applies in its full rigour, subject to the availability of accommodation, to any employment in a ship or aircraft. That is absurd, and I hope that the House will accept the clause.

Mr. John Fraser: I certainly hope that the House does not accept the clause. I shall not deal with the matter at great length and take up all that the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Bell) has said. The argument that is used against employing women among the crews of ships is exactly the same argument that can be applied to not having women in factories and in other occupations which require some physical strength. It is to dispose of that stereotyped attitude that we bring forward the Bill. It is exactly the same argument, and it is not peculiarly applicable to ships.
Secondly, the proposal to extend the Bill to ships has the full support of the General Council of British Shipping. I have received a letter from the council which says that as employers the council gives an unqualified welcome to this legislation. It is in favour of women being employed at sea to the greatest practicable extent. For a good many years a sizeable number of women have been employed in catering departments on board ships. More recently not a few shipping companies have gone out of their way actively to recruit young women as officer cadets.
As the Bill has the support of the shipowners and the support of the General Council of British Shipping, and of course, since if we accepted the argument behind the clause we would have exceptions running right through the Bill—I ask the House to reject the clause.

Mr. Ronald Bell: There is nothing unexpected in that answer. The Minister will realise that I was well aware of what was written on behalf of the General Council of British Shipping. Of course, the council wants a particular amendment to the Bill. If that amendment is carried its problems will be met for the time being. Obviously the council felt it wise to go along with the Government and to express airy-fairy sentiments, bearing in mind the amendment which it wants to see passed by the House.
I do not disagree with the Minister in that what I have said would be applicable in some degree to other aspects of life. That is why I made it clear that I am totally opposed to the principle of the Bill. I believe that discrimination is right on all grounds and in all cases. I think that on Second Reading I described it as the informing principle of life itself. We can have too little of it but we cannot have too much.
The crucial point underlying the clause is that in the case of ships the provisions of the Bill are particularly absurd. There has not been employment of women on the deck as seamen. Such work is as yet clearly unsuitable for women. This fact will be represented by there being scarcely any women applicants, if any, for deck duties and duties as seamen on the lower deck. However, that is no excuse for passing a silly section in an Act of Parliament. I hope that the House will accept the clause all the more because of the Minister's speech.

Question put and negatived.

New Clause 9

EXEMPTION OF POLICE

This Act shall not apply to service of employment in any police force.—[Mr. Ronald Bell.]

Brought up, and read the First Time.

7.45 p.m.

Mr. Ronald Bell: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this we may discuss Amendment No. 30, in page 13, line 15, leave out Clause 17.

Mr. Bell: I should have said when I moved new Clause 8 that the linked amendment was merely to strike out the existing clause. That is the position as regards Amendment No. 30.
New Clause 9 would prevent the Bill applying to service or employment in any police force. I must say that I find this matter as surprising as the Bill's provisions as regards ships. No doubt the Government are hoping that these matters will work out all right in practice. Of course, there are many women serving in police forces in various capacities. However, the idea that a chief officer of police shall be legally prevented from

choosing a proportion of men in his force is absurd.
It is clear that for a certain amount of the time—and if it is not a major part, it is a significant part—a police officer is engaged in physical struggle in arresting people by force and in overcoming people by force. We see them holding back crowds. Quite often they are friendly crowds, but we see pictures of linked policemen. It is clear that that is a matter of size and strength. I would say that the majority of the personnel in our police forces should be men. What is the point of passing an Act of Parliament which provides that a chief officer of police may not have any regard to any such consideration? In theory, a chief officer could end up with seven-eighths of his police force being women. In that event, the force would not be able to discharge its function.
It is no answer to say that these matters change slowly, that for the time being the majority of recruits coming forward will be men, and that the matter will be solved on a practical plane. We are passing a coercive section of an Act of Parliament. I have heard no sensible justification for this provision. Discrimination in the police force between men and women is plainly right as we need a certain proportion of men. Why have the Government put the original clause in the Bill?
I propose to leave out Clause 10 and to replace it with new clause 9. That would leave chief officers of police free to recruit the proportion of men and women respectively that they thought the requirements of their neighbourhood made appropriate.

Dr. Summerskill: I think that the speech of the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Bell) was fairly predictable and in line with his speech on new Clause 8.
The Equal Pay Act applies to the police, and we can see no reason for the principle of non-discrimination embodied in the Bill, which covers employment as well as other matters, not applying to the police. In the Metropolitan Police there is already complete integration. Outside London there are separate establishments for men and women police officers. The days when policewomen had only a limited range of specialist duties has


gone. Their range of duties is becoming increasingly large. In every force women are serving in at least some of the specialist departments, such as the CID. We have been encouraging police officers to ensure that separate establishments for women make provision for an adequate career structure.
Under the Bill and in general terms, it will no longer be possible for chief officers to discriminate between men and women in recruitment, postings, selection for training or promotion. In each case applicants will be considered solely on the basis of qualifications required for the particular post, and the best person, man or woman will be selected. But there are some important qualifications written into the Bill in Clause 7 which recognise sex as a genuine occupational qualification for jobs. In certain cases those exceptions will be available to chief officers. Therefore, we do not feel able to accept new Clause 9.

Mr. W. R. Rees-Davies: I wish to clarify a number of matters relating to the police. I agree that there is an increasing rôle for women in the police force. I should like to think that that rôle should also be increased in the matter of protection. I agree with what the Minister said on that matter. Bu there is still a wide area of police activity that is wholly unsuitable as a career structure for women.
Undoubtedly, many police in the metropolis have the major task of giving physical protection to Her Majesty's subjects. Let us take the example of a large number of police who are called in to control the Grosvenor Square troubles and a great many others. I appreciate that many women police are experts in judo and can look after themselves in the odd rough and tumble. However, the question involves the matter of balance, and I am a little worried on that score.
If we read Clauses 7 and 17 together, it is difficult to see exactly what the position of the chief constable, and indeed of the Metropolitan Police, will be. It is not enough to say that the police must consider both men and women for a particular job and choose those who are most suitable. They may decide that there are

certain areas in the force which are unsuitable for women. If there is a range of work for police in the London area where men are often sent off to cope with rather tough jobs, it is surely unsuitable for such jobs to be advertised as applying to women. There are also certain other fields of police activity which are unsuitable for women.
In those cases involving sex offences, such as prostitution—and I particularly refer to women's prostitution, though this may also involve cases of male prostitution which can be dealt with only by men—is there to be an increase in the number of women to be employed on those cases?
I have considered these problems carefully because I was a member of a Select Committee which considered this problem. We took the view that in some of these matters it was better that the police and, indeed, the clergy should be excluded altogether. However, the police have been included within the ambit of the present Bill. Obviously, we must be careful when seeking to legislate on these matters. I hope that clear guidance will he given by the Home Office in a circular to all chief constables showing how they can carry out their responsibilities fairly while at the same time recruiting more women. At the same time it should be made plain that certain parts of the police force would not be appropriate as part of a career structure for women.
I hope that women will be encouraged to take up detective work because there is no reason why women should not do a useful job in that role. I look forward to the day when the Home Office sets up a proper criminal investigation department—not only on regional but on national lines. However, that is a matter we can discuss on another occasion.
I am not altogether happy about the Government's provisions. I should like an assurance from the Minister that these matters have been discussed betwen the Department and the Metropolitan Police and that criteria will be laid down for chief constables which will be acceptable to the police force as a whole.

Mr. Ronald Bell: I hope that the Minister will consider this matter again and not brush it aside by calling in aid a broad principle. There is a real point involved here.
I am afraid that the matter is being dealt with, as the Minister's speech indicated, by analogy with the Equal Pay Act. It is one thing to apply the provisions of that Act to the police force, but it does not follow that one should apply the provisions of the Sex Discrimination Bill to the police force. I do not know what discussions have taken place with chief officers of police, but I should not be completely happy if matters were left to rest there. In practice they will be able to manage for a few years as they are. However, there is a momentum in these matters. The problem will not arise for a time, and that does not justify the existence of these provisions in the Bill.
The Minister said that there were provisions in Clauses 7 and 17 involving cases where sex was a qualification for the job, but there is little in the Bill which helps one to understand the situation. Are we to envisage in these circumstances the possession of "authentic male characteristics"? Does this involve the preservation of "decency or privacy", or is it likely to involve "physical contact with men"—a situation which might perhaps be complicated if women were employed in such a job? Does it involve the consideration that such employees may have to be in "a state of undress" or that they have to live in with their employers, or to work in hospital prisons, and so on?
Clause 17 refers to
height, uniform, equipment, or allowances…".
Clause 17(2)(b) refers to "pregnancy or childbirth"—which does not apply to the male constable—and also to pensions. The hon. Lady must accept that there is nothing in the existing clause to deal with that point.
There is beyond question a need for strong, fit young men to deal with situations not only in the metropolis but elsewhere in the country. Our police forces cope with those situations on our behalf because the rest of the population, by reason of age, sex or ill health, are not always able to protect themselves against attack and are protected by the police force. That is their first and primary function, and it involves physical superiority regularly day by day. This ought not to be brushed aside.
I know how these things are done. The hon. Lady is, after all, mandated by the Secretary of State. He is not here. He is not listening to the debate. She is not going to shift her ground today, but this will go to another place, and I urge that she and her right hon. Friend should give this sensible thought and get away from any doctrinaire influences. I realise that she is not going to accept my clause, but I hope that she will consider whether there could not be at any rate some amendment of Clauses 7 or 17, leaving chief officers of police a sensible discretion as to the balance of their force.

8.0 p.m.

Dr. Summerskill: In listening to the debate I was reminded that there was a time when there were no women in the police force at all, and no doubt some might have argued that a woman could not possibly go on the beat or be a mounted policewoman, yet today we see them in both situations and take them for granted. I think we are agreed that there is a place in the police force for men and women. I think the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Bell) is not saying that the police force should be solely manned by men.
We have had discussions and consultations with the police on this Bill, as we have had with very many organisations throughout its preparation. The police are the first to agree that there are areas of work or jobs in the police force where the most suitable candidate might be a man. There are other jobs where the most suitable candidate might be a woman, and others where the choice might be equally man or woman.
The philosophy and principle behind the Bill is that people should be chosen for the job on the grounds of merit, their ability to do the job, and not on grounds of sex. If a chief officer is selecting somebody for a post and thinks that a man would do the job better, or that only a man could do the job, there is nothing to stop him appointing a man. Conversely, there may be a job where a woman candidate is the one he would choose on grounds of merit.
As to Clause 7, relating to exceptions where sex is a genuine occupational qualification, there are certain jobs in the police force for which it is considered that a woman police officer is preferable


—for example, searching women, escorting women prisoners, or taking statements from children. But there are a wide range of jobs in the police force today in regard to which physical strength and superiority are not the real qualification. I hope that the House will not approve the clause.

Question put and negatived.

Clause 1

SEX DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN

Mr. John Fraser: I beg to move Amendment No. 3, in page 1, line 18, at end insert:
'and
(iii) which is to her detriment because she cannot comply with it'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this amendment we are to discuss Government Amendments Nos. 5 and 7.

Mr. Fraser: The purpose of the amendment is to clarify the definition of indirect discrimination. During the Committee stage an amendment was proposed by the Opposition, and carried, to delete the word "unfavourable" before the words "condition or requirement" in the first line of Clause 1(1)(b). It was apparent during the debate on that amendment that the term "unfavourable" had given rise to some confusion. What I hope the amendment will do is to give added meaning to the clause.
Perhaps I may show how the subsection would work with the amendment. That may be the best way of explaining it. Indirect discrimination must have a number of ingredients, and I will list them. First, indirect discrimination must consist of the application to men and women alike of a requirement or condition which they have to apply if they wish to obtain a particular benefit or avoid a particular detriment. There must be an ostensibly identical condition or requirement. Secondly, the conditions or requirements must be discriminatory in their effect. Whilst being ostensibly equal, they must be discriminatory in their effect. There are two elements to this.
The first is their effect upon women generally, in that a much smaller proportion of women than of men can

comply with them and, hence, qualify. Secondly, there must be a particular victim of indirect discrimination, and she must, for obvious reasons, be one of those women who are unable to qualify for the benefits.
It was in not distinguishing these two elements of unfavourable treatment that the previous draft was deficient, and we hope that the present wording adequately clarifies the matter by using the term "detriment".
The third element of indirect discrimination is that the conditions or requirements must be unjustifiable. This has already been touched upon earlier in the debate. In other words, they must be such that when looked at objectively they are basically irrelevant to the question whether and to whom the particular benefit should be made available.
I hope the House will consider that the wording suggested is an adequate and perhaps better substitute for the word "unfavourable" which was deleted in Committee.

Mr. Alison: Commenting on the Minister's amendments, which broadly we support and favour, he has already been kind enough informally to illuminate me on a particular aspect of the clause which left me a little puzzled.
I have two questions to ask, one on the matter of intention, to which I have already referred in an earlier debate, and the other concerning the Equal Opportunities Commission in its wide-ranging and generalised surveillance of this field.
First, concerning intention, I understand that intention is not affected by the fact that the subsection has to be triggered oft by an individual case because it can still be shown that an employer adopted certain criteria for the job which would have the effect of disadvantaging an individual when that person actually applied. Since we are talking about the lay courts' interpretation, does not the repeated reference to "her", the individual, in the introduction to this subsection mean that logically and in law it could be demonstrated that there could not conceivably have been any intention—because "her" must have been an unknown individual—in advance? With the very individualising of this phraseology here, it could be


argued in law that intention cannot be inferred from the effect upon an individual who has to produce an individual case.
The Minister has helped me a good deal already by pointing out that these generalised criteria which could be produced by employers may well have an individual effect, and it is when that individual effect arises that one can infer backwards that an employer really meant to discriminate against women the whole time. The individualising of the whole subsection in applying to her a requirement, and the situation in which the individual has to apply and complain, suggests that intention might be very difficult to prove and quite easy to defend.
Secondly, because the whole misdemeanour of indirect discrimination can arise only when an individual makes a complaint and shows that the particular practice is to her detriment, is it possible for the Equal Opportunities Commission, as it were, to go round looking for cases of indirect discrimination? No such case of indirect discrimination can arise unless an individual complains. The Equal Opportunities Commission can hardly go round the country looking at employment situations and saying "This is a situation of indirect discrimination in which the proportion of women who comply is considerably smaller than the proportion of men who comply. This is an employment situation in which it is difficult to see any justification for having a strength or a height requirement. But, still, no one has complained. No individual has shown that it is to her detriment. So really the indirect discrimination situation does not arise, and we cannot do anything about it." The commission might have to put up an agent provocateur, an individual woman to apply for a job and to be turned down, to show detriment to her individually before carrying on its general work of surveillance as to the prevalance of indirect discrimination.
Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will comment on those points.

Mr. John Fraser: First of all, the new drafting does not affect the previous meaning about intention.
Secondly, the drafting is in individualised terms because the two subsections, Clause 1(1)(b) and Clause 3(1)(b), are intended to give effect to individual remedies, and it is of the nature of the thing that it has to be in individualised language, but I am advised that they are effective in providing the remedy.
The hon. Gentleman pointed out that intention is difficult to prove in individual circumstances. He is right. That is why I hope that the House will agree later that the burden of proof for intention shall shift to the employer. I agree that intention may be difficult to prove. I think that we make it easier by reversing the burden of proof.
As to the inter-relationship between Clauses 1(1)(b), 3(1)(b) and new Clause 1, I have to hazard a guess as to the way in which the Equal Opportunities Commission will go about its business. On past experience with race relations, time and time again there have been situations where the Race Relations Board and others concerned with race relations have not had individual complaints, and yet there has been cause for concern and their apprehended cause for concern has sometimes turned out to be justified, with trouble breaking out in an establishment even though there has been no individual complaint. For that reason, we cannot say how the commission will use the new clause, but it looks for practices and arrangements which in its opinion could give rise to a case under Clause 1(1)(b) or Clause 3(1)(b).
If it looks as though the commission is being given the power to maraud, the person against whom a non-discrimination notice might be served has adequate safeguards. He can make representations to the commission. It may be that the threat of a non-discrimination notice may cause a change of practice, but even if that defence does not work for him he has the right of appeal to the tribunal.
We think that we have the balance about right by giving the Equal Opportunities Commission the right to make investigations where in the past individual complaints have failed to put matters right.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 3

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MARRIED PERSONS IN EMPLOYMENT FIELD

Amendments made:

No. 5, in page 2, line 16, leave out an unfavourable' and insert 'a'.

No. 7, in line 25, at end insert
and
(iii) which is to that person's detriment because he cannot comply with it'.—[Mr. John Fraser.]

Clause 4

DISCRIMINATION BY WAY OF VICTIMISATION

8.15 p.m.

Miss Richardson: I beg to move Amendment No. 8, in page 2, line 36, leave out 'against him'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this amendment, we are to discuss the following:

No. 9, in page 2, line 39, leave out against him'.

No. 10, in line 42, leave out 'in relation to him'.

No. 12, in page 3, line 1, leave out 'he has committed'.

No. 13, in line 4, after '1970', insert has been committed'.

Miss Richardson: The intention of the amendment is to deal with victimisation by third parties and with the operation of black lists against those who have instituted proceedings under the Sex Discrimination Bill or under the Equal Pay Act 1970.
I am sure that no one will deny the existence of black lists right across the board in all sorts of ways. They exist in employment, in the extension of credit facilities and elsewhere. It is no secret that people pass on information about whether an individual is considered a good and worthy person. It is a fact that that is what happens. Over the years various formulae have been sought to try to get rid of the existence of black lists. I understand that in the Standing Committee on the Employment Protection Bill there have been discussions about how blacklisting could be got rid of, and

I know that the problem is to find a formula to do so.
With this amendment the clause would cover the eventuality that an employer, a Government Department, a credit company, a trade union or anyone else might victimise those who had complained against them under this legislation or under the Equal Pay Act.
In my experience, the classic example is that of those who offer credit facilities. They check the creditworthiness of applicants in a way which often amounts to snooping. There are companies which collect and compile information about people who apply for credit. What would happen if a person applying for credit had complained already about a credit company on the grounds of discrimination? His or her name could go on a black list. It is that that I wish to try to avoid. We all abhor this kind of blacklisting. If we have a chance through this legislation to stop up a loophole, I believe that we should use it.

Mr. Ronald Bell: I waited for the Minister to speak first but in a spirit of equality she defers to me. It seems to me that leaving out the words "against him" in these three sections would really bring Clause 4 outside the Long Title and, indeed, the scope of the Act, because it renders unlawful certain kinds of sex discrimination. When it is "against him" that is all right where the person has made a complaint against the respondent under the Act or the Equal Pay Act. But once it ceases to be against him it does not necessarily seem to be a case of sex discrimination at all and it would really be widening the Act to cover coercive provisions against people who happen not to approve of the policy of the Act but yet are totally opposed to sex discrimination. Therefore, it seems that, apart from being oppressive, this would not be in consonance with the intention of the Act.

Dr. Summerskill: I am grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman for raising this point. I should explain that the victimisation provision in the Bill is a relatively new concept, although not wholly without precedent. There is an analogous provision in rent legislation. In drafting Clause 4 we sought to relate the victimisation closely to the original


alleged discrimination, and did so by confining the concept of victimisation to a situation where X treats Y less favourably on the ground that Y has, for example, brought proceedings against X.
We must consider carefully before extending this definition of victimisation in the way proposed in the amendments. It is a fairly new, although I believe valuable, concept. However, my hon. Friend's amendments deserve consideration, and I should like an opportunity to look further at the points involved. In the circumstances, I hope that she will feel able not to press the amendments so that I can consider them before the stage in another place.

Miss Richardson: It gives me great pleasure to withdraw the amendments on the Minister's undertaking that she will look at them. I am most grateful for that and beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Mr. Bell: I beg to move Amendment No. 11, in page 2, line 42, to leave out from 'him' to end of line 4, on page 3.
My comments on this amendment are much the same. The amendment seeks to strike out paragraph (d) of clause 4(1). Paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) to which the previous amendment related all refer to discrimination which has occurred under the Act as it would then be, or the Equal Pay Act. Paragraph (d) goes much further and treats as victimised someone who has alleged that the employer, I suppose, or whoever it might be, has committed an act which would amount to a contravention of the Act. That is nothing to do with sex discrimination. The person complained against might be a man, an employer, and the person who makes the statement that X has done an act of discrimination could easily be another man. It could be anybody.
To bring in a sanction like this of X, the person of whom the statement is made, against Y who made it, is really a novel procedure in legislation. This means, in effect, that the provisions under the Act are being used for people who have a bias against someone who has said something adverse to them although there has been no question whatsoever of discrimination between those two

people. I find this a most dangerous extension of legislative activity. Somebody disagrees with me, and he, for that disagreement and the antipathy arising out of it, shall be subject to penalties although there has been no question whatsoever of discrimination on the ground of sex between those two people.
I do not know whether this was thought through before it was done. It looks very much as though it was added on at the end, as a kind of attack on anyone who did not approve of the policy of the Bill. I hope that the Minister will realise the danger of this as a precedent. In previous debates this afternoon we have had quoted examples of things done under previous Acts like the Equal Pay Act and the Industrial Relations Acts and others where it is said "This may appear obnoxious but it has been done three or four times before". This will be the first precedent for something like this, and I regard it as constitutionally a very dangerous precedent. It is totally unnecessary for the purposes of the Bill.
I find it a little difficult to know how it got through the mesh, because it hardly seems to be inside the Long Title. I hope that the Minister and her advisers will give this careful thought, because we must not have oppressive legislation of this kind interfering with the ordinary antipathies, bias, prejudices, likes and dislikes of members of the community. The Bill is about discrimination on the ground of sex and nothing else. It should not go beyond that.

Dr. Summerskill: I have listened carefully to the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Bell). It seems that he is setting too little store by the safeguard provided in subsection (2), which provides that victimisation does not arise when one person treats another less favourably on account of allegations that that other person has made against him which are false and made otherwise than in good faith. The Government believe that this is a necessary safeguard and that it is sufficient.
Let me put two examples showing how the inclusion of subsection (1)(d) in Clause 4 will afford valuable and necessary protection. Suppose the Equal Opportunities Commission mounts a formal investigation into the activities of some firm and asks its employees about


their employers' practices, for example with regard to recruitment or training. In good faith a foreman gives evidence to the commission which amounts to an allegation of unlawful sex discrimination by that firm. As a result he is promptly sacked. Without (d) that person would have no redress against the firm.
My second example also concerns employment, because it is here that the clause is likely to be of most effect having regard to the nature of the employee-employer relationship. A woman believes she has been discriminated against and takes up the matter with a trade union. The employer gets to hear of the allegation and victimises her in some way or another because of that. Without (d) Clause 4 might afford that woman no protection at all.
If the Bill is to make any impact on sex discrimination, men or women who feel that they have been discriminated against must not be deterred from asserting their rights or seeking advice and assistance. Nor must the EOC be hamstrung in its task of identifying and eliminating discrimination by a wall of silence which the threat of victimisation can so easily erect. I ask the House to reject the amendment.

Mr. Ronald Bell: The Minister has not quite got the point. I did not even refer to the safeguard that she has mentioned. I was aware of its presence. I wanted to focus attention on the main point which is the dangerous extension which this subsection constitutes. Let me deal with the points she has raised. She says that the person who has been dismissed because of the evidence he has given to the commission would not have a remedy under Clause 4. What does that matter? He has a remedy under the unfair dismissal provisions in other legislation. We do not have to have everything in this Bill. That is my objection. This has nothing to do with sex discrimination. Such a person would go to the industrial tribunal and claim that he had been unfairly dismissed. He could not fail.
If we look at the safeguards it will be seen that we are normally dealing with a case involving a false allegation. If the allegation is not false the employer will find himself in trouble. But he will have to prove that it was not made in

good faith. That will be very difficult. How does he set about proving it? He has to prove that to extricate himself from the trouble he would be in under Clause 4(1)(d). This is nothing to do with sex discrimination.
First of all, such a person must prove that the allegation is false. One almost assumes here that the matter has not been adjudicated upon. That is normally the case. It would be necessary to prove that the allegation was made in bad faith. Malice is a difficult thing to prove because it requires a high standard of proof. In a case of dismissal or some such thing there is a remedy elsewhere. There is a remedy for ordinary breach of contract. Therefore, this special penalty, the pains and penalties praemunire, under the Bill is totally unjustifiable in relation to something which is not sex discrimination at all, and, therefore, it should not be covered by the provisions of the Bill.

Amendment negatived.

Clause 6

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST APPLICANTS AND EMPLOYEES

8.30 p.m.

Mr. John Fraser: I beg to move Amendment No. 14, in page 3, line 33 leave out "which is available".
Clause 6 at present makes unlawful, discrimination by an employer in relation to employment by him,
which is available at an establishment in Great Britain.
The words "which is available" are unnecessarily restrictive and their deletion will ensure that an act of discrimination against a person will not escape the terms of the Bill on the technical ground that it relates to employment that was not available at the time the act was committed.

Mr. Ronald Bell: I ask for clarification, because in my view this is an extraordinary situation. Is the Minister saying that someone can be guilty of discrimination for not giving a person a job that does not exist at the time?

Mr. Fraser: Perhaps I can give an example from my own profession. A solicitor employs articled clerks, but articles are available perhaps only once


a year. It may be that people write to the solicitor asking to be considered, and he may reject all the female applications but keep a list of the male applications. The post of an articled clerk is not available at the time the discriminatory act takes place, but it will become available in the future. Leaving the words in could have a restrictive effect on the Bill. I hope that that is an adequate explanation.

Mr. Ronald Bell: It does not make it any more acceptable to me. It means that an employer is guilty of an offence, even though he has no vacancy for an articled clerk, because he decides to throw away certain applications. He is guilty of a discriminatory offence because he has thrown away applications which relate to a vacancy which does not exist at the time but which may exist in the future.

Mr. Fraser: I shall try to make the position clear. Sometimes it is a mistake to be brief. Clause 6 does not create an unlawful act. It is the application of Clauses 1 and 3 to situations covered by subsequent parts of the Bill. There needs to be a combination of discrimination, as defined in Clauses 1 and 3, applied to situations which are described in the later part of the Bill. I hope that that answer amplifies my previous answer and satisfies the hon. and learned Gentleman.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 7

EXCEPTION WHERE SEX IS A GENUINE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION

Mr. John Fraser: I beg to move Amendment No. 16, in page 5, line 22, after 'in', insert 'or normally lived in'.
Clause 7 provides for exception where sex is shown to be a genuine occupational qualification for a job. The subsection to which the amendment relates provides an exception where the holder of the job is required to live in premises connected with the employment and where the sleeping accommodation is communal and the sanitary facilities, bathing, washing and toilet facilities, are such that they cannot be used in privacy from persons of

the opposite sex and where it is not reasonable for the employer to provide suitable accommodation and facilities, the provision was designed to cover, for example, jobs in ships, lighthouses and remote construction sites.
We now find that it is possible that a problem could arise in applying the subsection as now worded, and particularly in relation to employment in ships. This is a problem which the hon. Member for Barkston Ash (Mr. Alison) raised in Committee on 1st May at the request of the General Council of British Shipping. Unfortunately, some of the finer points of the case for amending the provision did not emerge at the time, but I now accept that the General Council had justification for its representations, and I shall do my best to explain to the House the intricacies of the problem.
The General Council is concerned about the position of shipowners if the first crew member to come forward for employment in a particular ship, where the crew accommodation is communal, happens to be a woman. As the subsection is now worded the exception applies where the premises are "lived in by men". Hon. Members should note that there are the words which are at the root of the problem, but in this particular ship which is due to sail, say, on the following day, the crew accommodation—the "premises" for the purposes of the Bill—is empty. None of the crew members has come forward so far. It is not lived in by men. In fact, it is not lived in by anybody. Therefore, the employer cannot plead the exception. This is the problem, a problem we solve by using the word "normally", so that the clause will read
normally lived in by men".
In case my hon. Friends think that I am going too far in giving a concession to the General Council of British Shipping I emphasise as strongly as I can that there is the other provision in the clause that for a shipowner to succeed in a defence he must convince a tribunal that the second part of subsection (2)(c) applies, that it is not reasonable to expect him to equip the ship with appropriate accommodation for women. Only if he so convinces the tribunal will he lawfully be able to restrict his crew to men.
I hope that I have the balance right, and that the amendment commends itself to the House.

Mr. Ronald Bell: Again I ask for clarification because my hon. Friend the Member for Barkston Ash (Mr. Alison) is not here. I see from the Official Report of the Committee debates that his point primarily concerned a new vessel being commissioned and the first person coming forward being a woman. Can the Minister give the assurance that the words
or normally lived in
apply to the accommodation in a newly commissioning vessel?

Mr. John Fraser: I am not sure what the hon. and learned Gentleman means by "newly commissioning vessel". The words apply not to a new vessel but to a vessel which is about to take on a crew. I am not sure whether the hon. and learned Gentleman means a completely new vessel or one about to go on a new voyage.

Mr. Ronald Bell: In the Standing Committee my hon. Friend the Member for Barkston Ash (Mr. Alison) postulated a new ship which had not been lived in, where the crew accommodation was obviously intended for men. He pointed out the difficulty if the first person to come forward is a woman. As he said, in a ship of any size it would not be possible to have a crew consisting wholly of women at present, and therefore there would be an impossible situation. Is that covered?

Mr. John Fraser: That is the situation dealt with by the amendment, which would apply whether it were a new ship or an old one.
The only matter that might have to be taken into account, if the employer had commissioned a brand-new ship, would be the provision about reasonableness. Such a defence might not be so readily available to him as with a ship constructed or commissioned well before the passing of the Act.

Mr. Stanbrook: How is it that a ship which has never been lived in can "normally" be lived in within the terms of the subsection?

Mr. Ronald Bell: I congratulate the Minister on the answer he gave me, and

thank him for it. It was precisely the answer I had hoped that he would give, because if a brand-new ship with crew accommodation can have that accommodation described as "normally lived in by men" there is a great deal to be said for what the Minister has been saying, as "normally" there means "according to the prevailing customs of the times". As long as that governs the interpretation of the Bill, I am quite happy.

Mrs. Colquhoun: I hope that these proceedings are not being broadcast. If they are, we shall all get the sack at the next election.

Mr. John Fraser: I shall consider the point about the brand-new ship. It had not occurred to me before.
However, I recommend the amendment to the House on the basis that—and I must be careful about this—if it can be established that the accommodation was designed for men the amendment would be intended to apply to a newly commissioned ship as well as an existing ship.

Amendment agreed to.

Mr. Ronald Bell: I beg to move Amendment No. 17, in page 5, line 25, leave out sub-paragraph (ii).
I wish to omit subparagraph (ii) of subsection 2(c) on which the Minister has been relying so heavily. It is the subparagraph which says that:
it is not reasonable to expect the employer either to equip those premises with such accommodation and facilities…".
This provision should be omitted because it is unreasonable.
Who on earth will decide whether it is reasonable for someone to build new premises? The Minister dealt with this provision as though it were all about ships. Of course it applies to ships, but it also applies to everything else. Clause 7 is a perfectly general clause. The heading says:
Exception where sex is a genuine occupational qualification.
Therefore, certainly it applies not only to ships.
It is a good, old clause about the authentic male characteristics. It is the lavatory clause—and all that. Nothing would help the Bill to make sense, but if we did not have Clause 7 the Bill


would be such manifest nonsense that it would have been laughed out on Second Reading.
We should not have the impression that the lines which I am seeking to omit are about ships in particular. They are about anything. The question is raised whether being a man is a genuine occupational qualification for a job. Someone has to decide whether an employer should build new accommodation and equip it for women. This is a most extraordinary provision to put in a Bill. I can understand a Bill that says that an employer must not discriminate between whether men and women can both do the job. However, to say that the employer will be committing an unlawful act if he does not employ a woman because he has an existing establishment where the accommodation permits only the employment of men is going a little too far. Shall we have all sorts of accountancy evidence about the capital costs involved, the interest charges, the expected future of the business, the demand for products and other matters of that kind? Who will examine all this rubbish—a county court judge or an industrial tribunal?
Let us have some practical common sense. If the employer does not have the right accommodation, that is it. If he has, we are back to the general principle of the Bill, which I do not like but which the Minister does. I ask him to throw out these lines and to make the Bill just that shade less absurd than it is at present.

Mr. John Fraser: It is not that the Bill be a shade less absurd. It is that it would be a shade less effective, and we intend that it should be as effective as possible, that it should have the minimum number of exceptions and that the cost of having to comply with it should not be a defence.
There is a huge yawning gulf between the philosophy of the hon. and learned Gentleman and my philosophy and, I suspect, the philosophy of a great many right hon. and hon. Conservative Members on equal opportunities for women.
We take the view that the exceptions should be minimal. If, for instance, it is necessary to build a second lighthouse in order to provide accommodation for a

woman, we regard that as a reasonable defence for the employer. If it is necessary so to alter a small ship that all the cargo space is taken up in order to provide women's accommodation, the employer or the shipowner should have a defence. However, that apart, if it is reasonable to make alterations, he cannot use that as a defence for having to provide communal accommodation. We apply exactly the same principles in safety legislation and in legislation applying to offices, shops and railway premises. In my view, we ought not to do anything less for women.

8.45 p.m.

Mr. Ronald Bell: The hon. Gentleman has not answered the question at all. If it takes up half of the cargo space, or a quarter of it, to put in a women's lavatory, this will produce an absurd position. The Minister said that possibly a good many of my hon. Friends shared my view. Let me tell him that a good many Labour Members also share my point of view. It is just that they are not all bold enough to state it. The amount of genuine support on either side of the House for this Bill could go into quite a small ink pot and leave room for a piece of chalk.
This is one of the silliest Bills that have ever been inflicted on Parliament. It is making a fool of the legislative procedure. It just shows that any set of dedicated cranks who lobby long enough can get any Bill through Parliament.

Amendment negatived.

Clause 8

EQUAL PAY ACT 1970

Mr. John Fraser: I beg to move Amendment No. 18, in page 7, line 23, leave out from his' to end of line 30.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to discuss Amendment No. 86, in Schedule 1, page 52, line 37, leave out from 'his' to end of line 43.

Mr. Fraser: Several hon. Members expressed doubt in Committee as to the inclusion in Section 1(3) of the Equal Pay Act, as submitted by the Bill, of the examples of what constitutes a "material difference", and I dealt with this matter in Committee. I asked for guidance from members of the Committee. I am afraid


I did not get any guidance. I have, however, reconsidered the matter without guidance.
It is not our intention to make unnecessary alterations to the wording of the Equal Pay Act, and because the examples we put into the Bill are not in the Act at present and are not strictly necessary, and because representations from outside sources have asked for the examples to be withdrawn, we have decided to amend the Bill in the form of this amendment.

Mr. Ian Gilmour: What effect does this amendment have? Does it make the clause more restrictive or less restrictive than it was previously?

Mr. Fraser: The problem is that the insertion of the two examples was felt to make the Equal Pay Act more restrictive. That is why we have decided to take out the examples.

Amendment agreed to.

Mr. John Fraser: I beg to move Amendment No. 19, in page 7, line 37, leave out
'deemed to be included in her contract of employment'.
This is a technical amendment designed to ensure that it is unlawful to make a discriminatory offer of employment in the case where an employer includes an express equality clause in all his workers' contracts. This is already the case where the equality clause would be deemed to be included in the woman's subsequent contract of employment by virtue of substituted Section 1(1) of the Equal Pay Act, if she accepted the job offered to her.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 11

PARTNERSHIPS

Mr. Ronald Bell: I beg to move Amendment No. 21, in page 9, line 37, leave out Clause 11.
This is the clause applying the Bill to partnerships. It is quite unreasonable that so personal a relationship as a partnership should be governed by the Bill. What is more, the clause applies not only to partnerships but to people considering forming themselves into a partnership. Although there is no partnership—and this applies to six or more partners, very

small partnerships—they cannot even decide that they will have a partnership all of men without breaking the law.
Perhaps I cannot say any more than I have already said. I have explained my attitude to the Bill I regard it as wrong and oppressive, and as an interference in the private arrangements of life. One could understand the clause better in relation to large limited companies, but when it is dealing with small partnerships and saying that people cannot decide that they are a men's club, or a women's club for that matter, this again shows the doctrinaire extremism of the Bill.

Dr. Summerskill: It was our original proposal in the White Paper that the Bill should make discrimination in professional partnership with eight or more partners unlawful. This proposal to include partnerships in the Bill was welcomed. But in the light of the comments made we decided that the provision should cover all kinds of partnership—not only professional partnerships—and that it should relate to firms with six or more partners.
The personal relationship between partners is of a special kind. That in a small partnership will often be even closer than, for example, that between an employer and the employees of a small firm. It is because of these close personal relationships that we have excluded small partnerships from the scope of the Bill.
Leaving small partnerships aside, I see no reason why the larger partnerships should lawfully be able to turn away a prospective woman partner simply because she is a woman, or should lawfully be able to treat an existing woman partner less favourably than her male partners, again simply because she is a woman. The converse would apply.
In some instances employees in a partnership have a normal career expectation to be considered in due course for the position of a partner. It would be indefensible if the Bill did not give women in such situations the right to be treated equally with men.
Many of the professions, such as accountants, solicitors and chartered surveyors, are largely organised on a partnership basis. Women in those professions should not be denied the protection of the Bill. I therefore ask the House to reject the amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

Division No. 240.]
AYES
[8.54 p.m.


Bell, Ronald
McCusker, H.
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Fry, Peter
Molyneaux, James
Mr. Ivor Stanbrook and


Gray, Hamish
Paisley, Rev Ian
Mr. John Biggs-Davison


Grist, Ian
Powell, Rt Hon J. Enoch





NOES


Allaun, Frank
Fraser, John (Lambeth, N'w'd)
Mitchell, R. C. (Soton, Itchen)


Anderson, Donald
George, Bruce
Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)


Armstrong, Ernest
Golding, John
Murray, Rt Hon Ronald King


Atkins, Ronald (Preston N)
Gourlay, Harry
Noble, Mike


Bagier, Gordon A. T.
Hamilton, James (Bothwell)
O'Halloran, Michael


Bates, Alf
Hardy, Peter
O'Malley, Rt Hon Brian


Bennett, Andrew (Stockport N.)
Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)
Ovenden, John


Bidwell, Sydney
Hatton, Frank
Owen, Dr David


Blenkinsop, Arthur
Hayman, Mrs Helene
Park, George


Boardman, H.
Heffer, Eric S.
Penhaligon, David


Booth, Albert
Hooson, Emlyn
Prescott, John


Boothroyd, Miss Betty
Horam, John
Price, C. (Lewisham W)


Bray, Dr Jeremy
Howells, Geraint (Cardigan)
Price, William (Rugby)


Callaghan, Jim (Middleton &amp; P)
Hoyle, Doug (Nelson)
Radlce, Giles


Campbell, Ian
Hughes, Rt Hon C. (Anglesey)
Richardson, Miss Jo


Cant, R. B.
Hughes, Mark (Durham)
Roderick, Caerwyn


Clemitson, Ivor
Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)
Rodgers, George (Chorley)


Cocks, Michael (Bristol S)
Hughes, Roy (Newport)
Rooker, J. W.


Cohen, Stanley
Jackson, Colin (Brighouse)
Roper, John


Colquhoun, Mrs Maureen
Jackson, Miss Margaret (Lincoln)
Ross, Stephen (Isle of Wight)


Cox, Thomas (Tooting)
Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)
Selby, Harry


Craigen, J. M. (Maryhill)
John, Brynmor
Skinner, Dennis


Crawshaw, Richard
Jones, Alec (Rhondda)
Small, William


Cunningham, Dr J. (Whiteh)
Jones, Barry (East Flint)
Smith, Cyril (Rochdale)


Dalyell, Tam
Jones, Dan (Burnley)
Spearing, Nigel


Davidson, Arthur
Kaufman, Gerald
Spriggs, Leslie


Davies, Ifor (Gower)
Kilfedder, James
Stewart, Rt Hon M. (Fulham)


Dean, Joseph (Leeds West)
Kilroy-Silk, Robert
Stoddart, David


de Freitas, Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey
Lamborn, Harry
Summerskill, Hon Dr Shirley


Dempsey, James
Lamond, James
Taylor, Mrs Ann (Bolton W)


Doig, Peter
Lestor, Miss Joan (Eton &amp; Slough)
Thomas, Ron (Bristol NW)


Dormand, J. D.
Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)
Tierney, Sydney


Duffy, A. E. P.
Lipton, Marcus
Tinn, James


Dunn, James A.
Litterick, Tom
Tuck, Raphael


Edge, Geoff
Mabon, Dr J. Dickson
Wainwright, Edwin (Dearne V)


Edwards, Robert (Wolv SE)
McCartney, Hugh
Wainwriqht, Richard (Colne V)


Ellis, John (Brigg &amp; Scun)
McElhone, Frank
Ward, Michael


Ellis, Tom (Wrexham)
MacFarquhar, Roderick
White, Frank R. (Bury)


English, Michael
McGuire, Michael (Ince)
White, James (Pollock)


Ennals, David
Mackenzie, Gregor
Williams, W. T. (Warrington)


Evans, Ioan (Aberdare)
McMillan, Tom (Glasgow C)
Wise, Mrs Audrey


Evans, John (Newton)
Madden, Max
Woodall, Alec


Fernyhough, Rt Hon E.
Magee, Bryan
Woof, Robert


Flannery, Martin
Marks, Kenneth
Young, David (Bolton E)


Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)
Marquand, David



Fookes, Miss Janet
Marshall, Dr Edmund (Goole)
TELLERS FOR THE NOES


Ford, Ben
Mellish, Rt Hon Robert
Mr. Joseph Harper and


Forrester, John
Millan, Bruce
Mr. Donald Colman


Fowler, Gerald (The Wrekin)
Miller, Dr M. S. (E Kilbride)

Question accordingly negatived.

9.0 p.m.

Mr. Alison: I beg to move Amendment No. 22, in page 10, line 8, at end insert:
'(2) Subsection (1) shall not apply in relation to a firm or partnership in which it is reasonable, having regard to the essential character or declared purpose of the undertaking, that the position should not he held by a woman'.
I hope that it may be possible for the Government to give us some hope and encouragement on this amendment. It is

The House divided: Ayes 8, Noes 142.

partly exploratory but it raises a real problem in the matter of firms or partnerships of six or more men or women. The fact that we use "woman" as the last word in the amendment is in the context of the general provisions of the Bill in which "man" is interchangeable with "woman".

It is possible to conceive of a situation in which for bona fide reasons a group of women club together, more than six strong, to set up a firm or partnership exclusively of women. They may want to set up a professional all-women choir in


which they are all partners and in which they share the profits from the work they do. They may wish to form an orchestra or a band for the same purpose. They may wish to set up a consultancy service to advise women on the problems of married life or on women's job opportunities. They may wish to set up a consultancy service on household aspects of women's life—for example, to give advice on cooking, shopping, or furnishing and decorating a house.

It is conceivable that for perfectly respectable and bona fide reasons a group of women more than six strong should want to set themselves up in partnership as a firm and deliberately make themselves exclusively a firm or partnership of women. They would be able to advance a good case for restricting their membership on the basis that they got on well with one another and that they wanted to impart a feminine slant to the service that they intended to render. There would be good and respectable reasons for their saying at the beginning of a project, venture or enterprise "We shall limit this undertaking to women only as regards partners and the character of the firm because we shall do a job of work which we believe will attract customers if only women are rendering the service."

It does not need a lot of imagination to conceive of a whole range of entrepreneurial activities in which groups of women more than six strong could legitimately and properly say that they intended to make it an essential character of the enterprise that only women would render the service. They could well say "We mean to make it a declared purpose of the consultancy service that we are setting up to give advice on a whole range of subjects that we shall have only women in the firm." It seems unreasonable that that kind of freedom of choice and perfectly proper discrimination in favour of their own sex in their project or enterprise should be disallowed by the far-reaching and sweeping provisions of Clause 11.

If the hon. Lady cannot accept our amendment I hope that she will be able to reassure the House that the kind of situation which I have described, and the concept of freedom of choice which I have put before the House, will be open to individual groups of women or men and that they will not be inhibited or ruled

out by the clause. If that is not the position there will be an infringement of personal liberty and freedom which I believe the Government did not mean to write into the Bill. Such a situation would be unacceptable.

Dr. Summerskill: Clause 11 already contains two significant exceptions to the requirement that firms or partnerships should not discriminate. First, partnerships of five or fewer persons are not covered by the clause. Secondly, subsection (3) allows discrimination where the position of a partner would meet any of the genuine occupational qualification criteria set out in Clause 7. As the hon. Member for Barkston Ash (Mr. Alison) knows that is quite a long clause.
I think that the two exceptions go as far as is necessary to safeguard the reasonable requirements of partnerships where there are close personal relationships, as in small partnerships. It will be lawful for membership of a partnership to be restricted to one sex. For example, it will be lawful for three or four women, formerly close friends, to set up in partnership for whatever purpose they have in mind and to exclude men from that partnership. As I have said, when the genuine occupational qualification criteria are met it will be lawful for there to be restriction to one sex.
The hon. Gentleman concentrated particularly on women banding together, but to transfer what he was saying to the other sex, a group of men might need to make it an essential character of their service that they should only be men. It is that situation which is one of the reasons for our having seen fit to introduce legislation so that people can enter partnerships on grounds of merit and not be discriminated against on grounds of sex.
To go beyond the exceptions in the way proposed by the amendment would create a major loophole in Clause 11. The words used in the amendment are capable of immensely wide application, as the hon. Gentleman has illustrated.
The phrase
having regard to the essential character or declared purpose of the undertaking
is very wide and would include bodies such as orchestras and other bodies which


for many years have always been the prerogative of men. I can best illustrate this by giving an example. If 20 male solicitors got together to form a partnership and provided that the declared purpose of the undertaking was to run a practice of male solicitors, it would be arguable that the amendment would allow them to take such action lawfully. I believe that the amendment would bring about an unacceptable weakening of Clause 11, and, indeed, of the whole philosophy of the Bill. I ask the House to reject the amendment.

Mr. Alison: With the leave of the House, I would say that I hope the Minister will not skate off with that explanation. I hope that she can at least hold out some hope that this matter will be examined in more detail by those in the other place. I hope they at least will take the view that this provision, Clause 11, is an undesirable and probably unwelcome infringement of personal liberty. If the Bill is passed in this form it will not be possible for a group of women more than six strong to form an all-women's choir, an all-women's orchestra or an all women's consultancy service. The law of the land will say that they must not get together in any larger number.

Dr. Summerskill: Let me try to help the hon. Gentleman. To take his example of an all women's choir, presumably the purpose of setting up such a choir is to have sounds emitted which are of the feminine voice. Therefore, a man applying to become a member of such a choir, if he so wished—which is not very likely—would be rejected not on grounds of sex, but because his voice would not be of the type required for an all-women's choir. In such a case the Bill would be irrelevant, but if that man could show that he had been kept out of the choir on grounds of sex, he would have a case. One could draw this parallel in many of the examples given by the hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Lane: Has my hon. Friend, or, indeed, the Minister considered the question of the Dagenham Girl Pipers? I wish to support my hon. Friend's remarks. The matter requires further thought, and I hope that the Government will move

a little way to meet my hon. Friend's point.

Mr. Alison: I am grateful for the support of my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Mr. Lane). He illustrated the point I was making. Perhaps we were on slightly weak ground when talking about choirs, although I can think of some men who could produce a tone or sound that would get close to the sounds emitted by an all-women's choir. Let me move from vocal chords to instruments. Let us consider the Dagenham Girl Pipers, women's jazz bands or women's all-steel orchestras. In other words, when we consider, not the human voice, but sounds emitted by other instruments, it brings other considerations into play.
I am thinking of the situation faced by a number of women who wish to set up a consultancy service to advise women on job opportunities, or to give medical advice, or to give advice on household problems which confront women in their shopping, cooking or decorating. There are a whole range of topics in which women have a special interest and in which it may be commercially advantageous for a group of women to band together.

Dr. Summerskill: If a man wanted to join one of those bodies he would have to show, if refused admission, that he was rejected on grounds of sex and not on any other grounds. If he could show that he had the qualifications, qualities and knowledge to make it possible for him to be a member of one of those bodies, that would strengthen his case, but he would still have to show that he had been rejected on grounds of sex. Similarly, a woman applying for an all-male symphony orchestra would have to show that the reason she was not accepted was not on grounds of her musical ability, but that she was a woman.

9.15 p.m.

Mr. Alison: I think the hon. Lady has in a sense proved my point. I am not sure that she meant to do so. I am arguing that there should be in certain circumstances situations in which members of the different sexes should be allowed to discriminate on the grounds of sex, as with the setting up of what is by definition an all-women band. We only want women of one sex—[Laughter.]—I


am sorry, though I caused a smile to flit across your face, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I meant to say we only want human beings of one sex where commercial advantage is seen in a regime of that sort, with discrimination on the ground of sex. The Bill allows this in respect of firms or partners up to the number of six, but it is quite conceivable that larger numbers might be involved.
I hope that the hon. Lady since she has shown such a ready disposition to join in the debate on this, will at least look carefully at what my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Mr. Lane) and others have said, and consider whether something can be done in another place to take account of a situation in which, for proper commercial reasons, and reasons of liberty, men or women should be allowed to discriminate, on grounds of sex, in partnerships or firms.

Dr. Summerskill: My readiness to take part in the debate must not be misconstrued as sympathy with the amendment. My last word on this is that I feel very strongly that it would provide an extremely serious loophole in our legislation. If we are to concentrate on the effect on women in particular it would seriously affect the chances of many women joining partnerships in many spheres of life.

Amendment negatived.

Clause 12

TRADE UNIONS ETC.

Miss Joan Lestor: I beg to move Amendment No. 23, in page 10, line 24, leave out from 'exists' to end of line 36.
Clause 12 lays down as a general principle that it is unlawful for trade unions, employers' organisations or similar bodies to discriminate on grounds of sex in admission to membership or in their treatment of members.
An amendment was carried in Committee which would exempt from this provision those trade unions which already exist on a single-sex basis, and are the counterpart, or substantially the counterpart, of a similar body limited to members of the other sex. Although the exception was worded in such general terms, there are, as far as we know, only six bodies to which it would apply, namely,

those representing headmasters, headmistresses, assistant masters and assistant mistresses, and, to some extent, the National Association of Schoolmasters and the Union of Women Teachers. The Government cannot accept that there is a case for treating these bodies differently from every other trade union and professional association in the country, and we are, therefore, asking the House to reject the Committee's amendment to Clause 12.
It was argued in Committee that only by organising themselves in separate unions could women teachers ensure representation of their sex within their union structure or on negotiating bodies in education. I find this very difficult to accept.
Women are not a minority in the teaching profession: they constitute a clear majority of all teachers. Moreover, they are, by the nature of their profession, an exceptionally intelligent and articulate group of women. If women in such a position cannot ensure that their voice is heard except by isolating themselves and refusing to compete directly with men, the case for allowing women in a wide range of other occupations to form separate unions must be far stronger, in particular in those occupations where women as yet form only a small minority. Yet the clause at present gives the exception only to those who, by their own argument, are in least need of it.
If the Government were to accept, therefore, that it is necessary to allow unions to function on a single-sex basis, with parallel organisations for men and women, it would be only logical for us to introduce a much wider exception than that in the clause at the moment. Any such exception, however, would be far more likely to rebound to the disadvantage of women than to work in their favour. If women are allowed to exclude men, we can hardly forbid men to exclude women from their trade organisations, and in these cases the position of women would suffer gravely in consequence.
Another argument has been put forward in support of separate teaching unions. It is the argument that women teachers can work for equality of the sexes as a separate group and that only so can they give girls evidence that women can achieve influence and responsibility.
I cannot accept that. There is nothing in the Bill which will prevent women working for equality. Other trade unions have been active in the fight for equality, and so have women within those trade unions, as have teachers and others.
We are not asking the unions to go out of existence as they are. We are simply asking that those unions be subject to the same law as will apply to every other union in the country. Because of the history of unions in the teaching profession, unless the teaching unions themselves take a deliberate decision to lose their separate identities, I should expect the Association of Assistant Mistresses to continue with a largely female membership and the Association of Assistant Masters to remain predominantly male. Whether that is good or bad in either case, that is what I should expect. But neither organisation, because of that, has the right to refuse a member of the opposite sex membership on sex grounds.

Mr. John Page: I am amused by the idea of men joining the Association of Assistant Mistresses. It would seem quite impossible that that state of affairs could exist. If it is impossible, surely the hon. Lady must realise that what she is saying does not add up. The unions cannot remain as they are.

Miss Lestor: In a sense, the hon. Gentleman is right. I am saying that at the moment there are two unions, one of which is the mistresses' union and the oilier the masters' union. I am saying that, although it would be surprising if a flood of men wished to join the Association of Assistant Mistresses, if a man said that he wished to join for reasons of his own—possibly to fight for women's equality—he could not be excluded on the ground of sex. The hon. Gentleman is right in saying that it would no longer be a union of school mistresses. It would be a union of school teachers, most of whom would be mistresses.

Mr. Carol Mather: Would not the name have to be changed? It could not call itself a union of school mistresses any longer, could it? Surely the name would have to be changed, otherwise it would be discriminatory.

Miss Lestor: That is right. In the light of these applications occurring, the union then would obviously constitute a different membership.

Mr. R. C. Mitchell: Is not the whole argument ridiculous? The two organisations work together in the Joint Four in all that they do.

Miss Lestor: It is foolish to argue about a name. It is rather like a new lady Member coming to this House and finding doors marked "Members only", only to discover that the signs mean male Members only. It may be that, after the passage of this Bill, we shall have less of the confusion to which new female Members of Parliament are subjected from time to time.
On a more serious note, it also seems to me that the advantage of ensuring that girls see that women are active at high levels in their trade unions and on related negotiating bodies and other committees must be largely offset by the knowledge that such women achieved their positions not through equal competition with men but through the protection of a preferential system. I am myself very much opposed to this. It seems to me that it would be much more valuable if the very able representatives of the Association of Assistant Mistresses and its sister unions were known to have reached their positions, as I am sure they are eminently capable of doing, without the shelter and protection of a system which ensures that it is not their ability which got them where they were but that their sex was at least one of the most important factors in their selection.
We cannot have this both ways. If we are arguing for a Sex Equality Bill and sex equality we cannot at the same time say that we want special protection because, in effect, we are women and cannot yet, because of attitudes and so forth on all sides in this argument, get the kind of representation we deserve through our abilities. I have said that I do not foresee the application of the requirement of non-discrimination necessarily having any very spectacular effect on the composition of the teaching unions, however desirable that may be.
In fields where workers have a multiplicity of unions which they may join, their choice may depend on a number of things. They may wish to join the largest union, or that which provides a particular service, or very possibly will make their choice because they agree with the policy line taken by one particular union on one or more issues on which they feel strongly. At present the Clause 12 exception applies to a single-sex union which is "the counterpart or substantially the counterpart" of a union confined to the other sex. It will be practically impossible, however, to ensure that two unions provide exactly the same choice for potential members. If a woman supports the policy of a "male union" on some issue where it differs from that of its female counterpart she may feel justly aggrieved that her sex alone precludes her from joining the organisation she feels most truly represents her, her views and what she wants to fight for. It is an essential principle of the Bill that choice in such matters should not be restricted on the irrelevant ground of sex.
While the Government remain firmly opposed to the principle of separate, single-sex trade unions, we have given sympathetic consideration to the arguments that have been put to us about the need for some provision to ensure that until women in all walks of life achieve a situation of practical as well as formal equality, they can be assured of some representation on trade union executive committees and other representative bodies.
Therefore, I can now tell the House that we have decided to introduce in another place a provision which will allow those bodies covered by Clause 12, where it seems that one sex would not otherwise be adequately represented, to make special arrangements to ensure the representation of that sex on elected committees, be they male or female. This will allow for the "positive discrimination" for which some of my hon. Friends have asked but in a more general, more relevant, and more justifiable form than the mere exclusion of a few unions from the Bill as a whole. I hope that in view of this the House will agree to the amendment.

Mr. Ian Gilmour: We welcome the hon. Lady's new appointment and her graceful presence at our deliberations.

We would like to have welcomed her for having produced new arguments on this matter but I am afraid we cannot. The Government were beaten on only three substantive points in Committee and are now trying to undo what happened in Committee on each of those three points. In other words, they are virtually trying to make the whole Committee proceedings a nullity. After what happened in Committee, after informed debate, after people had listened to the arguments, they are trying to undo that by getting a Whip vote from outside, so that those who have not heard the argument will come here and undo what we did.
9.30 p.m.
This seems to be a very sleazy way of going on, particularly as the Opposition helped the Government materially in Committee. There was a great deal of cross-voting throughout. For the Government to come back now and be dictatorial and dogmatic seems to be quite wrong. The hon. Member for Ilford, North (Mrs. Miller) moved this amendment in Committee. When we divided on it the only people who voted against it were those on the "payroll vote". There was a vote of nine to one in favour of it. There was a Labour majority against the Government.
For the Government to come back and pretend that nothing has happened in Committee and seek to undo our work is insulting, dogmatic and dictatorial. In this amendment and in Amendment No. 36 the Government have shown that they are quote prepared to have a bash at the small, weak unions. Yet they cave in when confronted by the strong unions. This, too, is a sleazy way of proceeding.
The Minister has conceded that the amendment is extremely well drafted. She agrees that it applies only to those unions to which the hon. Lady intended it to apply; namely, the educational unions. Nothing that the Minister has said—she was quite funny, unintentionally or otherwise—about the advantages of schoolmasters joining schoolmistresses' unions and vice versa does anything—

Mr. R. C. Mitchell: If the teaching profession joined one union it would be much more powerful and useful.

Mr. Ian Gilmour: That is the same dictatorial attitude that the Government are showing. It may be that a lot of


teachers do not want to join the NUT. I do not see why they should be made to do so. I strongly support the schoolmistresses and the others who want to preserve their own position. The Government's attitude arises from sheer dogmatism. No one suggests that any harm whatever is done as a result of the present position. The Minister has been unable to show that any harm would be done. She merely said that it would not fit in with her general view of what women should do. The right thing to do is to look at the present situation, which is working perfectly well. We debated this in Committee and took the matter to a vote. It is quite wrong for the Government, without adducing any new argument, to seek to undo what we did in Committee.

Mr. Lane: May I draw the attention of the House to the final argument used by the Minister in which she said that it was proposed to introduce a small amendment in another place? May I impress on her that she is doing this for precisely the same reasons, in the trade union context, I was arguing on my new clause? I hope that she will reflect upon that.

Mr. Michael Stewart: I thought that the Minister adduced one argument that had some weight when she said that if the situation remained as the amendment made it, women elected to committees would have the unhappy feeling that they owed their position to their sex and not to their abilities. Then she went on to say that in another place an amendment would be introduced to make it possible in the mixed unions for women to get places on executive committees by virtue of the fact that they were women.
It seems that the argument that is to be advanced in another place for the proposed amendment is the very one to which the Minister has objected here. I cannot understand this. Can one always use the argument that there is a special device to make it easier for women to get elected and that this is in no way derogatory to them? I do not think that we should say that, for example, about the women's section of the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party It reflects a situation which exists at the moment.
It is unfortunate if, in the name of equality between the sexes, we legislate in a way that assumes that public opinion

and general practice have gone further than they have and as a result give women the worst of both worlds in the law and in the eye of public opinion. I hope that the Government will think again about this.

Mr. John Page: I feel that I can speak with some authority on this matter of sex discrimination because my godmother was a male chauvinist pig. She was quite properly, the secretary of the Anti-Suffragette League. That shows that sex prejudice does not run in one tide only.
In my view the Minister is letting down the teaching profession tonight, and I cannot see any reason, other than blind prejudice and a determination to stick to a secret code, why she is trying to get the amendment overturned. Why on earth should not assistant schoolmistresses and assistant masters, if they wish, have an organisation of their own? In my view it is beyond the dreams of reasonableness that the Minister has to bring the might of the payroll vote here tonight to stop a few teachers who wish to band together for a particular purpose.
The right hon. Member for Fulham (Mr. Stewart) touched on a very important aspect of the whole subject when he said that so much of this legislation gives the ordinary woman the worst of both worlds. The hon. Lady spoke about women being active at high levels. In my view, so much of this legislation is produced by women who are active at high levels, and discriminate against the ordinary housewife and mother by making it easier for the ordinary woman to work on difficult shifts and so on.
I have received a number of letters from assistant schoolmistresses in my constituency who are opposed to this measure from an entirely non-political point of view, and believe that it is quite unreasonable. They believe that by demanding this allegiance the Government are showing prejudice, but by leaving things as they are they would show sensible flexibility.
The Minister made an interesting point when she said that an amendment will be produced in another place, providing, I suppose, that statutory men appear on largely women's unions and that statutory women appear on committees of largely male unions. I should have thought that if she believed in the


equality of the sexes and proper opportunities for people to rise, she would not demand that there should be a particular pigeonhole where a pigeon of a particular sex should roost in the union head office.
In trying to reverse the amendment the Minister makes the Bill ridiculous and I wish she would stop it.

Mr. R. C. Mitchell: As someone who is not a member of the payroll vote or who is not on the payroll—I think I should be but I am not—I declare an interest as a member of the National Union of Teachers.
I should like to say a few words in support of the amendment tabled by the Government. I did not say, when I intervened earlier, that all teachers should be members of one union, but I said that I took the view that the teaching profession's position had been weakened in the past by a multiplicity of trade unions and that had there been one strong union its position would have been strengthened sooner than it was. Nobody wants to bring everybody into the National Union of Teachers, and it is absurd, in a profession like teaching, to have single-sex trade unions.
A lot of play has been made about the Association of Assistant Mistresses and the Association of Assistant Masters but they come together in the Joint Four for negotiations. The men's organisation, the women's organisation, and the equivalent head teachers' organisations all sit together on the Burnham Committee and co-operate on all wage negotiations. They are called the Joint Four, and their offices are all in the same building. In theory, they may be four separate organisations, but in practice they are one, and act as one. It seems absurd that in a profession such as teaching there should be separate organisations.
I am concerned about what my hon. Friend the Minister said about the amendment the Government propose to make in another place. I did not catch what it was, but it seemed to me to be going back on the principle. If that amendment is to be made, we might as well have the clause as it stands, so I hope that it will not be made. I think that the original Bill was right, and that it would be right with the amendment before us.
I say to my women colleagues "You can't eat your cake and have it". I am all for equality. But to ask for separatism as well as equality does not make sense, and it makes less sense in teaching than anywhere else.

Mrs. Colquhoun: Does my hon. Friend accept that for generations men have eaten their cake and had it? It is about time we had positive discrimination for women. That is what this is all about.

Mr. Mitchell: I have heard the phrase "positive discrimination" used about education in another context, but never in this one.
I cannot see the advantage to women of having a separate women's teaching organisation, for example. The amendment applies particularly to the teaching profession, which is the one profession where we have had equal pay for many years. There is probably already more equality in it than in most. Why do my hon. Friends not now accept the logic of the situation and support the amendment to reverse the amendment made in Committee?

Mr. Rees-Davies: The hon. Member for Southampton, lichen (Mr. Mitchell) typifies a certain type of trade unionist. He believes that the only thing that matters is to have the maximum bludgeoning power. That is one of the major causes of the nation's troubles. The hon. Gentleman never realised that the real issue is that both men and women are entitled to belong to a union of their choice. For example, the craftsmen are entitled to belong to a union of their choice.
As a member of the National Union of Teachers, the hon. Gentleman can see no advantage for women in having a union of their own choice. He cannot see any advantage in the existence of the National Association of Schoolmasters or independent crafts unions. He may well feel that Mr. Scanlon, Mr. Jack Jones and the others should rule this country. They are well on the way to doing it. The hon. Gentleman showed throughout his speech that he failed to understand that freedom of choice and the liberty of the subject are the first things that should prevail in this matter.
The essence of the matter is that nothing in any of the views expressed so


far denies the right to have single-sex unions and single-sex schools. Here we are dealing with single-sex unions. I served on one of the Select Committees, that of this House. There was also a House of Lords Select Committee. Both Select Committees produced reports, which were virtually unanimous, setting out the criteria which should be in the Bill. At all times we approached the Bill with a wide measure of agreement between at any rate the two major parties, after a great deal of evidence had been given by Ministers in 1972 and 1973 and adopted as the background to the Bill.
I have just read all the way through the Bill, and nowhere in it do I see any recommendation or suggestion that single-sex unions should be abolished. The whole matter is merely one of stopping discrimination on the ground of sex, including discrimination to protect jobs in particular forms of advertising. The Bill is intended particularly to stop discrimination in employment, education and training. There is nothing in any of that which suggests that people may not join the body of their choice. What is quite extraordinary is that it goes further.
9.45 p.m.
The Minister pointed out that the question is one of choice on merit in employment. There is nothing here that suggests that the whole group, either of mistresses or of masters, should not, if they so desire, get together, any more than there should be employers' associations which might wish for a particular reason to be either all men or all women. I, together with others, had the great honour to address in this House the Association of Women Public Relations Consultants—and a very intelligent body they are. That association has its own reasons, some of which are well known to hon. Members, for wishing to remain as it is. Its members are very distinguished persons. They just happen to like to get together as an association of professional women who are pursuing a job which they feel, in various ways, can inure to their own benefit.
Where is the difference between that type of professional association of women or the Association of Professional Women's Clubs and, indeed, the Townswomen's Guilds? All of these are organi

sations for women who have decided that they want to remain as organisations for women because they see certain advantages in doing so. We, as men, may not see those advantages, but it is up to them so to decide the matter.
There is no possible case here for this amendment. It is not surprising that some Labour Members in Standing Committee supported the Conservative Front Bench and so secured the present position. They were right to do so. The Government must remedy this matter because what is being done is unfortunate. Unfortunately, I was not a member of the Standing Committee when this measure was dealt with, but, by reacting in this way and destroying what was done in Committee, the Government are destroying the amity and the genuine co-operation which hitherto existed in the promotion of such a measure.
Why is that important, if it is important? I maintain that it is most important. The real essence of whether women will be successful and of a measure which is designed to assist co-operation for the benefit of women, can be achieved only in the right atmosphere and the right climate. It is the pattern which is used by the Government and in the public sector which will succeed in creating the right climate for women in their employment, training, education, and other areas. It would be unfortunate if, at this stage, women were to be told that the associations they want for their own benefit in the trade union movement will be denied to them, especially when a great many are already union members. They may be wrong about that view. It may be that there are no very great advantages. If they are wrong, they will reach their own conclusion, wind up their associations themselves and say that there is no longer any need for them.
I hope that my hon. Friends will divide the House on the amendment. I also hope that when it is dealt with in another place, careful thought will be given to it by the Government, not only because in the main it will be men who are opposing what women's associations clearly want to do, but because it is better to obtain the substantial agreement of the House of Commons rather than use any type of bulldozing tactics, with which we are


all too familiar at the moment in relation to certain sections of the trade union movement.

Division No. 241.]
AYES
[9.49 p.m.


Allaun, Frank
Flannery, Martin
Mellish, Rt Hon Robert


Anderson, Donald
Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)
Millan, Bruce


Armstrong, Ernest
Ford, Ben
Miller, Dr M. S. (E Kilbride)


Atkins, Ronald (Preston N)
Forrester, John
Mitchell, R. C. (Soton, Itchen)


Bagier, Gordon A. T.
Fowler, Gerald (The Wrekin)
Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)


Bates, Alf
Fraser, John (Lambeth, N'w'd)
Murray, Rt Hon Ronald King


Bennett, Andrew (Stockport N.)
George, Bruce
Newens, Stanley


Bidwell, Sydney
Golding, John
Noble, Mike


Blenkinsop, Arthur
Gourlay, Harry
O'Halloran, Michael


Boardman, H.
Grant, George (Morpeth)
O'Malley, Rt Hon Brian


Booth, Albert
Hamilton, W. W. (Central Fife)
Ovenden, John


Boothroyd, Miss Betty
Hardy, Peter
Owen, Dr David


Bray, Dr Jeremy
Harper, Joseph
Park, George


Callaghan, Jim (Middleton &amp; P)
Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)
Prescott, John


Campbell, Ian
Hatton, Frank
Price, C. (Lewisham W)


Cant, R. B.
Horam, John
Radice, Giles


Clemitson, Ivor
Hoyle, Doug (Nelson)
Roderick, Caerwyn


Cocks, Michael (Bristol S)
Hughes, Rt Hon C. (Anglesey)
Rodgers, George (Chorley)


Cohen, Stanley
Hughes, Mark (Durham)
Rooker, J. W.


Coleman, Donald
Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)
Roper, John


Conlan, Bernard
Hughes, Roy (Newport)
Selby, Harry


Cox, Thomas (Tooting)
Jackson, Colin (Brighouse)
Skinner, Dennis


Craigen, J. M. (Maryhill)
Jackson, Miss Margaret (Lincoln)
Small, William


Crawshaw, Richard
John, Brynmor
Spriggs, Leslie


Cunningham, Dr J. (Whiteh)
Jones, Alec (Rhondda)
Stoddart, David


Dalyell, Tam
Jones, Barry (East Flint)
Summerskill, Hon Dr Shirley


Davidson, Arthur
Jones, Dan (Burnley)
Taylor, Mrs Ann (Bolton W)


Davies, Ifor (Gower)
Kilroy-Silk, Robert
Thomas, Ron (Bristol NW)


Dean, Joseph (Leeds West)
Lamborn, Harry
Tlerney, Sydney


de Freitas, Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey
Lamond, James
Tinn, James


Dempsey, James
Lestor, Miss Joan (Eton &amp; Slough)
Tuck, Raphael


Dolg, Peter
Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)
Wainwright, Edwin (Dearne V)


Dormand, J. D.
Lipton, Marcus
Ward, Michael


Duffy, A. E. P.
Mabon, Dr J. Dickson
White, Frank R. (Bury)


Dunn, James A.
McCartney, Hugh
White, James (Pollock)


Edge, Geoff
McElhone, Frank
Williams, W. T. (Warrington)


Edwards, Robert (Wolv SE)
McGuire, Michael (Ince)
Wise, Mrs Audrey


Ellis, Tom (Wrexham)
Mackenzie, Gregor
Woodall, Alec


English, Michael
McMillan, Tom (Glasgow C)
Woof, Robert


Ennals, David
Madden, Max
Wrigglesworth, Ian


Evans, Ioan (Aberdare)
Magee, Bryan
Young, David (Bolton E)


Evans, John (Newton)
Marks, Kenneth
TELLERS FOR THE AYES


Fernyhough, Rt Hon E.
Marquand, David
Mr. James Hamilton and


Fitt, Gerard (Belfast W)
Marshall, Dr Edmund (Goole)
Mr. John ob/




NOES


Alison, Michael
Eyre, Reginald
Le Marchant, Spencer


Arnold, Tom
Fairgrieve, Russell
Luce, Richard


Atkins, Rt Hon H. (Spelthorne)
Fisher, Sir Nigel
McCusker, H.


Bain, Mrs Margaret
Fletcher-Cooke, Charles
Macfarlane, Neil


Bell, Ronald
Fookes, Miss Janet
McNair-Wilson, M. (Newbury)


Biggs-Davison, John
Fowler, Norman (Sutton C'f'd)
Mather, Carol


Blaker, Peter
Freud, Clement
Mawby, Ray


Brittan, Leon
Fry, Peter
Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin


Brotherton, Michael
Gilmour, Rt Hon Ian (Chesham)
Mayhew, Patrick


Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)
Gilmour, Sir John (East Fife)
Meyer, Sir Anthony


Buchanan-Smith, Alick
Gow, Ian (Eastbourne)
Miscampbell, Norman


Bulmer, Esmond
Gower, Sir Raymond (Barry)
Moate, Roger


Chalker, Mrs Lynda
Gray, Hamish
Molyneaux, James


Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)
Grist, Ian
Montgomery, Fergus


Cockcrott, John
Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)
Moore, John (Croydon C)


Colquhoun, Mrs Maureen
Hawkins, Paul
Morgan, Geraint


Cooke, Robert (Bristol W)
Henderson, Douglas
Morrison, Charles (Devizes)


Cope, John
Hooson, Emlyn
Morrison, Hon Peter (Chester)


Cordle, John H.
Howells, Geraint (Cardigan)
Mudd, David


Costain, A. P.
Hunt, John
Neubert, Michael


Dean, Paul (N Somerset)
Hutchison, Michael Clark
Page, John (Harrow West)


Dodsworth, Geoffrey
Irving, Charles (Cheltenham)
Page, Rt Hon R. Graham (Crosby)


Douglas-Hamilton, Lord James
Jessel, Toby
Paisley, Rev Ian


Drayson, Burnaby
Jopling, Michael
Parkinson, Cecil


Eden, Rt Hon Sir John
Kilfedder, James
Penhaligon, David


Emery, Peter
Lane, David
Percival, Ian


Evans, Gwynfor (Carmarthen)
Lawrence, Ivan
Powell, Rt Hon J. Enoch


Ewing, Mrs Winifred (Moray)
Lawson, Nigel
Prior, Rt Hon James

Question put, That the amendment be made:

The House divided: Ayes 129, Noes 112.

Rathbone, Tim
Stradling Thomas, J.
Wakeham, John


Rees-Davies, W. R.
Taylor, R. (Croydon NW)
Warren, Kenneth


Richardson, Miss Jo
Tebbit, Norman
Watt, Hamish


Rifkind, Malcolm
Thomas, Rt Hon P. (Hendon S)
Weatherill, Bernard


Ross, Stephen (Isle of Wight)
Thompson, George
Welsh, Andrew


Shersby, Michael
Thorpe, Rt Hon Jeremy (N Devon)
Young, Sir G. (Ealing, Acton)


Skeet, T. H. H.
Townsend, Cyril D.



Smith, Cyril (Rochdale)
Tugendhat, Christopher
TELLERS FOR THE NOES


Stanbrook, Ivor
Vaughan, Dr Gerard
Mr. Adam Butler and


Stewart, Donald (Western Isles)
Viggers, Peter
Mr. Michael Robert


Stewart, Rt Hon M. (Fulham)
Wainwright, Richard (Colne V)

Question accordingly agreed to.

Order,
That the sex Discrimination Bill may be proceeded with at this day's sitting, though opposed, until any hour.—[Mr. Coleman.]

Bill, as amended (in the Standing Committee), further considered.

Clause 13

QUALIFYING BODIES

Mr. Ronald Bell: I beg to move Amendment No. 24, in page 11, line 13. leave out 'or facilities'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Oscar Murton): With it we shall also consider Amendment No. 25, in page 11. line 22, leave out subsection (2).

Mr. Bell: The clause applies the provisions of the Bill to bodies which give a qualification or confer an authorisation
which is needed for, or facilitates, engagement in a particular profession.
I am not on this occasion objecting to the words "which is needed for", but seeking to omit the words "or facilitates". That term extends the prohibition in the clause to a whole range of bodies which almost by definition are private unofficial bodies conferring a qualification or certificate which is not needed for any occupation but which someone thinks would facilitate the getting of a job or employment.
It seems wrong in principle that private bodies offering qualifications, if that is the right word, which are purely optional and are not needed as an entry qualification for any occupation should be subject to the provisions of the Bill. There are many private bodies and clubs which have during the years established such a reputation and acquired such esteem that to have the cachet of their approval would be helpful in many aspirations.
Such a body, which is purely a private body, owes no public duty. Examples of such a body are the Marylebone Cricket Club and the Jockey Club. There are a great many such clubs, and people think very highly of them. The qualifications or certificates which they confer are

prized. Anyone who is not licensed by the Jockey Club, for example, cannot, understandably, take part in race meetings organised by that club. By a sort of convention the team which the Marylebone Cricket Club selects is often considered to be of peculiar efficacy in a representative capacity. However, it is simply a cricket club, just as the other is simply a jockey club. All these private bodies owe no public responsibility. They are members' clubs and they should be totally free to act in any way they think appropriate which commends itself to them.
The general attitude of the community may be to attach importance to the cachet which the private clubs give, but the law should not crystallise that into an official status nor subject the clubs to statutory discipline. We should keep a clear distinction between bodies whose qualifications are needed to enter an occupation and bodies, however eminent, however highly thought of, which are private clubs whose approval is purely optional and should be conferred in their own caprice and without answerability to the law or to the public

Mr. John Fraser: The example of the Jockey Club given by the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Bell) is a good one. On the whole, the Bill does not include personal and private relationships, and it does not affect private clubs. That is not to say that some private clubs do not have a public responsibility. The Jockey Club has a public responsibility. It can influence the employment of a woman as a jockey by withholding its recognition or its cachet, and, in doing so, it is not merely regulating its internal private affairs but is going outside its private domain and affecting someone's opportunity of employment.
For that reason we believe that bodies that can give licences, certificates, diplomas, permits. registrations or other forms of cachet should not be able to influence adversely the employment prospects of a person in the public area of employment. That is why we believe the words to be necessary and why they are inserted in the Bill. I hope that the House will reject the amendment.

Amendment negatived.

Clause 14

VOCATIONAL TRAINING BODIES

Mr. John Fraser: I beg to move Amendment No. 26, in page 12, line 2, at end insert
or (c) by terminating her training.
My hon. Friend the Member for Northampton, North (Mrs. Coiquhoun), who was berating the Government for not being responsive to back benchers, is unfortunately not present on this occasion. An amendment which my hon. Friend moved in Committee was not exactly right, and I promised to have the right words ready on Report. These are the right words which I now put before the House, and I hope that the amendment will be accepted.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 15

EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES

Mr. John Fraser: I beg to move Amendment No. 27, in page 12, line 24, after "authority", insert "or an education authority".

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this we are taking Government Amendment No. 29.

Mr. Fraser: These are purely technical amendments designed to ensure that Clause 15 applies to education authorities in Scotland in the same way as it applies to education authorities in England and Wales.

Amendment agreed to.

Mr. Ronald Bell: I beg to move Amendment No. 28, in page 12, line 28, leave out subsection (3).
The purpose of the amendment is to leave out the following words:
References in subsection (1) to the services of an employment agency include guidance on careers and any other services related to employment".
The rest of Clause 15 relates to the general activities of employment agencies. If we accept the general principle of the Bill, which I do for the purpose of moving the amendment, it can be seen that there is no objection to those activities. However, when it comes to guidance on

careers, it seems an improper use of the law to make it unlawful to suggest to a man or a boy that certain careers are particularly suitable or to give advice and guidance to a girl or woman that there are better openings in certain areas. Advice and guidance should be given in good faith by whoever gives it. In that capacity people are giving their opinion.
This is an outrageous interference with freedom of thought and the freedom of speech. If someone goes to someone else for advice and guidance it is only right that that person should be free to give whatever advice and guidance he thinks appropriate. It is not for Parliament to say that certain advice and guidance should be unlawful. Of course, the person to whom guidance is given may or may not take it. He is at liberty to give it such weight as he thinks appropriate. However, we are unfortunately passing legislation which says that men and women are exactly the same in all respects and that no one must pretend that they are not. To go further and say that it is unlawful to give advice or guidance on the basis that there is some difference between the sexes, or that a girl may have a more hopeful future in one area rather than another, is going far beyond the sort of prescription on which a statute should embark.
Guidance is quite different from anything else that is contained in the Bill—for example, refusing a job, refusing promotion, refusing training or treating differently. This provision prescribes the kind of advice that shall be given by an employment agency to anyone who goes to it. I hope that the Minister will not brush this matter aside in his usual way, telling us what the Government have in mind and so on. We all know too well what they have in mind. What we want to do is improve their mind. I know that this operation is hopeless, but there is no reason for us not to try.

Mr. John Fraser: Perhaps I shall surprise the hon. and learned Gentleman by saying that he is totally right in suggesting that the Government should not interfere with genuine career advice. However, I must tell him that he is totally wrong if he thinks that the Bill does what he says it does. In those circumstances I am sure that he will seek leave to withdraw the amendment.

Mr. Bell: It is all very well for the Minister to say that, but it greatly confirms a suspicion which I have entertained for a long time although I have been much too polite to mention it. It seems that the Minister does not understand the Bill for which he has responsibility. It is obvious that the clause does exactly what I have suggested. Clause 15 reads:
It is unlawful for an employment agency to discriminate against a woman—".
It seems that the Minister is suggesting that the words "discriminate against a woman" govern everything. When there is a reference in subsection (1) to the services of an agency, including guidance on careers, it is suggested that that does not matter if it is not discrimination against a woman. That will not do. That argument does not add up. That may have been what the Minister was told, but that is not the case. Clause 15(3) reads:
references in subsection (1) to the services of an employment agency include guidance on careers …".
If guidance is given that it is better for a girl to do "this" rather than "that", it is clear that the clause is saying that "that" is prohibited. It is no good the Minister saying that it is not so, because it is clear that that is the position. The Minister knows that is so. Therefore, I am sure he will accept the amendment.

Amendment negatived.

Amendment made: No. 29, in page 12, line 34, after 'authority', insert 'or an education authority'.—[Miss Joan Lestor.]

Clause 19

MINISTERS OF RELIGION ETC.

10.15 p.m.

Mr. Ivor Clemitson: I beg to move Amendment No. 31, in page 15, line 4, leave out 'for purposes' and insert 'in the ministry'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this amendment, it would be convenient to take Amendment No. 32, in page 15, line 5, after 'the', insert 'said'.
Amendment No. 33, in page 15, line 6, leave out from 'sex' to end of line 7 and insert
'but only in such cases where the discrimination complies with the doctrines of the religion'.

Amendment No. 34, in page 15, line 6, leave out from 'doctrines' to end of line 36 and insert 'or principles of the religion'.
Amendment No. 35, in page 15, line 6, leave out from 'religion' to end of line 7 and insert:
'Provided that the recognised representatives of the organised religion have submitted their reasons for being so exempt to the Equal Opportunities Commission within such time as the Minister shall determine'.
and Amendment No. 42, in Clause 33, page 22, line 10, leave out from 'doctrines' to 'or' in line 12 and insert or principles of the religion'.

Mr. Clemitson: The amendments which appear in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Kings-wood (Mr. Walker) have three basic and simple objects. They seek, first, to limit the exclusion from the provisions of the Act in respect of employment in the ministries of religious bodies; secondly, to remove the phrase about avoiding the religious susceptibilities of any of its followers; and, thirdly, to restrict the exemption provided in the clause to those religious bodies which have submitted their reasons for exemption to the commission.
As the clause stands, it is clear that any employment in a religious body is exempt from the provisions of the Bill provided that the discrimination complies with the doctrines of the religion or avoids offending the religious susceptibilities of any of its members. In other words the exemption goes very wide indeed. It goes much wider than the ministry of the religious bodies concerned. It seems odd that the phrase used to describe Ciause 19 is "Ministers of religion etc.". Clearly, this implies to my mind that the main category of employees—assuming ministers of religion are employed, and in my days in the ministry I used to pay my self-employed insurance stamp—are intended to be exempt if employed in the ministry of a religious body. This is a fairly well-recognisable category of people even if they do not all wear dog-collars these days. They are capable of some sort of definition.
How do we define "etc."? The Minister quoted certain expressions in Standing Committee and thought that administrative workers at Church House or those who work for the Salvation


Army would be included in the provisions of the Bill, but the caretaker of a Muslim temple would not be. Suppose a religious organisation were set up and it was against its doctrines to employ typists because that would offend the susceptibilities of its members. How is that to be treated within the wording of these provisions? It seems to me that once one tacks on the word "etc." the proverbial flood-gates are opened wide. The extent of discrimination by religious bodies is potentially unlimited. The "etc." becomes a much larger category than the category of ministers. Surely it would be better to confine the exemption to that which is certain of definition. Certainly the word "minister" is more capable of definition than is the word "etc.".
This brings me to my second point—that doctrines of the religion are much more capable of definition than the religious susceptibilities of any of their followers. This is incapable of any sort of definition at all. It is so drawn that it would appear that it needs only one of the followers to say that his or her susceptibilities are offended to put the imprimatur on any discrimination which takes place.
What of the religious susceptibilities of those who think precisely the opposite—of those whose religious susceptibilities are highly offended by the present practice, in some churches of which they are members—for example, of not ordaining women? Are not their susceptibilities equally valid along with those who want to preserve an all-male priesthood?
No one is trying to impose an end to discrimination on grounds of sex upon any bona fide religious body, where genuine beliefs about such discrimination exist, but the limits of exemption must be as carefully drawn and defined as possible—as much for the sake of the bona fide religious bodies as anyone else.
As the clause it written it is possible for discrimination to extend very far and wide indeed, and for the clause to be used by all kinds of bodies which the great majority of us would hardly regard as bona fide religious bodies at all.
This brings me to the third leg of the group of amendments where the onus is on religious bodies to state their reasons

for exemption to the commission. This is not an attack upon bona fide religious bodies such as the Roman Catholic Church or the Jewish faith or the Muslims, and so on, whose religious attitudes about the all-male ministry are deeply rooted in their doctrines. Far from it. These bodies would have no difficulty whatsoever in showing that they should be exempt from the provisions of the Bill. What it would do is to help sort out the wheat from the chaff, to help prevent any non-bona fide body trying to use the clause for not very desirable ends. It would also give a little push to the waverers—to those who are teetering on the brink of the pool, so to speak, wondering whether to immerse themselves in the strange waters of sex equality.
These amendments are very modest. I would admit that they are not as clear-cut as they might be, but I believe that they are a very considerable improvement on the clause as it stands. By limiting the exemption to a specific type of employment—that is, the ministry—by confining exemption to that which is more capable of definition—that is to say, doctrines—by removing the impossibly vague susceptibility provision, and by imposing a duty to report reasons for exclusion to the commission, the clause would he made much more definite than it is. The genuine would be protected and reasons for justified discrimination would be removed.

Dr. Summerskill: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Are we also discussing Amendment No. 35?

Mr. Deputy Speaker: We are discussing Nos. 32 to 35 inclusive and also No. 42.

Dr. Summerskill: Amendments Nos. 31 and 32, moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Luton, East (Mr. Clemitson), restrict, as he says, the scope of the employment exception for religious bodies so that it covers only employment in the ministry of the religion in question, and not employment in any other capacity, such as that of a gardener in an enclosed order, or an accolyte, even though the religious susceptibilities of the followers of the religion might still be involved. This is the difference between my hon. Friend's amendment and the Bill as it stands.
In our White Paper we proposed an exemption from the employment provisions in the Bill for
the clergy and religious bodies whose membership involves employment.
Clause 19 goes slightly wider. It applies to other cases where employment is
for purposes of an organised religion.
This could vary from the exceptions that I have given to the exceptions concerning an organised religion which is not affected by a religious doctrine, such as those quoted by my hon. Friend—workers at Church House or people in the Salvation Army. Neither does it exempt religious organisations as such from the requirement to treat male and female employees exactly the same or equally where employment is not limited to one sex only; for instance, secretaries working for religious organisations cannot be exempt from the Bill as it stands.
But there will among the many and varied religions which are freely practised in this country be cases where the very presence of a person of a particular sex in a temple or part of a holy place will give grave offence to the religious susceptibilities of the adherents of the religion as well as offending against the religious doctrines. In such cases, we believe it right that the religion in question should be able to insist on employing only people of the appropriate sex where the tasks to be performed are such that their performance by a person of the other sex offends against the religious doctrine or susceptibilities.

Mr. Clemitson: My hon. Friend said that typists, for example, would not be exempt from the provisions of the Bill. Let us suppose that a religious body says that to employ a female typist would offend either its doctrines or the religious susceptibilities of some of its followers. Surely that religious body would be entitled under the provisions of Clause 19 to discriminate against women typists.

Dr. Summerskill: If it could be shown that it was part of the religion and the accepted religious susceptibilities that typists in general or in some part of the holy place caused offence, that would be accepted. But that is a very extreme

example. I was talking about ordinary secretarial office people who would work for any organised religion. They would be covered by the Bill.
As for the amendment relating to the Equal Opportunities Commission, apart from the fact that it leaves open the question of who is to recognise representatives of an organised religion which some would find not always easy to determine, the amendment does not say what the EOC is to do with the information so supplied. This seems to add a number of additional complications, and it might achieve an unjust or wrong result.
The amendment does not stand or fall by these points of detail. I presume its underlying intention is to enable the EOC, if it sees fit, to publish, perhaps even to comment on, the doctrinal reasons for the exemptions submitted to it by the various religions.
We have to ask ourselves whether it is right or possible to attempt to evaluate religious doctrines in this way.
As to who should or should not be permitted to be a minister of religion in one of the many religions now existing in Great Britain, quite apart from its effect on community relations, it would be difficult in matters of this kind to expect the EOC to evaluate between different religions. I think that the House will wish to deal with these matters with some respect for people who have always held very deep religious and conscientious scruples, and there is nothing to prevent the commission itself from looking into these matters at it wishes, as far as it can.
It is obviously a difficult and vexed question. The EOC can publish its findings and make recommendations, if it considers them to be necessary and desirable. We would be wrong to insert into the Bill an amendment which implies that Parliament thinks that the religious exemptions in the Bill should depend in some way upon a justification to the commission of the doctrines or principles of the religion.

10.30 p.m.

Miss Richardson: May I say how disappointed I am by that reply. At least part of this amendment was put forward in Committee, and on that occasion the Minister said that the debate had been


useful and that if the amendment was withdrawn she would carefully consider the wording of it. My hon. Friend has not come back with anything else. I am extremely disappointed that no gesture has been made. There is a considerable volume of opinion about this, particularly on the question of the religious susceptibilities of the followers of a religion. This Bill is too widely drafted and provides an occasion for licensed prejudice. I hope that my hon. Friend will have another look at this issue before the bill gets to another place.

Dr. Summerskill: May I now deal with Amendments No. 34 and 32? I undertook in Committee to look again at the wording of Clauses 19 and 33 and to see whether it could be clarified. I have done so and come to the conclusion that the present wording is as good as we can possibly manage in what are difficult clauses. The exception is limited to an activity which is restricted to one sex and is carried on for the purposes of an organised religion. This applies to both employment in Clause 19 and to services and facilities in Clause 33. The activity has to be organised in this way either to comply with the doctrine of the religion or to avoid offending the religious susceptibilities of any of its followers.
The main purpose of the exemption is to ensure that the Bill does not cut across the doctrinal requirements of any organised religion. We are dealing with a great many different religions apart from the Established Church and other Christian Churches—religions such as those of the Jews, Muslims, Sikhs and others.

Mr. Costain: I cannot find any reference to "organised religion" in the definition clause. Can the hon. Lady help by saying what that is?

Dr. Summerskill: It is not defined in the Bill. We have to define it perhaps as an established religion.

Mr. Ronald Bell: "Established religion" has a special meaning which is quite different from that which the hon. Lady suggests.

Dr. Summerskill: I will look into the question of the definition of an organized

religion. When we talk about an organised religion most of us are thinking of the main, well-known religions in this country, such as those I have mentioned.

Mr. Clemitson: That is precisely what we may be thinking of but it is not what the clause says. It just says "an organised religion." As far as I can see, anybody can get up and say "We are an organised religion" and discriminate until the cows come home—if that is not an unfortunate phrase in the circumstances.

Dr. Summerskill: However the phrase is defined, the fact remains that the doctrines and principles of religions vary enormously and it would be invidious or impossible to put a court or an industrial tribunal in the position of having to decide between two different doctrinal interpretations if they were used in support of and in defence of a complaint under this measure.

Mr. Leslie Spriggs: My hon. Friend has failed to answer my hon. Friend the Member for Luton, East (Mr. Clemitson). There is a reference to "ministers of religion etc." Where do we draw the line? How wide does the clause go? My hon. Friend asked for an interpretation of "etc." I can assure my hon. Friend the Minister that not only my hon. Friend the Member for Luton, East but many other hon. Members want to know before the Bill goes any further.

Dr. Summerskill: I think that I explained this. I should say that I am informed that the headings in the margin of any Bill cannot be taken into consideration in law. It is only the actual content of the Bill that counts.
The difference between me and my hon. Friend the Member for Luton, East is that his amendment restricts the scope of employment exception for religious bodies, to cover only employment in the ministry of the religion in question. It does not restrict the scope of the employment exception to employment in any other capacity. I gave as an example a gardener in an enclosed order. That is what is covered by "etc."

Amendment negatived.

Clause 20

MIDWIVES

The Minister of State, Department of Health and Social Security (Dr. David Owen): I beg to move Amendment No. 36, in page 15, line 12, at end insert—
(4) In the Midwives Act 1951 the following section is inserted after section 35—
Extension of Act to men.
35A. From 1st January 1976 references in this Act to women (except to a woman in childbirth) apply equally to men.
(5) In the Midwives (Scotland) Act 1951 the said section 35A is inserted after section 37 of that Act as section 37A.'
The purpose of the amendment is to restore the provisions deleted in Committee which were intended to remove the statutory barriers in England and Wales and in Scotland to men becoming midwives.
I say straight away that the Government see this quite simply as a matter of principle. I have read the speech of the right hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mr. Gilmour) in Committee in which he raised two questions. One, which I thought was probably not the more important, was that he thought that the provision would be unjust to women, because he felt that there would be an element of discrimination against female midwives, because the male midwife, as I understand his argument, would not be carrying out the full duties. I hope to show that that will not happen.
It is the purpose of the Bill to uphold the right of women and, equally, of men to have access to the work of their choice, unimpeded by the fact of their sex. The principle has found wide acceptance in the House. I do not think that the objections raised in Committee to the clause can be regarded as being on the grounds of principle. It is true that the Bill provides for exceptions to the principle, but I think that it is generally agreed that they are very few, and in limited areas. The Government do not wish to see the Bill, which represents a major step forward for women, weakened in its effect by enlarging the area of exceptions. Indeed, it could be argued that the area of exceptions should be reduced rather than enlarged.
I have said that the objections raised in Committee were not founded upon principle. They stem, in fact, from difficulties which may arise in practice. I would not for one moment suggest that these are not proper matters for concern. They raise delicate issues on which it is possible for people with the same views on the broad principles of the Bill to disagree.
I shall not weary the House with a list of the various bodies that have taken views on this subject. It would be fair to say, broadly, that bodies concerned with the medical profession have tended to come out against the provision that the Government wish to introduce, and, broadly, bodies more generally concerned with women's rights and women's interests have favoured the Government's prosion.
There are some reasons for this—mainly because the Royal College of Midwives, which will obviously have a strong influence on the medical professional bodies, has throughout adopted the view that this should not take place.
I want to try to deal with the grounds of the objections. The first is the freedom of choice for the patient. I think that that element has been adequately dealt with in Committee. There is no question here of our wish—indeed, I think of it as our duty—that there should be freedom of choice for the patient. That is, in effect, freedom for the expectant mother to choose not to be cared for or treated by a male midwife. We appreciate that there should be no deterrent to expectant mothers seeking proper and necessary care. We understand the concern expressed on behalf of some of the immigrant communities, which was mentioned in Committee.
There need be no apprehension on that score. The Bill provides for coverage for this. It provides for the exemption of employing and training authorities from the obligation not to discriminate on grounds of sex. This is designed, therefore, to leave the situation under administrative control.
We propose to limit the training and the employment of men as midwives to a few selected centres where it will be possible to ensure that there can be choice by the patient. We do not know how many centres will need to be established


because we have no idea how many male nurses will wish to take up the opportunity of being trained as male midwives. I think it would be a very small number. On the experience we have already of the recent extension to male nurses of the opportunity to be trained to gain obstetric experience on a 12-week course—they do not practice midwifery; I want to make that perfectly clear—so far no one has taken up this option, although the course started only in January. It is early days, but I do not believe that this will be extensively used.

Mr. Ronald Bell: If it is the intention to restrict the employment and utilisation of male midwives to certain centres at which the patient can be certain of having a choice, how will that be done without offending against the general provisions of the Bill against discrimination in employment?

Dr. Owen: We have exempted these areas because of this problem. The hon. and learned Gentleman raises a debating point. We have provided for the exemption of employing authorities and training authorities from the obligation not to discriminate on grounds of sex. What we are saying, in effect, is that in these training centres they will have special facilities. They will have a higher level of chaperonage. This is the key to the problem. I think that one will tend to find that a male midwife will be treated as supernumerary to the establishment. There will be other midwives, so it is not necessary for the chaperonage to be undertaken by either trained nurses or trained midwives. It will be sufficient if there is another female in the room. This method is often used by doctors and male medical students. It is a familiar problem. There would be little point in adding to it and, therefore, raising the question of cost.
If there were to be a very large number of male midwives, obviously the cost would become a matter of concern. The House will obviously be asked to make a judgment as to whether it thinks that this will be a very large group of nurses. I am saying that I do not think that this will be so. It is true that the centres which train and employ male midwives will have to make some allowance for possible increases in costs. I accept that. But that additional expenditure will be very small. The initial restriction to a

few centres will in itself help to limit the extra cost.
On this question I do not think that the House will make cost the real issue, or one which would persuade us to overturn the principle of equal access to jobs, bearing in mind the sensitivities of this issue. I do not believe that the House will make the decision in terms of cost.

10.45 p.m.

Mr. Freud: The Minister has explained that there would be a chaperon in the case of a male midwife. Presumably the chaperon would be a woman, which surely constitutes sex discrimination. It seems to me desperately unfair that the "midhusband" should not be allowed to choose the sex of his chaperon.

Dr. Owen: The hon. Gentleman has made a fair and perhaps amusing point. The fact of life is that this question of chaperonage is not new. It is regulated by common sense. The question we must bear in mind is that there are some male nurses who, it appears, may well take up this provision. We must ask why they do so. One of the reasons is that this completes the training of a nurse. Some nurses wish to have experience of all aspects of care. No doctor can be trained without gaining some obstetric experience. No doctor would say that the period of three months could be taken out of the curriculum without loss. Nurses have the same feeling. A nurse who may wish to reach a senior position in charge of a hospital may feel that it would be of benefit to have a period of midwifery experience. There is no reason why they must have it. A male nurse can take a job in the administration of a hospital without having had midwifery experience, although I can see why they might wish to do.
The question of chaperonage also arises when nurses go out "on the district". It is necessary as part of the year's training in midwifery to do some district work. During that period there must be arrangements for chaperonage.
There will be an element of distinction. I do not think that many male midwives will ever engage in purely district midwifery. We must bear in mind that 94 out of every 100 children are born in hospitals. That is where the main obstetric practice lies. Hon. Members


have raised questions of toilets and aftercare, not just the problem of the delivery. The point has been fairly made that it is probably easier to deal with the passage and birth of the child. Embarrassing questions are raised as regards post-natal care. Those questions must be dealt with by male nurses in the health service. It is possible to hold different views.
I do not think that there is any cause for alarm over this provision. It is no more than a fairly logical extension. Attitudes are changing. It would have been difficult to envisage mixed wards in the health service 20 years ago. Some people still do not like mixed wards. Other people find it easy to cope with mixed wards. I am not saying that there will be no difficulties. This is an object which, given good sense on both sides of the House, could easily be achieved.
The Government have chosen the approach indicated in the Bill. We think that it is preferable to remove the barriers to men training and practising as midwives, but to retain administrative control over the situation. The introduction of men to midwifery will be measured, deliberate and with all the proper safeguards. I think that as and when attitudes change—they will change, with the passage of time—we shall look again at the situation. In the meantime, we think that it is best concentrated on a few centres.
A number of surveys were held. They showed that the initial feeling that women were anxious about this was not necessarily true. The Sutherland community health council conducted a survey. Previously there had been no adequate survey of public opinion on the issue. In keeping with the changed circumstances, and most people's attitudes to this, this is a provision which the House would do well to reinstate in the Bill.
In that spirit I commend the amendment.

Mr. Ian Gilmour: Once again the Government are seeking to undo a decision taken in Committee by those who have heard the arguments, using the votes of those who have not. We all appreciate that the Minister of State has moved his amendment with great moderation and attentiveness. He moved it with such moderation that he must have raised in

most people's minds the question why he moved it at all. His case could hardly have been more conciliatory, but was not worth putting forward. He said that this was a matter of principle. I think that it is a matter of dogma—dogma by the Secretary of State for Social Services.
Before the Bill was introduced the right hon. Lady said in her letter to the Royal College of Midwives
it would be wrong to rule out male midwives as a matter of principle and that to do so would damage the reputation of the midwifery profession in the eyes of the public".
That is taking silliness to a sublime level. The Minister of State instanced Sutherland County Council, but surveys tend to go the opposite way to that instance, although they are not conclusive. One certainty, however, is that there is no public demand for male midwives and, as the Minister seemed to concede, very few people want to become male midwives. I therefore cannot understand why he or the Secretary of State should want to come to the House and upset a perfectly sensible decision.
The Royal College of Midwives is not a very powerful organisation, which is no doubt why the principle that the Minister spoke about can be forced home. Where an organisation is very powerful the matter of principle no longer applies. All the medical bodies in the country are against the Minister on this. All informed medical opinion is against him for two very simple reasons. He said that he would deal with the first, but I do not think that he did. The first effect will be to confine a lot of female midwives to post-natal and ante-natal care, because it is obviously much easier for male midwives to be present at the delivery since at that stage the chaperon difficulty does not arise. The second argument is on the chaperon point, which the Minister skated around very delicately, but he ran into the difficulty encountered by the Under-Secretary in Committee.
The fact that there are already some chaperons in the health service is not a very good argument for saying that in a time of great shortage of staff, manpower and resources we should add to the wasted manpower by creating male midwives who have to have chaperons a lot of the time. A survey has been conducted which showed that in the normal


8-hour shift of a student midwife, threeand-a-half hours would have to be spent with a chaperon. That is a quite ludicrous way of using manpower in the health service.
The hon. Member for Wolverhampton, North-East (Mrs. Short), who is not here tonight because, I think, she is abroad, said, very fairly, that this is a matter which goes very deep. It affects not only pregnant mothers but their husbands too. Where the economic argument, the efficiency argument and the argument about what people want all point the same way there can be no justification for the Government talking about a matter of principle, especially when they are really talking about saving the face of the Secretary of State for Social Services. I therefore hope very much that the House will reject the amendment.

Mrs. Audrey Wise: I rise to oppose the Government amendment. It is not a question, it seems to me, which should be judged by the yardstick of opening up job opportunities to men, but that is precisely the yardstick the Government are using.
The Government amendment says:
references in this Act to women (except to a woman in childbirth) apply equally to men.
The fact that it is necessary to use the words "except to a woman in childbirth" deals precisely with my point that this is not simply a question of job opportunities, not simply a question of the views of male or female midwives, but there is a third party entitled to have a point of view: the mother in childbirth, an area in which it is pointless to talk of equality as an abstraction. For the mother in childbirth, equality has no meaning whatever.
We are told by the Government that the mother will have a choice, but I want to tell the Government quite straight that I do not believe it.
In Committee the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department said:
choice of care is a factor in our National Health Service
That will be news to many of us. Choice of GP, yes. She goes on to say:
Fortunately, as quite a lot of women doctors are available, many women are able to choose to see a woman GP …"—[Official Report, Standing Committee B, 6th May, 1975; c. 252.]

The word "many" exactly reinforces my point. Even in an area where there is free choice, the male domination of medicine is such that this free choice is not even available to all women. If one goes to hospital, not only is there no choice of which doctor shall attend one. I had a major operation in the NHS, and not only could I not choose who should do it but they would not even tell me who would do it or, when it was done, who had done it. Am I expected to believe we have choice?
If one compares Clause 20 with Clause 7 we find that in Clause 7 we are told:
where men might reasonably object to the presence of a woman because they are in a state of undress or are using sanitary facilities
they are to be sheltered from embarrassment. I am told that if I wear corsets and go to buy them, I shall be sheltered from having to have a man attend me in the changing room, but this clause tells me that if I am a new mother and have my baby at home, or I am an early release from hospital—and the Minister gave no figures about the women released very soon after delivery—I shall be sheltered from a male attendant in the changing room. But I might have a male midwife to do a vaginal swab in the privacy of my home, not in a clinical and surgical atmosphere.
That is the kind of thing which will exercise the minds of men and women. In practice I do not think they will send male midwives round the district because it causes too many problems, and difficulties with chaperons. Shortly after this comes into operation, male midwives will be found to be doing far more of the supervisory kind of jobs and the females will be doing the slogging round the districts.
We are worsening the position of women in relation to job opportunities, and I am not at all surprised that this proposal is resisted by female midwives, although that is not my primary concern.
11.0 p.m.
I contrast this provision with the provisions of Clause 19, in which exemption on religious grounds is so wide as to cover anyone employed in any capacity, even—as the Minister conceded—as a typist, if the religious susceptibilities of a follower of any organised religion are offended. The exemption could not be


wider—because we are so scared of being told that we are intolerant towards religion.
In our search for abstract equality we shall greatly offend the susceptibilities of many women by Clause 20. I am not particularly interested in their husbands, although the women themselves may be—presumably they are. We are told that chaperonage already exists and that we are just adding to it. The Minister knows that the National Health Service is desperately short of resources. In addition to my other resentments, I deeply resent the waste of resources on chaperonage in opening up further jobs to men in an already male-dominated profession. I see no point in that. When we can supply all the staff required to carry out properly the services which already exist, I might reconsider the matter, but it is ridiculous for the Government now to propose increasing costs for this purpose.
We have been told that most babies are delivered in hospital. That is a pity. I should like to defend the domiciliary midwifery service, as I am sure would many mothers. The employment of male midwives would be yet another nail in the coffin of the domiciliary midwifery service. The male domination of medicine is one factor in the increasingly mechanistic attitude to childbirth to which, as a mother, I object.

Division No. 242.]
AYES
[11.8 p.m.


Anderson, Donald
Ellis, Tom (Wrexham)
Kilroy-Silk, Robert


Armstrong, Ernest
English, Michael
Lamond, James


Bagier, Gordon A. T.
Ennals, David
Lestor, Miss Joan (Eton &amp; Slough)


Bates, Alf
Evans, John (Newton)
Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)


Bennett, Andrew (Stockport N.)
Fernyhough, Rt Hon E.
McCartney, Hugh


Bidwell, Sydney
Fitt, Gerard (Belfast W)
McGuire, Michael (Ince)


Booth, Albert
Flannery, Martin
Mackenzie, Gregor


Boothroyd, Miss Betty
Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)
McMillan, Tom (Glasgow C)


Brotherton, Michael
Ford, Ben
Magee, Bryan


Callaghan, Jim (Middleton &amp; P)
Forrester, John
Marks, Kenneth


Clemitson, Ivor
Fowler, Gerald (The Wrekin)
Marquand, David


Cocks, Michael (Bristol S)
Fraser, John (Lambeth, N'w'd)
Marshall, Dr Edmund (Goole)


Cohen, Stanley
George, Bruce
Millan, Bruce


Coleman, Donald
Golding, John
Miller, Dr M. S. (E Kilbride)


Conlan, Bernard
Gourlay, Harry
Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)


Cox, Thomas (Tooting)
Grant, George (Morpeth)
Mudd, David


Crawshaw, Richard
Hardy, Peter
Murray, Rt Hon Ronald King


Cryer, Bob
Harper, Joseph
Newens, Stanley


Dalyell, Tam
Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)
O'Halloran, Michael


Davidson, Arthur
Hatton, Frank
O'Malley, Rt Hon Brian


Davies, Ifor (Gower)
Hayman, Mrs Helene
Ovenden, John


Dean, Joseph (Leeds West)
Horam, John
Owen, Dr David


de Freitas, Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey
Hoyle, Doug (Nelson)
Park, George


Doig, Peter
Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)
Prescott, John


Dormand, J. D.
Jackson, Colin (Brighouse)
Price, C. (Lewisham W)


Duffy, A. E. P.
Jackson, Miss Margaret (Lincoln)
Price, William (Rugby)


Dunn, James A.
John, Brynmor
Radice, Giles


Edge, Geoff
Jones, Alec (Rhondda)
Richardson, Miss Jo


Ellis, John (Brigg &amp; Scun)
Jones, Barry (East Flint)
Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

This provision will not improve the position for mothers but will, rather, cause deep resentment in the minds of many of them. There is no evidence that mothers will have a choice. Choice can be given only at the expense of resources which cannot be afforded. It will not improve the position for midwives; in fact it will worsen their job opportunities. The only people who will be helped by the amendment are the few men who want to be male midwives. It will open up job opportunities for a few men at the expense of the interests and desires of women as mothers and women as midwives.

I strongly urge the House to reject the amendment, not in a spirit of prudery but because I believe that after childbirth women are entitled to—and want—the services of their own sex. That is the way in which the House should look at it. I speak independently, not as a supporter of the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Bell). I speak as someone who is totally committed to the advancement of women, women's rights and women's status in society. I earnestly request the House to reject the amendment.

Question put, that the amendment be made:—

The House divided: Ayes 104, Noes 96.

Roderick, Caerwyn
Taylor, Mrs Ann (Bolton W)
Wrigglesworth, Ian


Rooker, J. W.
Tinn, James
Young, David (Bolton E)


Roper, John
Wainwright, Edwin (Dearn V)
Young, Sir G. (Ealing, Acton)


Skinner, Dennis
Walker, Terry (Kingswood)



Spriggs, Leslie
Ward, Michael
TELLERS FOR THE AYES


Stewart, Rt Hon M. (Fulhum)
Woodall, Alec
Mr. James Hamilton and


Summerskill, Hon Dr Shirley
Woof, Robert
Mr. David Stoddart.




NOES


Alison, Michael
Gray, Hamish
Penhaligon, David


Arnold, Tom
Henderson, Douglas
Percival, Ian


Ashton, Joe
Hooson, Emlyn
Powell, Rt Hon J. Enoch


Atkins, Rt Hon H. (Spelthorne)
Hutchison, Michael Clark
Prior, Rt Hon James


Bain, Mrs Margaret
Jessel, Toby
Rees-Davies, W. R.


Bell, Ronald
Jopling, Michael
Rifkind, Malcolm


Biggs-Davison, John
Kilfedder, James
Roberts, Michael (Cardiff NW)


Blaker, Peter
Knight, Mrs Jill
Rodgers, George (Chorley)


Bray, Dr Jeremy
Lamborn, Harry
Shersby, Michael


Brittan, Leon
Lane, David
Small, William


Buchanan-Smith, Alick
Lawrence, Ivan
Smith, Cyril (Rochdale)


Bulmer, Esmond
Lawson, Nigel
Speed, Keith


Campbell, Ian
Le Marchant, Spencer
Stanbrook, Ivor


Cant, R. B.
Luce, Richard
Steel, David (Roxburgh)


Chalker, Mrs Lynda
McCusker, H.
Stewart, Donald (Western Isles)


Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)
McElhone, Frank
Stradling Thomas, J.


Cockcroft, John
Macfarlane, Neil
Thomas, Ron (Bristol NW)


Cooke, Robert (Bristol W)
McNair-Wilson, M. (Newbury)
Thompson, George


Cope, John
Madden, Max
Thorpe, Rt Hon Jeremy (N Devon)


Cordle, John H.
Mather, Carol
Townsend, Cyril D.


Costain, A. P.
Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin
Tugendhat, Christopher


Craigen, J. M. (Maryhill)
Mayhew, Patrick
Vaughan, Dr Gerard


Dean, Paul (N Somerset)
Meyer, Sir Anthony
Viggers, Peter


Dodsworth, Geoffrey
Miscampbell, Norman
Wakeham, John


Douglas-Hamilton, Lord James
Mitchell, R. C. (Soton, Itchen)
Watt, Hamish


Evans, Gwynfor (Carmarthen)
Moate, Roger
Weatherill, Bernard


Ewing, Mrs Winifred (Moray)
Molyneaux, James
Welsh, Andrew


Eyre, Reginald
Morgan, Geraint
Wise, Mrs Audrey


Fisher, Sir Nigel
Morrison, Hon Peter (Chester)



Fletcher-Cooke, Charles
Neubert, Michael
TELLERS FOR THE NOES


Fowler, Norman (Sutton C'f'd)
Noble, Mike
Mr. Adam Butler and


Freud, Clement
Page, John (Harrow West)
Mr. Russell Fairgrieve.


Gilmour, Rt Hon Ian (Chesham)
Paisley, Rev Ian



Gow, Ian (Eastbourne)
Parkinson, Cecil

Amendment accordingly agreed to.

Clause 22

DISCRIMINATION BY BODIES IN CHARGE OF EDUCATIONAL ESTABLISHMENTS

Mr. Ronald Bell: I beg to move Amendment No. 37, in page 15, line 25, to leave out Clauses 22 to 28.
These clauses apply to education, and I propose to delete them from the Bill because, if they remain in, no single-sex school may be established because schools exclusively for boys or for girls will be a declining category, and only existing establishments would be exempted from the provisions of the Bill.
In my experience there is a considerable demand from parents for single-sex schools. There are already not enough of such schools for parents who want to send their children to them. This is certainly true of my constituency. I believe it to be the case throughout most of the country. Yet this position is bound

to get worse under the terms of the Bill as time passes.
So far as I know—I shall be corrected if I have missed something in the Bill—it will not even be permissible, for example, for the Roman Catholic Church to start up a new convent school for girls only under the terms of the Bill. An absolutely rigid doctrine is to be clamped down, and it will mean that gradually single-sex education will be faded out.
Different people have different views on this matter. I believe that there should be freedom of opinion, freedom of conscience, and a variety of facilities available to the public.
I happen to believe in single-sex schools. I know that there are people who take a contrary view. We should all be free to back the view that we hold. The Bill is in that respect tyrannous. It is not merely dogmatic and overbearing. It is entirely ruthless and leaves no mitigation for the future. Nowhere will it be possible to start, either by a local authority


or privately, an independent single-sex school.
I am surprised that this has not attracted more attention than it has. One of the strange things about this House is that if a lot of controversial and extreme proposals are put into a Bill, controversy is concentrated upon a few of them, such as the NUT amendment dealt with earlier. There is a great row and battle over a number of them, and a whole lot of things which are equally important slip through with very little attention and comment.
In my time in the House I have noticed that if a Government want to get through some quite outrageous things, all they have to do is put them in the schedules at the end of a very long Bill, and by the time the Committee gets there, having had battles all the way, it all goes through and the Committee hardly knows what it has done. This is a provision of that kind in this Bill which has had very little public attention and virtually no parliamentary attention. Here we are abolishing for the future—it will be gradual, I admit—single—sex schools. It is quite outrageous and I do not think I need say anything more about it.
I know that the hon. Lady the Under-Secretary of State for Education and Science does not approve of single-sex schools and would like to see every child go to a mixed school. I do not dispute her right to hold that view, if indeed it is her view. What I dispute is the right of any legislature to say that nobody else shall effectively hold any other view. That, I think, is quite monstrous.
I wish I had realised earlier—it is my own fault—that the clauses that I am moving to omit, Nos. 22 to 28, only apply to the admission of pupils, and that colleges at Oxford and Cambridge or other universities, or single-sex schools, are going to be exempt in no way under the Bill in relation to the engagement of staff, so that they will not be able to say at a boys' school that they want masters, or at a girls' school that they want school-mistresses. The hon. Lady confirms that that is so. I think that has slipped through without being noticed, and it is outrageous. The spokesmen for the Government should have drawn attention to this fact earlier on. They did not do so. The first time I heard

of it was this evening. Had I known of it earlier I would have put down an amendment to the employment clauses to deal with it. Perhaps that can be put right in another place and come back to us in that way.
I ask the House to take my amendment very seriously, if belatedly. I hope that my hon. Friends will support me in this and that we shall not let this drift through unchallenged because other things have taken up our attention and nobody has bothered about it enough.

Miss Joan Lestor: I should like to help the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Bell) if I could, because what he is saying has no relevance to what he is trying to do. He has moved that we leave out Clauses 22 to 28. That would mean taking out all the education clauses. But Clause 26, one of the clauses which the hon. and learned Gentleman wishes to remove, is the express clause which allows single-sex schools to exist. An amendment will be moved to Clause 26 later on which deals with single-sex schools. But if the hon. and learned Gentleman succeeds in getting the approval of the House to this amendment, he will remove the clause which retains what he wants to retain—the preservation of the single-sex school.

Mr. Bell: The hon. Lady is right that I seek the removal of Clauses 22 to 28 and that Clause 26 allows existing single-sex schools to continue. But, without Clause 22, we do not need exceptions. Clause 22 says:
It is unlawful, in relation to an educational establishment …, to discriminate against a female … in the terms on which it offers to admit her to the establishment".
Clause 22 is the operative clause. I agree that Clause 26 is a mitigating clause. But I am not just proposing to leave out Clause 26. I am proposing to leave out the whole of the Bill's application to education. If that is so, I am content to do without mitigation, because there will not be any disaster to be mitigated.

Mr. Michael Shersby: I listened with great interest to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Bell), and I wish to make one or two further remarks about the operation of this legislation as it affects education.
Since coming to this House, it has been my experience that there is one factor above all others in which parents are interested. In past years we have had great arguments about comprehensive schools, direct grant schools, independent schools, and the rest. But what many parents desire above all is the opportunity to send their children to single-sex schools. I should be extremely concerned if any provision in this legislation prohibited any parent from sending a child to such a school or prohibited the setting up of any single-sex school in the future.
I hope that we shall have an assurance from the Minister that nothing in this measure prohibits any parents in my constituency sending a child to a single-sex school which exists today or which may be set up in the future.

Miss Joan Lestor: One of our difficulties is that we shall be discussing later the very clause dealing with single-sex schools, which is the exception in all this, and I do not want to make now the speech which I intend to make later.
If the hon. Member for Uxbridge (Mr. Shersby) reads Clause 26, he will see that what he is asking for is covered by that clause and that there is no need for his concern.
The hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Bell) directed almost all his remarks to single-sex schools. He said that, because he wished to preserve such schools, he wanted to remove all the clauses relating to education. But this is not what he wants at all. He wants to ensure that the doing away with sex discrimination does not apply in any area of education.
We have no intention of removing education from the Bill. Clause 26, which gives certain exemptions on single-sex schools, is another matter with which I shall deal later.
The principle of putting in education is such an obvious one. It is no good arguing that when children leave school there should be equal opportunities for boys and girls, whatever occupations they choose to follow, irrespective of their sex, when we have an education system which, by virtue of the way it operates, discriminates not so much by having boys' schools and girls' schools, which is a separate issue, but by what it teaches

girls and boys, whether they be in single-sex schools or co-educational schools. It can apply to both. The teaching and educational opportunities given to those children means that ultimately they do not have equal opportunities. That is the point of having education in the Bill. It would make a nonsense of sexual equality for men and women if it were not.
11.30 p.m.
I know what the views of the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield are upon women—and men—because it works both ways. If we want to give equal opportunities to boys and girls we must ensure that we do not build into the educational process a conditioning which makes assumptions about the roles of girls and boys. We have to ensure that there is equal access to all subjects, irrespective of sex. Whether this takes place in a single-sex school or a coeducational school is not the most important factor. This subject will be dealt with when we come to Clause 26.

Mr. John Page: Can the hon. Lady state quite clearly that when the Bill is passed it will be possible, if this Clause remains as it is, for new single-sex schools to be established in the private and public sector? Can she give us a categoric assurance?

Miss Lestor: I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman will not wait until we reach Clause 26. He is being unfair to those hon. Members who have tabled amendments to that Clause. I am being asked to give an answer to something that we have not yet reached. If the hon. Member wants an answer without any explanation I can say that there is nothing in the Bill which prevents an authority from establishing a single-sex school. That is why the hon. and learned Member's remarks were so erroneous.

Mr. John Page: And independent schools? [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"] The hon. Lady was kind enough to answer part of the question but I specifically referred to independent schools and schools within the State sector. I was wondering whether she had particularly singled out schools within the State sector.

Mr. Shersby: I have listened with great care to the hon. Lady and I am grateful to her for her explanation. Could


she elaborate precisely what she means by avoiding discrimination in relation to teaching? I find it hard to follow her on this. What do the Government wish to avoid in terms of discrimination within teaching?

Miss Lestor: This is something that will arise later. Other hon. Members have tabled amendments to the clauses dealing with this point. I have done my best to reassure the hon. Gentleman. It is not fair to those who wish to move amendments later if I answer the point before they raise it. I hope the hon. Member will be patient.

Mr. Alison: The hon. Lady is beginning to ignore the mood and reasonable requests of the House. We are debating a group of amendments which include Clause 26. She has mentioned Clause 26. My hon. Friend the Member for Harrow, West (Mr. Page) made a perfectly reasonable request of the hon. Lady, who, sensibly enough, answered it, after making a great deal of fuss. I hope that she will now answer simple questions We do not ask for elaborate explanations We want short answers to succinct questions. If the hon. Lady wants to elaborate later we will not object. I hope that the hen. Lady will not say "I have a lot to say but I will not say it now I will wait until it suits me." The Opposition are properly moving amendments and we insist upon answers to reasonable questions. I hope that the hon. Lady will not prolong our debates by producing delaying answers telling us that we must wait and see.

Mr. Ronald Bell: When an amendment is moved to leave out Clauses 22 to 28 everything in those clauses is in issue. It is not unreasonable to ask for answers, nor is it fair of the Minister to suggest that nine clauses deal only with the single question of the curriculum, with what the children are taught at school. Clauses 22 to 28 inclusive are seven clauses dealing with a wide variety of subjects.
The hon. Lady brushed aside the question of the curriculum. Because of lack of time I did not mention, although I had intended to, that this is also a strong argument against having education in the Bill, because it is the avowed intention of the Bill to control the curriculum of schools in order to shape people's minds

in the way in which the hon. Lady wants them shaped. That is the purpose of most of these clauses that I want to leave out. The hon. Lady has virtually said so. It is to reverse the views that people may hold on their own about what it is desirable that their sons or daughters shall learn, or what the daughters want to learn. There will not be freedom, for example, to have cookery lessons for the girls while the boys do something else. All this prescribed by Act of Parliament, not personal preference or desire, but Act of Parliament based on partisan prejudices.
This is entirely wrong. The only proper thing to do is to take education out of the Bill and leave it to the free play of parental choice and preference, and not the prejudices of, or put it bluntly, Left-wing Socialists.

Miss Joan Lestor: The hon. and learned Gentleman has got it wrong. There is a great difference between what we are doing and saying "We shall control the curriculum and you shall learn this, this and this". The hon. and learned Gentleman asks "Why can't girls learn cookery and boys do something else?" That is exactly the prejudice we are getting at.
What we are saying, as most people in the country understand, is that at whatever education establishment whether single-sex or co-educational, the subjects available shall be available equally to boys and girls. There will be no dictation that a girl must learn cookery and that a boy must not, as is often the case, or that a boy must do woodwork while a girl does something else.
We believe that as wide a curriculum as possible should be available to all the children at the school. If that is not crystal-clear, and if it is regarded as dictatorship, the hon. and learned Gentleman is misusing words.

Amendment negatived.

Clause 25

GENERAL DUTY IN PUBLIC SECTOR OF EDUCATION

Miss Joan Lestor: I beg to move Amendment No. 38, in page 17, line 41, leave out 'responsible'

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Myer Galpern): With this amendment we may discuss Government Amendments Nos. 39 and 40.

Miss Lester: These are mainly drafting amendments. The word "responsible" is superfluous, and could be misleading by giving the impression that Section 71 of the 1971 Act applies only to the performance of certain duties by anybody mentioned in subsection (5)(c), and not by an education authority.
Amendment No. 39 is to remove words which were appropriate at an earlier stage of drafting but are no longer so. The words proposed to be omitted could give the impression that there could be some sanction for a breach of the duty imposed by Clause 25(1). This is not so since the principle is that the only sanction for breach of the general duty imposed by Clause 25(1) should be default action by the Secretary of State under Section 71 of the Education (Scotland) Act 1962 as applied by Clause 25(3). These words should, therefore, be deleted.
Amendment No. 40 is a drafting amendment. Clause 26(1)(b) makes special provision for educational establishments which are provided mainly for pupils of one sex but admit a few pupils of the other sex to a particular course or class. The governing body of such an establishment will be permitted to discriminate to the extent—and only to the extent—that these few pupils will be confined to the particular course or class to which they are admitted. Sub-section (3) as drafted disapplies the provision in Clause 22 which would otherwise make it unlawful to do this. The amendment disapplies Clause 25, which would make it a breach of the general duty imposed by that clause.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment made: No. 39, in page 18, line 6, leave out from 'duty' to end of line.—[Miss Joan Lester.]

Clause 26

EXCEPTION FOR SINGLE-SEX ESTABLISHMENTS

Amendment made: No. 40, in page 18, line 44, at end insert
'or the duty in section 25'.—[Miss Joan Lestor.]

Miss Richardson: I beg to move Amendment No. 41, in page 18, line 44, at end insert
'(4) This section shall cease to have effect on 1st January 1980.'
Half of the argument on the amendment has been pre-empted by the previous debate. I should like to follow on from that.
The hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Bell) accused us of wishing so to change the education system that we would be shaping people's minds. I contend that the whole of the education system, at least up to the recent past, has been shaping people's minds—in a totally different direction, which I do not like. It has been shaping them by class prejudice and sex prejudice. It is because of this that, although I would prefer to see single-sex schools go altogether as soon as possible—I am at the other end of the scale from the hon. and learned Gentleman—that not being possible, I should like the Government to agree to putting a date on the ending of single-sex establishments.
I am not especially wedded to the date of 1st January 1980. If the Government had some other proposal this side of that date, I would be willing to accept it. But at least some stab has to be made at some period in this respect.
The perpetuation of single-sex schools represents the antithesis of what the whole Bill is about. It perpetuates the idea of segregation between the sexes in the different establishments. It also perpetuates the type of teaching that has gone on for centuries and has produced a kind of conditioned mind which very many women and young girls still have today.
From a purely practical point of view, here we are in 1975 finding it very difficult to get women teachers of physics and mathematics. That is because very few women find themselves able to take the courses required to become such teachers. There are not sufficient of them because they are not sufficiently encouraged to do so. Single-sex establishments perpetuate this sort of thing.
I should very much like the Government to agree to our doing what we agreed in Committee. My hon. Friends the Ministers and back benchers who


supported me agreed that it was a good idea that single-sex schools should be seen to be being phased out. I disagree with the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield because I object to the gradualness of the process of phasing out. I want us to put a date to it.
11.45 p.m.
The majority of single-sex schools provide a choice to a limited number of people. Single-sex schools are not available for children of all classes. It is a class argument. I hope that the Minister will give us an assurance on that point.
I know that there are difficulties about saying that the Government will do this by this or that year. However, I should be grateful to hear that the Government have the intention of phasing these single-sex schools out of existence within the foreseeable future.

Miss Joan Lestor: I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Barking (Miss Richardson) for the sympathetic way in which she moved the amendment and for her acknowledgement of the difficulties involved in the process mentioned. I have also referred to the meaning of the clause in respect of single-sex schools.
Speaking for myself, and probably for the Government, if we were starting from scratch in education—which we are not—many people would want single-sex schools. It would have been much easier if we were not dealing with an established system of education.
This amendment would have the effect of ending within five years the exception for single-sex schools and colleges from the obligation not to discriminate in the admission of pupils and from the duty to secure the provision of facilities without sex discrimination. That would include single-sex schools and colleges for girls and women. The Government said in the White Paper of September 1974 entitled "Equality for Women" that legislation should not make existing or future single-sex schools and other educational establishments unlawful. That will not please my hon. Friend. The White Paper noted and welcomed the growing tendency to move towards co-education.
In many respects, the development of comprehensive education will encourage that. However, there are difficulties in

volved in saying that we shall, by means of legislation, end single-sex schools in January 1980 or indeed give any strong commitment that we shall do so at any one time.
One of the difficulties is the question of resources. I am sure that my hon. Friend appreciates that. There is also the question of the present reorganisation schemes, which must be followed up if this step is insisted on. It would place a considerable burden on the resources of single-sex establishments if they were required to become co-educational and provide the necessary facilities for both sexes within these few years. It would also be at variance with Section 13 of the Education Act 1944, under which the Secretary of State must give his approval to individual proposals to change the character of the school from single sex to mixed. In exercising this duty the Secretary of State must have regard to the wishes of those in the area for single-sex or mixed schooling.
The hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Bell) is right. I have always believed in co-education. I believe that single-sex schools, to a very large extent, create an artificial environment for young people. I know that my view is shared by many others. In dealing with discrimination in education, the opportunities offered to those educated in the school are more important than whether a school is single sex or mixed. Whatever the differences which may continue to exist in them, the curricula should be based upon genuine choice, not upon traditional assumptions about the proper spheres of interest of boys and girls and men and women, but what they want to do irrespective of their sex.
I therefore have to ask the House, because of difficulties over resources, the time limit and other factors, not to support the amendment and to avoid placing any narrow time limit on the exception for single-sex schools which the clause provides. Since we are dealing with the whole question of sex discrimination it is important to watch very carefully what is going on in all our schools, whether single-sex or co-educational. It does not always follow, as evidence has shown, that co-educational schools do not sometimes fall into the trap of assuming different roles for girls and boys. We must watch what goes on in these schools


to ensure that what determines the curricular is based not on the sex of the pupils or on what the backwoods men and women think they should pursue because of their sex, but on what the pupils genuinely want to pursue.

Mr. Rees-Davies: It is necessary to get on the record the fact that a Select Committee of this House, supported by the Government, stated
We accept the principle of parental choice in education.…. We are, therefore, not opposed in principle to single-sex education and we would not recommend legislation which would make existing or future single-sex schools and other educational establishments illegal.
That paragraph was subscribed to by all parties and persons, and I hope that that position will be maintained.
All the single-sex schools have planned their programmes and curricula for some years ahead and have accepted their entrants. It is a matter not of four years but of at least 10 years ahead for which they have already laid out their entire programmes. It would take a great deal of time to phase them out if the House thought that desirable. I am quite sure that there are a very large number of people who will feel that parental choice should be maintained and that those who want to send their girls and boys to single-sex schools and do not want to adopt the principle of co-education should be entitled to continue to do so.
Many of these educational institutions are famous throughout the world. They are very successful, their standards are high, and I hope that we shall maintain them as a principle.

Mr. John Page: As an active backwoods person I listened with great care to what the Minister said, but I do not think that she answered my questions. I repeat them. Is there anything in Clause 26 to stop the establishment of new independent single-sex schools? Is there anything to stop existing co-educational schools returning to being single-sex at some stage if that appears appropriate?

Miss Joan Lestor: I was not trying to evade the hon. Gentleman's first point, I simply forgot it. There is nothing in the clause to prevent the establishment of such schools. As I understand the clause, there is nothing in it to stop a co-educational school turning into two

single-sex schools, but that is a matter on which I think I should write to the hon. Member. However, the changing of the character of a school is a matter for the Secretary of State, and he must take account of other factors.
Although there is nothing in the Bill to prevent a change of character, the Secretary of State would be brought in on such a question and he would listen to the representations which were made.

Mr. Ronald Bell: I should like to get something on the record. If a school is, or goes, co-educational, Clause 22 prevents it going back to single sex again, does it not? It is a ratchet effect.
The Minister nodded when I was moving the amendment when I put the point that there was no freedom of choice in the engagement of staff to single-sex schools. Can we have it explicitly that this is the case and that they cannot discriminate between men and women?

Miss Joan Lestor: That is right.

Miss Richardson: Obviously I would have preferred the Government to accept my amendment, but in view of the sort of assurances the Minister has given—I know she has an enlightened view of education—I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Mr. Lane: Mr. Lane rose——

Mr. Deputy Speaker: I must put the Question, otherwise it is blocked. Is it the pleasure of hon. Members that the Amendment be withdrawn?

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 33

FURTHER EXCEPTIONS FROM SS. 29(1) AND 30

Amendment made: No. 43, in page 22, line 28, leave out subsections (3) and (4).—[Mr. John Fraser.]

Mr. John Fraser: I beg to move Amendment No. 44 in page 22, line 41, leave out subsection (5) and insert—
'(5) Sections 29(1) and 30 do not apply—

(a) to discrimination which is rendered unlawful by any provision in column 1 of the table below, or


(b) to discrimination which would be so unlawful but for any provision in column 2 of that table, or
(c) to discrimination which contravenes a term modified or included by virtue of an equality clause.


TABLE


Provision creating illegality
Exception


Part II
…
Sections 6(3), 7(1)(b), 15(4), 19 and 20.




Schedule 4 paragraph 1.


Section 22 or 23
…
Sections 26, 27 and 28.



…
Schedule 4 paragraph 2.'


Although this amendment is lengthy, it is technical. Clause 33(5) is intended to exclude from Clauses 29 and 30 matters which are dealt with in the provisions of Part II of the Bill or of clause 22 and 23. Where matters are so dealt with, it is not intended that an act in relation thereto should be unlawful under Clauses 29 or 30 even though, by reason of some let-out provided in the Bill, the act is not unlawful under Part II or Clauses 22 or 23.
Whether that is clear or not, it is brief. I hope that it commends itself to the House.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 34

EXTENT OF PART III

Dr. Summerskill: I beg to move Amendment No. 45, in page 23, line 5, leave out from 'to' to 'for' in line 6 and insert
'facilities by way of banking or insurance or for grants, loans, credit or finance, where the facilities are'.
This is a purely drafting Amendment. Clause 34(1)(b) disapplies Clause 28(1) to the provision of
banking, financial or insurance facilities for a purpose to be carried out, or in connection with risk arising wholly or mainly, outside Great Britain".
The words "financial facilities" were intended to cover grants, loans and credit, but it has been put to us that the difference between the words "banking, financial and insurance facilities" in Clause 34(1)(b) and the words in Clause 29(2)(c) cast doubt on this. To remove this doubt, we are proposing in the amendment to

substitute in Clause 34(1)(b) the words in Clause 29(2)(c).

Amendment agreed to.

12 midnight.

Miss Joan Lestor: I beg to move Amendment No. 46, in page 23, line 24, leave out 'Subsection (3)' and insert 'This section'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this we may take Government Amendment No. 47.

Miss Lestor: Amendment No. 47 places outside the scope of Clauses 22, 23 and 25 the provision of education outside Great Britain except where education is provided on British ships. Educational cruises, which are organised by several local education authorities, would therefore be covered by the Bill.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment made: No. 47, in page 23, line 27, at end insert—
'(5) Sections 22, 23 and 25 do not apply to benefits, facilities or services outside Great Britain except—

(a) travel on a ship registered at a port of registry in Great Britain, and
(b) benefits, facilities or services provided on a ship so registered'.—[Mr. John. Fraser.]

Clause 40

CHARITIES

Mrs. Helene Hayman: I beg to move Amendment No 51, in page 25, line 30, at end add—
(3) The trustee or any other person charged with the management of funds subject to such a provision as is referred to in subsection (2) may apply for such provision to be altered to enable him to confer benefits upon persons of either sex any such applications shall be made in accordance with the procedures laid down by Part III of the Charities Act 1960 and the making of such application shall he conclusive evidence that the condition set out in Clause 13(1)(e)(iii) of that Act has been fulfilled".
This is a small but important amendment. All hon. Members will recognise that a measure such as this poses problems for charities, and that is why the Government chose to exempt charities and charitable trusts from the provisions of the Bill in general. However, an important area which is not covered by that


blanket exemption is where trustees of a charitable trust desire to alter the terms of that trust to prevent it applying only to members of one sex and to open it up so that it is equally applicable to members of both sexes. This is particularly important in education.
Hon. Members who have been female students at university will remember having felt deeply chagrined about scholarships, trusts and bursaries being open only to male students. Some trustees who administer trusts of colleges at universities are embarrassed because the college is no longer a single-sex college but admits members of both sexes yet they are forced to administer a trust set up many years ago when the availability of education to women was not even considered by the people who set it up. They are deeply embarrassed at being unable to offer to people of either sex scholarships, bursaries or trust funds of this type.
There is no element of compulsion in the amendment. I recognise the deep feelings that exist about trusts that have been set up—particularly under wills—and I accept that the wishes of the trustees should not lightly be set aside, but there is nothing in the amendment to force trustees to alter the terms of a trust that applies only to one sex.
The amendment is purely an enabling measure to allow the trustees, where they consider it appropriate and beneficial, and where they have no means whereby they can alter the trust terms so as to apply the trust equally to men and women, to give equal access to such funds to men and women. That is a limited but important provision.
I hope that the Government will see that we are trying to steer a path between too much interference with charities and ensuring that where public policy is being articulated, as it is in the Bill, and where public policy is coupled with the desire of the trustees to implement that policy, the charity they are administering is made open to men and women.

Mr. Lane: I support the general argument put by the hon. Member for Welwyn and Hatfield (Mrs. Hayman) with a case from my constituency, where there is a fund administered by trustees from which grants are made to young scientific research workers. It has proved

to be a valuable fund, but at present the terms of the trust do not permit any grant to be made to a woman research worker. This is the kind of situation where surely we want a little more common sense and sensibility in the Bill.

Miss Joan Lestor: The Government are sympathetic to the intention underlying the amendment, which is concerned with educational trusts in which there are these anomalies.
It is important to say, first, that one of the principles of charity law is that the law should respect, as far as is practicable, the wishes of the donor. It is also clear that perhaps, as things are, there are precedents for a rather greater degree of flexibility in the education context to meet the major social changes that have taken place.
There have been many changes since many educational trusts were set up in the last century, not least the development of universal education. There has also been the general movement towards co-education, which the Government welcome, and for which provision has been made in the Bill. My right hon. Friend believes that there is a case for a public policy of implementing the principles of the Bill in relation to educational charities to enable, but not require, trustees to obtain leave to alter the original purpose of a trust in order to delete a conditional requirement based on sex. If no such change were made in the Bill, the trustees of a single-sex educational trust might have difficulty in moving to co-education.
We are currently considering how such a provision might be formalised and operated and what conditions and safeguards need to be introduced. The procedures proposed in the amendment are not entirely satisfactory as they stand. There is a certain inconsistency in the requirement that an application by trustees of a kind specified in the amendment should be deemed to fulfil the requirements of Clause 13 as to the occasions for applying property cy-pres. But at the same time, the provisions as regards the making of schemes should be required to be fulfilled.
On the other hand, there are problems about permitting trustees, whose principal and continuing duty is to preserve and


administer trusts as long as they can, to have an unfettered and arbitrary right to modify them if they feel so disposed.
Difficult questions are involved and the Government are considering them urgently. We propose to introduce our own amendment in another place. In the light of that assurance, I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Welwyn and Hatfield (Mrs. Hayman) will withdraw the amendment. We accept the principle behind it.
I make it clear that our amendment would be related only to educational trusts. It is these with which my hon. Friend and the hon. Member for Cambridge (Mr. Lane) are concerned. The considerations relating to other single-sex charities are different. The Bill already includes a wide range of exceptions for single-sex voluntary institutions.

Mrs. Hayman: I am sure that my hon. Friend is a much better draftsperson than I am. On the basis of her assurance, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 43

CERTAIN DISCRIMINATORY TRAINING ETC

Mr. John Fraser: I beg to move Amendment No. 52, in page 26, line 9, leave out 'section 6' and insert 'Parts II to IV'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: I do not have the proposals of the Government as to the grouping of amendments. It would be useful if we could be given advance notice of the amendments which the Government wish to group together.

Mr. Fraser: It would be helpful to consider with Amendment No. 52 Government Amendment No. 53.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Yes, and it would be useful to the Chair to receive advance notice.

Mr. Fraser: Both these amendments are technical. Amendment No. 52 removes a technical fault. The amendment removes the risk that actions which would normally fall within Clause 6 might, when Clause 6 only is disapplied,

become unlawful by some other provision of the Bill rather than becoming clearly lawful.

Amendment No. 53 removes an anomaly in subsection 3(a) of Clause 43. The amendment makes the relevant test the likely future area of employment rather than the physical location of the training.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment made: No. 53, in page 27, line 3, leave out from 'persons' to 'which' in line 4 and insert
'who are of the sex in question, and who appear likely to take up that work in that area, access to facilities for training'.—[Mr. John Fraser.]

Mr. Alison: I beg to move Amendment No. 54, in page 27, line 30, at end insert—
'(6) References in the foregoing subsections to the absence of persons of one particular sex, or their presence only in small numbers, shall not be taken as an inference that the absence of an exact balance, or an approximate balance, in the numbers of the different sexes, constitutes evidence of discrimination as specified in Part I of this Act'.
This is an exploratory amendment. One of the views that the public hold about the Bill is that it seeks to redress the balance in employment opportunities and the actual employment of women. It is thought that it will produce the result that in many industries and sectors of employment there will be a much greater number of women employed and that they will represent a much higher proportion of the total work force than is at present the case. However, the Government have not at any point in the Bill taken a position that indicates whether or not it is desirable that there should be a rough balance between the sexes in any given sector.
The purpose of the amendment is to give the Minister an opportunity to make plain the Government's attitude towards achieving a rough balance, and to explain why it has not been felt necessary to spell out any clear formula somewhere in the Bill of the implications of the concept of a balance of the sexes in certain employment opportunities, the Government having been at pains to note the fact that in some situations relatively small numbers are involved. That is matter that is taken into account in the Bill.
But should there not be some reference to the fact that a balance is an ideal to be aimed at? If such a balance is not held by the Government to be an ideal to be aimed at, should there not be a rough balance of the sexes in certain kinds of employment? It should be made clear that the Equal Opportunities Commission, for example, is not expected to regard an absence of anything approaching a balance of employment between the sexes in particular sectors of industry as constituting prima facie evidence that something has gone wrong. I hope that the Minister can comment briefly on this matter.

Mr. John Fraser: The Government have made it clear that the Bill is not intended to lead to an imposition of quotas. We considered the arguments about a balance of the sexes being achieved. Such a balance can operate in favour of and against women. We decided against having any balance clause in the Bill. The Bill is intended in the main to allow people to proceed on their merits and free from discrimination. We think that that is the right approach.
In Clause 43 we contemplate a possibility where there is an area of employment where women have by tradition always been excluded or in which they have not naturally come forward. The employer cannot discriminate or give preferential treatment in terms of recruitment. Pre-recruitment training, for example, might enable women the better to fight for an area of employment where traditionally in the past they have not been involved.
In presenting a case to the tribunal or the courts a woman may support her case by pointing to evidence that no woman has ever been employed in the work in question. I emphasise that that of itself will not be sufficient to demonstrate her own rejection on the ground of sex. I give an assurance that Clause 43 does not carry the implication which the amendment suggests. With that assurance, I hope that the amendment can be withdrawn.

Mr. Alison: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 47

ESTABLISHMENT AND DUTIES OF COMMISSION

12.15 a.m.

Mr. Ian Gilmour: I beg to move Amendment No. 56, in page 28, line 34, at end insert
'and
(d) to keep under review the number of women who are appointed to the Boards of public bodies and corporations; to certain committees; and to certain panels and tribunals as listed in paragraph 16 of Schedule 3 to this Act; and to report and make recommendations to the Secretary of State accordingly'.

Mr Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take Amendment No. 88, in Schedule 3, page 64, line 13, at end insert—

'16. The bodies referred to in section 47(1)(d) of this Act are as follows:—

The Advisory Board for the Research Councils.
The Agrément Board.
The Appellate Tribunal constituted under the provisions of the National Service Act 1948 relating to conscientious objectors.
An area Electricity Board in England and Wales.
The Attendance Allowance Board.
The British Airports Authority.
The British Airways Board.
The British Film Fund Agency.
The British Gas Corporation.
The British Railways Board.
The British Steel Corporation.
The British Transport Docks Board.
The British Waterways Board.
The Central Council for Agricultural and Horticultural Co-operation.
The Central Electricity Generating Board.
The Channel Tunnel Planning Council.
The Civil Aviation Authority.
The Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal.
A Colonial Currency Board.
The Commission for Local Administration in England.
The Commission for Local Administration in Wales.
The Commission for the New Towns.
The Commonwealth Development Corporation.
The Community Relations Commission.
The Council on Tribunals.
The Covent Garden Market Authority.
The Crofters Commission.
The Crown Agents for Overseas Governments and Administrations.
The Crown Estate Commissioners.
The Development Commission established under the Development and Road Improvement Funds Act 1909.
A Development Corporation within the meaning of the New Towns Act 1965 or the New Towns (Scotland) Act 1968.

A Development Council established under the Industrial Organisation and Development Act 1947.

The Eggs Authority.
The Electricity Council.
The Foreign Compensation Commission.
The Forestry Commission.
The Freight Integration Council.
The Gaming Board for Great Britain.
The General Practice Finance Corporation.
The Health and Safety Commission.
The Health and Safety Executive.
The Herring Industry Board.
The Highlands and Islands Development Board.
The Home-Grown Cereals Authority.
The Housing Corporation.
The Immigration Appeal Tribunal.
An Independent Schools Tribunal constituted under Schedule 6 to the Education Act 1944 or Schedule 7 to the Education (Scotland) Act 1962.
The Independent Broadcasting Authority.
The Industrial Arbitration Board.
An Industrial Court established in Northern Ireland.
The Industrial Estates Corporations constituted in accordance with the Local Employment Act 1972.
The Industrial Injuries Advisory Council.
The Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce and every committee of the Board performing functions of the Board.
A Joint Planning Inquiry Commission constituted under Part III of the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1972.
The Lands Tribunal.
The Lands Tribunal for Northern Ireland.
The Lands Tribunal for Scotland.
The Law Commission.
The Local Government Boundary Commission for England.
The Local Government Boundary Commission for Scotland.
The Local Government Boundary Commission for Wales.
The Location of Offices Bureau.
The Manpower Services Commission.
The Maplin Development Authority.
The Meat and Livestock Commission.

A Medical Appeal Tribunal constituted for the purposes of Part III of the Social Security Act 1975 or Part III of the Social Security (Northern Ireland) Act 1975, including any panel constituted for the purposes of any such Tribunal.

A Medical Board or Pneumoconiosis Medical Board constituted for the purposes of Part III of the Social Security Act 1975 or Part III of the Social Security (Northern Ireland) Act 1975, including any panel constituted for the purposes of any such Board.

A Medical Practices Committee constituted under section 34 of the National Health Service Act 1946 or section 35 of the National Health Service (Scotland) Act 1947.

The Medicines Commission and any committee established under section 4 of the Medicines Act 1968.

A Mental Health Review Tribunal constituted under the Mental Health Act 1959.

The Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland.


The Metrication Board.
The Ministry of Defence (Army Department) Teachers Selection Board.
The Monopolies and Mergers Commission.
A National Broadcasting Council
The National Bus Company.
The National Coal Board.
The National Dock Labour Board.
The National Film Finance Corporation
The National Freight Corporation.
The National Health Service Staff Commission.
The National Insurance Advisory Committee.
The National Ports Council.
The National Radiological Protection Board.
The National Research Development Corporation.
The North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board.
The Northern Ireland Electricity Service.
The Occupational Pensions Board.

A Panel of Chairmen of Re-instatement Committees constituted under section 41 of the National Service Act 1948.

The Panel of Official Arbitrators constituted for the purposes of the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act 1919.

The Parole Board constituted under section 59 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967.

A Pensions Appeal Tribunal.

The Performing Right Tribunal.

A Planning Inquiry Commission constituted under Part III of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971.

A Planning Inquiry Commission constituted under Part III of the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1972.

The Post Office.
The Price Commission.

The Property Commission for Scotland established under section 224 of the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973.

The Race Relations Board and any conciliation committee constituted by the Board under section 14 of the Race Relations Act 1968.

The Red Deer Commission.
The Reserve Pension Board.
The Restrictive Practices Court.
The Review Board for Government Contracts.
A Rural Development Board.
The Scottish Committee of the Council on Tribunals.
The Scottish Land Court.
The Scottish Law Commission.
The Scottish Transport Group.
The South of Scotland Electricity Board.

The Staff Commission established under section 85(5) of the London Government Act 1963.

The Staff Commission for England established under section 257 of the Local Government Act 1972.

The Staff Commission for Scotland established tinder section 218 of the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973.

The Staff Commission for Wales established under section 258 of the Local Government Act 1972.



The Sugar Board.
The Supplementary Benefits Commission.
The Traffic Commissioners for any area (including the commissioner for the Metropolitan Traffic Area).
The Transport Tribunal.
The Tribunal established under Part II of the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949.
The United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority.
The University Grants Committee.
A Value Added Tax Tribunal.
The Water Resources Board.
The Welsh National Health Staff Commission.

The White Fish Authority constituted in accordance with section 1 of the Sea Fish Industry Act 1970, and the committee constituted in accordance with section 2 of that Act'.

Mr. Gilmour: The amendment seeks to provide that the Equal Opportunities Commission should keep under review the number of women who are on public boards. Command 5609 lists members of nationalised industry boards, and on my calculation there are 296 men and seven women. That may not be a precise figure, but it is near enough. That seems to be a totally wrong proportion, and I hope that within a reasonable period of time the commission will be able to improve the situation.

Dr. Summerskill: The Government fully accept that women are under-represented on public bodies of the kind mentioned in the amendment. I made this clear when speaking on the Balance of Sexes Bill presented by my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton, North (Mrs. Colquhoun). We are taking various steps to remedy this deficiency throughout Government Departments. When vacancies occur the Government are considering suitable women to fill them. Procedures have been developed by the Civil Service Department and The Women's National Commission to secure the nomination of more women for appointment to public bodies. We seek to ensure that women will increasingly participate in all areas of public life.
I personally would welcome that commission looking at the question of public appointments. Indeed, the commission can do so, if it wishes, under the terms of the Bill as it stands. No doubt the commission will bear in mind tonight's discussions. But we have some reservations about adding to the list of specific tasks placed on the Equal Opportunities Commission in the Bill itself, except

where this is essential—as in Government Amendments Nos. 58 and 59 dealing with the protective legislation. The commission has a number of important tasks to undertake under the legislation. On the whole we prefer to leave it to arrange its priorities as it thinks desirable and to give it maximum flexibility, bearing in mind that it is a body that is independent of the Government.

Amendment negatived.

Miss Richardson: I beg to move Amendment No. 57, in page 28, line 34, at end insert:
'(d) to review existing and proposed legislation, with a view to eliminating discrimination and promoting equality of opportunity between men and women and, when so required by the Secretary of State or otherwise think it necessary, to draw up and submit to the Secretary of State proposals for amending such legislation'.
My suggested paragraph places certain duties on the Equal Opportunities Commission I appreciate that there is nothing to stop the commission from looking at any legislation it likes under the general powers to promote equality of opportunity The aim of this amendment is to keep in the forefront of the commission's mind the fact that it is expected to consider legislation which does not seem to be directly affected by the Bill It is the commission's duty to watch ensuing legislation, especially that concerned with social security, national insurance, the Inland Revenue, immigration laws and proposed amendments of the law
It is important that the commission should be seen to be playing such a rôle. Organisations such as the Child Poverty Action Group and the National Council of Civil Liberties have played an important part in pointing out over a long period where discrimination exists. It throws up evidence of discrimination. Their surveillance has always been warmly applauded, at least by me. How much better it would be if the Equal Opportunities Commission had the duty to play such a rôle officially as a Government agency.
There has been a lot of criticism of this Bill in general centred around vital areas of social policy, about which it is said by very many women's rights organisations that nothing fundamental has been done. This amendment does not in any way restrict the powers and duties of the


Equal Opportunities Commission. It simply spells out one important aspect of its job, and I hope the Government will consider taking it on board.

Dr. Summerskill: I can say to my hon. Friend what I said concerning the last amendment—that there is nothing to prevent the Equal Opportunities Commission from looking at her suggestion, in this case the review of existing and proposed legislation in any sphere, including the subjects she herself listed, with a view to eliminating discrimination and promoting equality of opportunity, and from making whatever proposals it thinks fit. I am sure that the EOC will take note of my hon. Friend's suggestions, but the Government do not want to impose on the commission too many statutory provisions, hence the wide-ranging nature of the general duties contained in Clause 47. But there is nothing in my hon. Friend's amendment that cannot be covered by the commission, and I think it is right that we should leave it to it, a body independent of Government, to settle its own priorities.

Amendment negatived.

Clause 49

REVIEW OF DISCRIMINATORY PROVISIONS IN HEALTH AND SAFETY LEGISLATION

Mr. John Fraser: I beg to move Amendment No. 58, in page 29, line 12, after 'subsection', insert '(a)'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. George Thomas): I understand that it would be for the convenience of the House to consider also Amendments Nos. 59, 89, 90 and 91.

Mr. Fraser: The first two amendments are to Clause 49, and the balance are to Schedule 6. It might be helpful if I first said a few words about the amendments to Schedule 6.
Schedule 6 lists the provisions of existing enactments which are to be repealed. When the Bill was being considered in Standing Committee an amendment was moved by the hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mr. Gilmour) which added to Schedule 6 amendments to sections of the Factories Act 1961, the Hours of Employment (Conventions) Act 1936, and the Mines and Quarries Act 1954, all

with the intention of repealing the provisions which regulate the hours and days of employment of women and their employment on the maintenance and cleaning of moving machinery.
The Government amendments to Schedule 6 seek to remove the provisions which were added in Standing Committee, but I want to make it quite clear that the reason for doing so is not just to reverse a Government defeat in Committee. In view of the known strength of opinion both for and against the removal of these restrictions, the Government feel it necessary to take into consideration the views of the whole House. That is why these further amendments have been put down. There is as well the problem which I pointed out in Committee that the Opposition amendments had some technical defects.
Clause 49 relates to the duty placed on the Equal Opportunities Commission to keep under review, in consultation with the Health and Safety Commission, the relevant statutory provisions which require men and women to be treated differently. In Committee the hon. Member for Cambridge (Mr. Lane) felt that there was a danger that the provisions could be rendered ineffective unless the Equal Opportunities Commission was required to make proposals within a reasonable period of time. Although it is to be hoped that such a situation would not arise, the Government now accept that there is a case for taking steps to ensure that the intention of these provisions is realised. That is why we have tabled these amendments to Clause 49.
The amendments to Clause 49 seek to give the Secretary of State authority to require the EOC to make reports within a specified time on matters concerning the discriminatory relevant statutory provisions. The Government are determined to see that at least a first review of all the provisions involved will he completed by the end of 1978. I hope that the House will realise that this is a fairly important statement of intention about the review of the protective legislation. It involves an assurance of an intention to have the first review completed within about three years, and it involves a power by the Government to require the review to be made by the commission.
The Health and Safety Commission, which Clause 49 requires the EOC to consult, is subject already to the directions of the Secretary of State for Employment by virtue of the provisions of Section 12 of the Health and Safety at Work, etc., Act 1974, and one of these amendments puts the EOC in the same situation in respect of the protective legislation.
I turn now to the provisions which are the subject of the amendments to Schedule 6, the bulk of which are to be found in the Factories Act 1961. I deal first with the provisions which prohibit or restrict the employment of women on certain jobs when machinery is in motion.
Broadly speaking, Section 15 of the Factories Act provides that only males aged 18 and over are allowed to lubricate or adjust machinery where it is necessary to carry out these operations whilst the machinery is in motion. Section 20 prohibits women and young persons of either sex from cleaning prime movers or transmission machinery in motion and restricts their cleaning any part of a machine where there is a risk of injury from moving parts of machinery. The effect of the amendment carried in Committee is to remove the prohibitions and restrictions as they relate to women aged 18 and over.
I said in Committee that I thought that, as the question of working with moving machinery involved safety matters, it would be best left for the EOC's review, which would be in consultation with the Health and Safety Commission. However, I had some sympathy with the point made at the time by the right hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham that it could not now be seriously argued that if women were capable of working with a machine they were not capable of cleaning or adjusting it.
I can now tell the House that the Government are considering the possibility of moving amendments very shortly in another place which will have the effect of enabling adult men and women to be treated equally with regard to jobs that can be done safely on moving machinery and, in addition, will apply equally to adult men and women any restrictions imposed because of risk of injury. This will involve some upgrading of the protection at present afforded to men. It is not intended to

alter any existing prohibition or restriction on the employment of young persons on moving machinery.
However, we may be advised that it is not technically possible to accomplish all this under the Bill because of the involvement of health and safety legislation. Should that be the case, I undertake to request the Health and Safety Commission to arrange for an early review of the provisions in question.
I turn now to the restrictions on the hours of employment of women and young persons which are contained in Part VI of the Factories Act 1961. The amendment carried in Committee had the intention of retaining the restrictions on young persons, and on this point there is no argument. The legislation is complex, but, very generally, the effect of the provisions is that women cannot be employed in factories before 7 a.m. or after 8 p.m. or 1 p.m. on Saturday; the total hours worked must not exceed nine in any day or 48 in any week; overtime is limited; employment on Sunday is prohibited; and there are provisions about rest intervals.
12.30 a.m.
I am fully aware that there are strongly held views both for and against the removal of the restrictions on hours.
There are some who contend that the restrictions are out of date and deny to women the opportunities, for example of shift work or night work, which are open to men. Others maintain that the retention of some if not all of the restrictions is necessary for the protection of women in the light of their responsibilities to their families and in view of their relative lack of trade union organisation.
The Government came to the conclusion that, while there may be some restrictions which have outlived their original purpose, there must be a further full and independent study of each of the restrictive provisions. That is why we have placed a duty on the Equal Opportunities Commission, in consultation with the Health and Safety Commission, to review relevant statutory provisions—not only in the Factories Act—which require men and women to be treated differently.
I can bring the House up to date with the statistics about those covered by exemptions. Over the past tour years


the number of people covered by special exemptions has increased from 170,000 to 209,000 and the number of women allowed to work at night has risen from 20,000 to 49,000.
I should like to refer briefly to the sections of the Mines and Quarries Act 1954 which are involved in the amendment. They restrict the hours of employment of women and young persons employed above ground at a mine or employed at a quarry. The provisions are similar to those of sections of the Factories Act. The amendment carried in Committee is defective in that it also removes the restrictions on young persons, which I am sure was not intended.
I hope that I have been able to demonstrate to the House that the Government are actively concerned with the restrictions on the employment of women. Indeed, in our consideration of the provisions relating to moving machinery and in our proposals to ensure an early review of the relevant statutory provisions by the EOC we have gone a long way to meet points made in Committee by hon. Members. I ask the House not to be too hasty and to think carefully before sweeping away all these provisions without any thought. I commend to the House that part of the editorial in The Guardian yesterday about this protective legislation in which it says of these women:
They are the poorest, worst organised and most vulnerable people in the work force. Their factory work is only one of two jobs. Nearly all are also trying to bring up families, run homes and look after their husband's needs".
I do not think we ought at a stroke to sweep away the protection given to them and based on the experience of many years. I ask the House to accept what I have said about the fact that we shall have the power to instruct the EOC to bring forward a review, that we contemplate a review period to the end of 1978 and that we shall try to amend immediately in another place the provisions of Sections 15 and 20 of the Factories Act. I hope that that goes a long way to meet what the Committee asked for and that both sides of the House can now reach accord on this and proceed on the basis of the Government amendments.

Mr. Alison: The proposals in these amendments are good in part. We cer-

tainly welcome the undertakings given by the Minister about the cleaning, maintenance, adjustment of moving machinery and so on. Since women are already allowed to work such machines it would be ludicrous not to change the regulations. I am delighted that the Minister has arranged for the Government to move amendments to this effect in another place.
I must remind the House and the Minister of what the Governments White Paper said. It commented:
Most women do low-grade jobs in a narrow range of industries and services for much lower rates of pay than unskilled men. Most of them are segregated into 'women's work'. Women do not have the same chances as men of training for skilled work or promotion. Proportionately five times as many boys as girls take up apprenticeships, and most of the girls are apprentices in hairdressing and manicure.
It was precisely because of this sort of defect in opportunities for women in industry as much as in other sectors that the Bill with its many and varied clauses was brought forward.
The Bill was designed to grapple with this imbalance of opportunity and reward for women. Now the Government have effectively come along with an amendment which proposes—the barriers having been swept away by a majority of the Committee after serious consideration of the issues—to throttle the flow of women into those areas of opportunity for work from which they are currently excluded and where the rewards are much greater than in those sectors into which they are now segregated.
It is not into the ranks of lower-grade white-collar workers that women need a new opportunity to gain entry, because they already represent a majority of such workers. It is not into the ranks of clerks that women need an opportunity to gain entry. They already provide the majority of clerks as defined in the various employment categories. It is not into the ranks of salesmen, shop assistants, hairdressers or nurses that women need a fresh opportunity of entry. They already represent a majority in all of those employments.
It is into the ranks of skilled manual workers that women need opportunity of entry. Only 15 per cent of such employees are women. It is into the ranks of electrical or electronic workers,


where there are high rewards and where dextrous manual skills are required, that women need the opportunity to gain entry. There are seven times as many men as women in electrical and electronics work. It is into the engineering and allied trades, with high rewards, and requiring the skills appropriate to many of the inherent capacities of women, that women should be encouraged to enter. There are 10 times as many men as women in the engineering and allied trades, and four times as many in the skilled metal trades.
It is entry into these sectors that the Government, with their amendment, have decided to postpone. Having introduced a reforming Bill, they have decided to postpone until the vague, uncertain activities of the Equal Opportunities Commission three years hence, in 1978, further chances for women to enter this promised land of skilled, highly rewarded work in factories.
Some people may feel that women need to be protected in respect of both hours and factory work in particular. But that feeling is not sustainable, with women accustomed to working all hours as nurses, and in view of their work in some factory conditions, doing exactly the same kind of shift system or late night hours. It is not sustainable to say that they should not work in factories anyway, because there are many exemptions in the Factories Acts which already enable them to work in laundries, food manufacturing premises of various sorts, and the textile industry.
The Government are now postponing for another three years entry into the plum jobs in the industrial sector, to which women are already admitted by exemptions and exceptions, and where they inherently possess many of the skills which men use, particularly for operations requiring dextrous manual skill. Why postpone it for another three years?
There is no risk to women here. They are used to working late hours as nurses, and to working as textile workers in factories. Having introduced a Bill designed to give women equal opportunities, the Government are now deliberately amending it to postpone this opportunity for women. It is a retrogressive step. The Committee was right to abolish these

limitations by a majority of Members of all parties serving on it.
It is a great pity that the Government will not go as far in this respect as they have happily agreed to go in respect of work with moving machinery. I hope that they will reconsider the matter, and perhaps even make amendments in another place, as they are prepared to do in the matter of moving machinery.

Mr. J. W. Rooker: I enter the debate briefly at this late hour to comment on the part of Schedule 6 referring to the hours of work for women in factories. The matter is not as straightforward as both Front Benches would have us believe. In my experience of the many engineering factories in which I worked, there is widespread abuse of the limitation of hours. When there have been rushes of production I have known women to be brought in on Saturday afternoons and Sundays. The windows are covered with curtains while the production lines run. I have known this to occur in factories in which I have worked and heard about it occurring at other factories.
Not all women who work in factories have families. Many are self-supporting and therefore the restrictions seem totally unfair. However, there is widespread abuse of them.
What will influence me to support my hon. Friend the Minister if there is to be a Division on the amendment are the motives behind wanting the facility for women to be able to work longer hours. Women are a source of cheap labour on the mass production assembly lines. The hon. Member for Barkston Ash (Mr. Alison) mentioned the number of women who work in the electronics industry. They are the only source of labour available to run the lines in that industry. Therefore, there is immense pressure for them to work all the hours God provides and to sweep away the limitations.
If it were left to some factory managements—of which I have been a part in some respects—they would not bother with the evening or twilight shift of women coming in to work from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. or 10 p.m. They would be only too happy to provide hours from 8 a.m., with all the overtime that was wanted, because there is an abundant source of labour that is fairly cheap. Many women


are forced by circumstances to want to grap the extra time and the extra money it brings in.
We should not now sweep away the restrictions and give women a so-called "opportunity". Who will be getting the opportunity? It is a little more one-sided than the hon. Member for Barkston Ash would admit. I believe that in his heart he knows the motives behind this. I admit that there is widespread abuse. But there is no doubt that we need a period of time to sort out this matter, and three years is the minimum in which to do that.

Miss Richardson: I would hardly have agreed with the hon. Member for Barkston Ash (Mr. Alison) that it was entering a promised land to have the opportunity to work on an assembly line in the electronics industry. To me it certainly would not be that, but if some people want to do it they should be allowed to do it.
In Committee I voted with the Opposition to repeal the protective legislation. I now propose to support the Government. If the Government had then said what my hon. Friend the Minister has now said, I would have supported him at that time, because I feel that some of the protective legislation is out-dated. It needs to be examined. The Minister has now suggested that the whole range of the legislation will be looked at closely. That is perfectly satisfactory from my point of view. I go along happily with the fact that it will take three years to do that. With my hand on my heart, I shall now support what the Government are doing.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment made: No. 59, in page 29, line 14, at end insert—
`and
(b) if so required by the Secretary of State, make to him a report on any matter specified by him which is connected with those duties and concerns the relevant statutory provisions.
Any such report shall be made within the time specified by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of State shall cause the report to be published.'.—[Mr. John Fraser.]

Clause 52

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Mr. Lane: I beg to move Amendment No. 60, in page 30, line 27, at end insert—
'(5) The terms of reference, and any revisions to the said terms, shall be made public before the commencement of any authorised investigation'.
The intention of this amendment is to make clear what I take it is the Government's intention anyway—that is, that the terms of reference or any changes in the terms of reference for these investigations should be publicly known. We may assume that from the wording of, among other things, Clause 52(3), which says
It shall be the duty of the Commission to give general notice of the holding of the investigation"—
and so on. I take it that the Government intend this, but we should like to add these two lines to make it absolutely certain.
I want to repeat briefly a point frequently made in Committee. Those of us who are in general in support of the Bill are all agreed that if it is to work smoothly there must be maximum public support for its aims and public under standing of what is going on. That applies particularly to the admittedly difficult and delicate area we are entering into here, especially having set up the Equal Opportunities Commission and given it fairly important powers to investigate and roam widely over considerable areas of national life.
I am sure that this will avoid misunderstandings, distortions or misrepresentations if it can be clearly and publicly known, not merely among a magic circle, what the Commission is doing when it starts a formal investigation. We think that it is a common sense, improving amendment. I hope that the Government will immediately accept it.

12.45 a.m.

Dr. Summerskill: Clause 52(3) provides for general notice to be given in the case of investigations of a general nature, whether undertaken at the request of the


Secretary of State or at the commission's own volition. "General notice" means a notice published by the commission at a time and in a manner appearing to the commission suitable for securing that it is seen within a reasonable time by the persons likely to be affected by it.
It is important that these people should be aware that they are being investigated, especially given the commission's powers in relation to formal investigations. But where the investigation is confined, by its terms of reference, to the activities of certain named persons it is unnecessary that the existence, or terms of reference, of the investigation should have to be made public, because the person under investigation will have received under subsection (3) notice of the investigation. The time for publishing the fact is when the investigation has determined either that the person in question has not discriminated or that he has, and a non-discrimination notice has been served on him. The notice will then appear in a public register.
We do not think it will necessarily help combat discrimination if such investigations as I have mentioned are carried out publicly. Under the Race Relations Act there is no obligation on the Race Relations Board to make known the fact before hand that it will investigate an individual complaint brought to its notice.
I am confident that the provisions in the Bill relating to publication or notifications of terms of reference are fair, and are the fairest that we can compile at the moment. I hope that what I have said will reassure the hon. Gentleman.

Amendment negatived.

Clause 53

POWER TO OBTAIN INFORMATION

Dr. Summerskill: I beg to move Amendment No. 61, in page 31, line 1, leave out from 'doing' to end of line 4 and insert
'acts of all or any of the following descriptions—

(i) unlawful discriminatory acts,
(ii) contraventions of section (discriminatory practices),

(iii) contraventions of sections 35, 36 or 37, and
(iv) acts in breach of a term modified or included by virtue of an equality clause,
and confine the investigation to those acts.'

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this we shall take Amendment No. 67, in page 36, line 29 leave out 'issue' and insert
'in the prescribed manner serve on him'.
We shall also take Amendment No. 73, in page 38, line 38, leave out 'section 61(1)' and insert
'paragraph (b), or contravening section (discriminatory practices)'.

Dr. Summerskill: Amendment No. 61 relates to Clause 53, which provides that the Equal Opportunities Commission shall have, for the purposes of a formal investigation, power to require the production of written or oral information relevant to it, provided that either of two criteria are satisfied. These two criteria are set out in Clause 53(2) and they represent safeguards for the rights of individuals.
The criteria are that either the commission must be specifically authorised by the Secretary of State to exercise the power, or the commission must believe, and state in the terms of reference of the investigation that it believes, that a person named in the terms of reference may have done or may be doing unlawful discriminatory acts or acts in contravention of the Equal Pay Act.
Clause 53(2) is fine as far as it goes but we feel that it should go further. It covers unlawful discriminatory acts, but it does not cover four related matters with which the commission alone has the power to deal. These are unlawful advertising, instructions to discriminate, pressure to discriminate, and discriminatory practices.
Amendment No. 66 to Clause 61 complements Amendment No. 61 to Clause 53. It is clearly right that the unlawful acts in respect of which the EOC should be able to issue a non-discriminatory notice should not be, as they are at present, confined to acts of unlawful discrimination but should include pressure to discriminate, instructions to discriminate, discriminatory advertising and discriminatory practices.
Amendment No. 73 is in turn consequential on the insertion of paragraph (b) into Clause 61.
I hope that the House will accept the amendments as improvements to the Bill.

Mr. Rees-Davies: I am wholly opposed to the amendment and also to the manner in which it has come about. The amendment very largely widens the scope of the Bill. It has arisen without any suggestion of any kind in Committee that it would do so and it comes before the House at a late hour. It seeks to give extensive additional powers for an investigation by the commission. The provisions relating to Clauses 35, 36 and 37 were not included before, and neither were those relating to discriminatory practices.
The Government have at no time given any specific reason for including these extra provisions. I am quite satisfied that they should not be included. Just what are the powers which will arise? Supposing, with the assistance of some advertising matter, I advertise for a host or hostess, a waiter or a waitress, a barman or a barmaid. Or suppose that I ask for a "chairman" rather than a "chair person", or I decide to ask for a "salesgirl" or a "salesman" rather than for a "sales person" because I have not yet managed to discover the totally new nomenclature which will have to be used by the advertising profession owing to the stupidities and absurdities of Clause 35(3).
Under Clause 53, as it is now proposed to be amended, the commission, for the purpose of a formal investigation, may, with notice in the prescribed form, not only require me to deliver written information as prescribed in the notice, but can specify the time, place, manner and form in which I give that information. It can then require me to attend at such time and place as it determines, give oral information, produce any documents which are in my possession, and impose a very severe penalty upon me if I destroy or fail to produce them. These are far wider powers than exist in any of the criminal courts. Previously all it could deal with was the question of the equality clause, on which it wanted formal investigation powers. It would, it was

stated, confine its investigation to that matter.
The amendments tabled to Clause 35 were not called, doubtless because it was felt that the matter had been adequately discussed in Standing Committee. But there is a serious point on this clause. Under subsection (3), if we, for the purpose of a job description with a sexual connotation, use the words salesgirl, postman, waiter or stewardess, that might be taken as an intention to discriminate. It is not illegal or unlawful to discriminate. It is illegal to commit an unlawful act of discrimination in pursuance of it.
Thus, of course, the whole question of Clause 35 needs to be looked at again. But if it is intended to impose this on the advertisers of this country and those who use advertising and any form of notice, they must be told that they may find themselves hauled up before the commission and asked to produce all kinds of documents with all the paraphernalia which goes with a court hearing of that kind where they are obliged to produce evidence.
It is wholly unreasonable to widen the scope of the Bill like this. Let us consider it. Is it true and right that we should say that if a person wants to employ only bar ladies he will not have the opportunity to do so? Is that the fact that if one is running a business which requires hostesses, one has to advertise for hostesses with the "esse" in brackets? Then one will have the job of turning away the hosts one did not want. It is a waste of time and money and also a waste of the time of the applicants for jobs. It is deplorable. It also distorts the English language. We are going to have to find some words. You, Mr. Deputy Speaker, will become a "chair person" because one does not have a chairman, chairlady or chairwoman but a chair person.
People wanting sales staff will not be able to advertise for salesman or sales girl. How ludicrous it will be. I like the Bill and have always been in favour of ending sex discrimination, but "discrimination" has two connotations. We are using it in the lawful sense and it is made plain what we mean. If one calls a person discriminating, however, one is paying a great compliment. One means discriminating in taste in food and


wine. It is a good phrase. I am pointing out that if one has a clause like Clause 35, which makes it impossible to advertise for people to get a special type of discriminating worker in a particular field, one is using a very blunt weapon.
I beg the Government to go away and think about this while the Bill is in another place and see if they can come back with some more sensible measures for advertising. Otherwise the country and the Government will soon look fools in this matter.
It is no use saying that this will not cause great troubles, because the editors of newspapers will have to lay down a proper advertising code. The types of advertising which the Under-Secretary of State for Employment referred to were ones in which one could clearly see the nature of the discrimination, like "Rapid promotion for brilliant young executive—male". That is fair enough, but what has been overlooked is the general run of these matters. People who have a first-class barman and staff may specifically want to get female staff. It may well be that in these days there are some entertaining jobs employing only men. It is the way the establishments are promoted. There are other establishments which want attractive girls for promotional purposes. That is part of tourism and promotional entertainment. We must not make it a joke. We must not make it necessary to add a long rider to the advertisement to the effect that a new type of bar is being promoted which employs only girls.
1.0 a.m.
To widen the provision by including a formal investigation by the commission before which advertisers and, no doubt, newspaper people have to give evidence is to use a sledgehammer to crack a nut. It goes far too wide.

Mr. John Fraser: The hon. and learned Gentleman has not quarrelled with the exceptions in Clause 7. We said that there would be some areas of employment where there may be exceptions and where discrimination will not be unlawful. For a post in respect of which an exception is provided in Clause 7 the advertisement can be discriminatory because the job is protected by Clause 7. There is some protection there.

Mr. Rees-Davies: Clause 7 provides exceptions only where it can be said that the man has a genuine occupational qualification for the job. The jobs I have been referring to—waiters and waitresses, hosts and hostesses, typists—can be done by men or women. I accept that a job that is normally only a man's occupation—as an actor, for example—is different. Section 7 does not limit that, and it will be left wide open for the nonsense that it is when the advertising managers have to work it out.
We are not dealing with Clause 35. I hang my argument on the fact that it is wrong to impose on the commission investigations into Clauses 35, 36 and 37. I accept that it is right for the commission to investigate cases arising on the new equality clause, and I understand that was the case the Government were presenting. Powers will be given to the commission which it does not want, and in many cases the commission will be dealing with frivolous matters.
I pray in aid what was said about advertisements in paragraph 28 of the Select Committee's report:
On the condition that provision is made for exclusions in the employment provisions of any proposed Bill and that the … enforcement body is given discretion to ignore trivial, frivolous or vexatious complaints, we are in favour of there being a statutory provision against advertisements and notices which seek to discriminate in employment on grounds of sex.
I do not believe that Select Committees or other bodies at any time meant to suggest that people should not be allowed to advertise either for a man or a woman. If a factory employs only men or only women, that will be apparent in the act of discrimination. I do not believe that the clause should be widened in this way.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 54

RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS ON FORMAL INVESTIGATIONS

Miss Richardson: I beg to move Amendment No. 62, in page 32, line 22, at end insert—
(4) Where the Commission has conducted a formal investigation other than on a requirement by the Secretary of State, it shall make available for inspection on request a report of such investigation".


The purpose is to ensure that access is available to information about the commission's investigations to the public and the Press and to the individual companies or organisations involved in the investigations—that is to say, directly and not necessarily as a requirement by the Secretary of State.
I take, for example, the position of an organisation which has come under the commission's scrutiny. Supposing that it is found not to be practising discrimination. It might wish to have access to the transcript of the report to the commission in order to show that it is innocent. As far as I can see, there is no provision in the Bill for it to be able to do so except by order of the Secretary of State.
The fact of an investigation having taken place will most likely be known, in the case of a company, to its employees, and, in the case of a union, to its members. If an organisation is innocent, it will wish to show that it is and publicise the findings of the commission. It should have the right to do so.
I am not asking for any major expenditure or for mandatory publication in printed form. I simply suggest that the report should always be available following an investigation by the commission so that the thing is seen to be in the open. It is a reasonable proposition.

Dr. Summerskill: Where the commission conducts an investigation at the direction of the Secretary of State, it is also required to deliver a report to him and he is required to have it published. The Bill imposes no obligation on the commission to produce reports of other formal investigations or to make them available.
I would like to consider whether it would be right to impose an obligation on the commission to produce a report of every single formal investigation it undertakes rather than only those which result in the issue of a non-discrimination notice or recommendation, or only those the terms of reference of which have been published. We would like to consider this matter further, so I ask my hon. Friend to withdraw the amendment on the firm understanding that the Government will study the matter further and introduce their own amendment in another place.

Miss Richardson: On that undertaking, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 60

CLAIMS UNDER PART III

Amendment made: No. 65, in page 35, line 26, leave out from 'made' to end of subsection and insert
'if the respondent proves that the requirement or condition in question was not applied with the intention of treating the claimant unfavourably on the ground of his sex or marital status as the case may be.'.—[Miss Richardson.]

Clause 61

ISSUE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION NOTICE

Amendment made: No. 66, in page 36, line 22 at end insert—
'(b) a contravention of section (discriminatory practices), and
(c) a contravention of section 35, 36 or 37, and'.—[Mr. John Fraser.]

Dr. Summerskill: I beg to move Amendment No. 67, in page 36, line 29, leave out 'issue' and insert
'in the prescribed manner serve on him'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: We shall take at the same time Amendment No. 70, in page 36, line 37, leave out 'issue' and insert 'serve'.

Dr. Summerskill: These are technical amendments. Amendment No. 67 requires that a non-discrimination notice is not merely issued but is served on the person to whom it is addressed. It also provides, by means of the words "in the prescribed manner", that the procedure to be followed in serving a notice shall be one which shall be set out in regulations made by the Secretary of State by statutory instrument. Amendment No. 70 will make the consequential amendment in Clause 61(3)(a).

Amendment agreed to.

Dr. Summerskill: I beg to move Amendment No. 68, in page 36, line 33, after 'arrangements', insert

'(i) to inform the Commission that he has effected those changes and what those changes are, and
(ii)'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. George Thomas): With this we may discuss Government Amendments Nos. 69 and 71.

Dr. Summerskill: The purpose of Amendment No. 68 is to encourage compliance with the requirements of a nondiscrimination notice to cease committing unlawful acts and to facilitate the monitoring by the commission of that compliance. The amendment does so by enabling it to include in the notice a requirement that the recipient should inform the commission of the changes he has made in his practices or arrangements so as to comply with the Bill. We believe that to include this requirement among those which a non-discrimination notice may contain will constitute a useful addition to the commission's powers. Amendment No. 69 further refines the proposal in Amendment No. 68.
I turn to subsection (2B), which Amendment No. 69 would insert. This subsection is designed to ensure that the liability of the recipient of a non-discrimination notice to furnish information to the commission does not extend beyond the time—namely, five years from the date on which the notice became final—when he would cease to be liable to a follow-up investigation under Clause 63. Amendment No. 71 is consequential on Amendment No. 69.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendments made: No. 69, in page 36, line 35, leave out from 'of' to end of line 36 and insert:
'affording that information to other persons concerned.

(2A) A non-discrimination notice may also require the person on whom it is served to furnish the Commission with such other information as may be reasonably required by the notice in order to verify that the notice has been complied with.
(2B) The notice may specify the time at which, and the manner and form in which, any information is to be furnished to the Commission, but the time at which any information is to be furnished in compliance with the notice shall not be later than five years after the notice has become final.'.

No. 70, in page 36, line 37, leave out 'issue' and insert 'serve'.

No. 71, in page 37, line 12, after (3)(b)', insert '(2A) and (2B)'.—[Mr. John Fraser.]

Clause 65

PERSISTENT DISCRIMINATION

Mr. John Fraser: I beg to move Amendment No. 72, in page 38, line 35, leave out from 'tribunal' to end of line 36 and insert:
`under section 57 or 69, or section 2 of the Equal Pay Act 1970, that he has done an unlawful discriminatory act or an act in breach of a term modified or included by virtue of an equality clause,'.
This is a technical amendment to prevent a duplication of the EOC's powers under Clause 65 and those under other clauses of the Bill.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment made: No. 73, in page 38, line 38, leave out section 61(1)' and insert:
'paragraph (b), or contravening section (discriminatory practices)'.—[Mr. John Fraser.]

Clause 68

HELP FOR AGGRIEVED PERSONS IN OBTAINING INFORMATION ETC

Mr. Ian Percival: I beg to move Amendment No. 75, in page 40, line 19, leave out Clause 68.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this we may discuss the following amendments: No. 77, in page 40, line 29, at end insert:
'(2) Subsection (1) above does not apply where a complaint is made under section 57'.

No. 78, in page 40, line 37, leave out 'or tribunal'.

No. 79, in page 40, line 40, leave out 'or tribunal'.

No. 80, in page 41, line 7, leave out 'sheriff court or industrial tribunal' and insert or sheriff court'.

No. 81, in page 41, line 14, leave out paragraph (c).

Mr. Percival: Clause 68 raises far more serious questions than may at first sight meet the eye. However, at this time of the morning I shall try to make the salient points as briefly as I can.
The clause provides for a form of amateur extra-judicial interrogation, the like of which does not exist in any other form of our law so far as I know. It is objectionable, and it is the view of the


Opposition that it would set a wholly undesirable precedent. In Committee the Government sought to argue that the clause did not create a precedent by referring to other instances in which the citizen may be required to give information. I am not going into all the details; I merely submit that the instances that the Government referred to do not have sufficient similarity to what is being done in the clause to enable them to be quoted as precedents.
It was also said that no question of principle was involved. With respect, that was wrong. In view of the late hour I shall resist the temptation to develop those general considerations. They are important and it is only because of the hour that I do not take them up in detail. I put them forward as bald propositions rather than develop them with the argument that they deserve.
I shall make one or two points to demonstrate how undesirable it is that such a provision should be included in this or in any other piece of legislation.
1.15 a.m.
It is a common thing for somebody who believes he has cause for complaint against somebody to write a letter to that person asking certain questions. That letter may provoke the answer "Yes" or "No". It is common for that letter to be placed before the court or for the court to be shown that letter of inquiry and to be told that there was no answer. Then the court deals with that according to rules which have been hammered out over years of practice.
If the provisions of Clause 68 add to or alter those rules they are objectionable. If they do not add to or alter them they are unnecessary. Let me illustrate it by referring to Clause 68(2)(a), which says:
the question and any reply by the respondent (whether in accordance with the rules or regulations under subsection (1)(b) or not) shall be admissible as evidence in the proceeding".
Is this meant to make such questions and the answers if any answer is received, or the failure to answer them, admissible in evidence whether or not they would be admissible according to the ordinary and general laws of evidence? In other words, are they to be admissible even though they would not be admissible

according to the existing and general rules of evidence? If the answer to the question is "Yes", the provisions are objectionable, and if the answer is "No", the provisions are totally unnecessary.
The same point can be made with equal force about subsection (2)(b). What does it mean? If it adds anything to the existing and general law, it is highly objectionable. If it does, it is wholly unnecessary.
There is one further point on which these provisions are objectionable. We must be careful in this House not to bring the court into matters which are not the court's concern, particularly to assist just one party. It may be right to give assistance to people who want to take advantage of the provisions of the Bill. If it is the desire to provide a questionnaire which may be used by people who may otherwise find difficulty in formulating their questions, let it be done by the Department or by the Equal Opportunities Commission, or by citizens advice bureaux, or by hon. Members in their surgeries. But let us not bring the court into a job that is not a matter for the court—and certainly do not bring the court in to assist the matter for just one party. If we look at the introductory words of the clause, we see that its purpose is to assist one party. By all means let us assist that party, but do so by other and more suitable means.
For this and other reasons the provisions are objectionable in the context of the Bill—and indeed would be objectionable as a precedent in any Bill at all. If this view is not accepted by the House, the other amendments grouped with this amendment will become material. The purpose of the amendment is to exclude from the operation of the clause, if it remains in the Bill, all questions arising on employment. The reason for that is very simply this. Clause 58 of the Bill provides that in employment cases a conciliation officer not only shall act where a complaint has been made but may also act before any formal complaint if requested to do so by either authority.
The need to which this clause is directed—albeit, as we think, so misguidedly—is thus already catered for in employment cases, and to provide a parallel procedure under Clause 68 would be unnecessary and could even prove vexatious in some cases.
Conciliation officers have a great deal of experience and understanding of the often very sensitive problems in the area of industrial relations, and would undoubtedly be of considerably more assistance to both complainant and respondent than any facilities which might be provided to either under Clause 68.
Accordingly, we submit to the House that if this clause were to be retained it should be amended to that extent by excluding from its effect all questions arising in the field of employment, so that those questions may be dealt with by the other procedure provided under Clause 58, which appears to us to be far more suitable.
It is our firm belief that what is being done in this clause, if it remains in this Bill, is far more serious than may yet have struck most hon. Members. I recognise that it is late in the day to develop any of those matters here, but there is still plenty of time and opportunity for the situation to be put right. I hope I have said sufficient to lead the Government to give further thought to these matters, and that more time may be given to them, at a more civilised hour, in another place.

Mr. Leon Brittan: I should like to support most strongly what has been said by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Southport (Mr. Percival). I did not have the privilege of serving on the Committee considering the Bill, and, therefore, did not have the benefit of participating in these debates, but in supporting what he has said I do so as a warm supporter both of the principle and of the detail of the Bill. I support what he has said because I would regard it is a very great pity that a Bill that makes a genuine social advance of this kind should be marred by a departure of the kind characterised by Clause 68.
I therefore very much hope that the Government will reconsider the clause before it is too late to do so. In my view, it is objectionable on a number of grounds. It is objectionable because, in the first place, it enables a party who believes he may have a case to set up that case by compelling a person, in effect, to incriminate himself. That is a

dangerous precedent to set up. It is different from the procedure in our courts in other respects, in that in the courts at the moment, in the circumstances in which a person may be interrogated by another party, that is something that is supervised very closely by the court itself, and does not permit a roving commission to be applied by one party before he even has a case.
In the courts in an ordinary action, if a person wishes to administer interrogatories, as the phrase is, he has first to get the case off the ground. If he cannot do that, the whole question of interrogatories does not arise. Secondly, he has to persuade a court that the interrogatories he wishes to administer are necessary and proper for the administration of justice. Here he has to satisfy no one. He has to establish no prima facie case. He may, if he wishes, ask questions up hill and down dale in an onerous and oppressive way.
The only limitation on the provisions of Clause 68 is that the rules and regulations shall prescribe forms by which the person aggrieved may question the respondent on his reasons for doing any relevant act or any other matter which is or may be relevant. There is no limitation on what can be asked. There is no screening process. It is merely a form which must be prescribed which will enable a claimant who may or many not have any real grievance to ask questions which the person to whom they are addressed declines to answer at his peril. Then, if he decides that it is unsafe not to answer them, his answers to those questions may be admitted as evidence.
I see no reason to believe that in this branch of the law, as it will become, there is a unique need for a procedure of his kind. I do not believe that a case has been made out for there being in this branch of the law so special a difficulty on the part of a complainant that a procedure as objectionable in principle and in practice as the one envisaged in the Bill has to be introduced. It seems to me that, when we propose a measure of social advance, it is a great pity that a legal provision should be introduced which smacks of the Star Chamber if it is not strictly necessary for the purpose for which it is intended, judged by the most stringent of criteria.
Notwithstanding the lateness of the hour in terms of the passage of the Bill, I hope that the Government will reconsider the matter and drop these provisions from the Bill in its present form.

Mr. John Fraser: When I spoke in Committee on this matter, I put forward a number of arguments for this procedure which I do not propose to repeat now. The relevant copies of Hansard are available for those right hon. and hon. Members who wish to pursue the matter further. However, I want to introduce one or two new points.
First, the Government have been under criticism in earlier debates about the burden of proof. It was alleged that the burden of proof was already too much upon the woman complainant—the vulnerable person as against the large employer or large institution. We have had a debate about that. We said that as a Government we did not feel able to accede to the proposition that the burden of proof generally should be reversed. However, we have in Clause 68 at least a procedure which is likely to tilt the balance somewhat the other way—in favour of the complainant.
That is my first new point in favour of the procedure. We are enabling the woman complainant, who may perhaps be unrepresented, to get a little more help by being able either to write a letter or to use a prescribed form.
My second point is that, very often, when someone is treated unfavourably, there are matters peculiarly within the knowledge of the person who is discriminating. Many hon. Members will have been faced at their advice bureaux with the problem of the man who has been sacked and cannot discover the reason for his dismissal. The simple facility of sending a letter or a prescribed form to the employer asking for the reason would be of considerable assistance to the person concerned in knowing whether or not he had a case. I suggest that the simple procedure of being able to ask questions and get simple answers to them is likely to eliminate frivolous cases and not create them.
My third point concerns whether the answer to a question is admissible in evidence. The hon. and learned Member for Southport (Mr. Percival) suggested that,

by virtue of paragraph (b), anything could be put into evidence. I do not think that that is so. All that is admissible in evidence is a question and a reply about the reasons for doing any relevant act. The question and the answer hinge on the relevant act. If the question is about a matter which is not a part of the relevant act, neither the question nor the answer would, in my view, be admissible evidence.

The next objection—

1.30 a.m.

Mr. Brittan: How can the Minister say that, when the question which is allowed and permitted under Clause 68(1) (a) includes a question
on any other matter which is or may be relevant"?
Therefore it is possible for a question to be asked on a matter which may be relevant but which is not, in fact, relevant. That is exactly the sort of question which is admissible under Clause 68(2).

Mr. Fraser: I would have thought that those words were necessary. I think that we can trust the tribunal to make up its mind, when deciding what is admissible, to consider whether the matter is relevant.
The hon. and learned Member for Southport takes objection to the fact that the tribunal may draw some inferences from a failure by the respondent to reply within a reasonable period, or from an evasive or equivocal reply. There is nothing which compels the tribunal or court to draw an inference. It simply says that it may draw the inference.
I can imagine the sort of case when the situation is reversed and the woman is being cross-examined, let us say by the hon. and learned Member, acting on behalf of a large employer. She fails to reply, or her letter is evasive or equivocal. I can certainly imagine the hon. and learned Member hammering home to the tribunal the point that the tribunal may draw the appropriate inference from the fact that that woman had been evasive or equivocal or had failed to reply. That is what happens time and again when a lay person appears before a tribunal without representation.
We are trying to reverse the process, so that when a woman has delivered an


inquiry to an employer who has not replied or has been evasive or equivocal she can invite the tribunal to draw the appropriate conclusions. That seems reasonable. I am sure that employers will be well advised and that their lawyers will be able to deal with any interminable and frivolous inquiries. I am sure that the tribunals will act sensibly. It may be an innovation but it is one which provides information in the early stages, before a case is brought, and it may well eliminate frivolous matters.

Mr. Percival: Can the Minister be a little clearer? Is he saying that subsection (2)(b) adds nothing and that the court is already entitled to draw an inference from a reply to an inquiry or from a failure to answer? That is a proposition I can understand. If he is saying that, why have the subsection? If it adds something and entitled the court to draw an inference which under existing and general law it could not, what are the extra rights given to the court and what is the justification for them?

Mr. Fraser: It adds something to existing law, otherwise it would not be there. It entitles the tribunal to draw the inference that people who fail to reply to the inquiry or who reply in an evasive or equivocal manner have committed an unlawful act.

Mr. Brittan: Is the Minister saying that without this provision the court could not draw such an inference if it thought it proper? It is only if he is saying that that the subsection can add anything new.

Mr. Fraser: I am not saying that the court could not draw the inference without the subsection. It simply emphasises the fact that the court can draw such an inference.

Mr. Brittan: Does it add anything?

Mr. Fraser: In my view, it adds to the position of the complainant in making it quite clear that the appropriate inference can be drawn. There is some advantage in that the complaint may have access to the Act and can read that the appropriate inference can be drawn.
The final objection to the new provision is that in the tribunal procedure we have conciliation officers, and they can sort these matters out. The answer to

that is, first, that it is not the job of the conciliation officer to go round seeking information in this way. More important, the conciliation officer normally comes into the matter only after the complaint has been lodged at the tribunal. The purpose of this procedure is to enable somebody to write something similar to what is called in legal proceedings a letter before action. It provides a reasonable certainty of a reply, or the appropriate inference can be drawn. Then the complainant can see her Member of Parliament or trade union official, for example. She has an exchange of correspondence before a case is launched, and it is possible to judge from that whether it is reasonable to start a case. If there is an evasive reply, or no reply, that adds to the complainant's case. The court can draw the appropriate inference.
I think that the provision assists in getting information in the early stages. It is a little thing that we can do to redress the balance in favour of the complainant. Even if it is an innovation, I hope that it commends itself to the House.

Mr. Percival: Nobody denies the value of assisting people in the letter-before-action stage, but that could be done in many other ways, all of which seem equally suitable. It could be done by the Home Office, the Equal Opportunities Commission or the Citizens' Advice Bureau. There is nothing at issue except the way in which help should be given.
But the Minister did not deal with my question whether subsection (2)(a) makes admissible documents or facts which would not be admissible according to the existing ordinary and general law. If it does, what is the justification for making admissible something which, according to the ordinary laws and rules of evidence, would not be admissible? There may be occasions on which it is justifiable to do that, but I think that the whole House would agree that we should need to be satisfied that there were good reasons for going outside the ordinary laws and rules applying to everyone else in all other circumstances.
I hope that the Minister will apply his mind to the question whether it is intended by these provisions to make admissible something which would not otherwise be admissible. If it is, what


is the justification? Perhaps he will be so good as to write to us about that.
Secondly, will the hon. Gentleman apply his mind again to subsection (2)(b)? I am trying to put these questions in as conciliatory a manner as possible, because they are not easy questions to answer off the cuff at any time of day, let alone at this hour. Does subsection (2)(b) entitle the court to draw any inferences that it would not be entitled to draw if these provisions were not included? I ask the hon. Gentleman to write to us saying whether it is intended to entitle the court to do something that it could not otherwise do. If the answer is "Yes", what is that something, and what is the justification?
If the Minister would be so good as to apply his mind to those questions a little further in the cooler light of day, we should appreciate it, but at present we are not entirely satisfied with the reply.

Mr. John Fraser: I think that I know the answers, but for the sake of brevity I think that the House would endorse any decision of mine to write to the hon. and learned Gentleman on these matters, and I undertake to do so.

Mr. Rees-Davies: Will the Minister also consider the phrase in subsection (1)
to decide whether to institute proceedings
which I believe to be a complete novelty in any law, international or otherwise? Will he seek advice in general from the legal advisers as to whether there is any kind of precedent for obtaining evidence in this manner before any action is brought in any proceedings whatsoever? I know of none now.

Mr. Fraser: No, Sir. I do not give that undertaking.

Amendment negatived.

Miss Richardson: I beg to move Amendment No. 76, in page 40, line 21, after 'Act', insert
'or the Equal Pay Act 1970'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to discuss Amendment No. 85, in Schedule 1, page 51, line 2 at end insert—
'(1B) The provisions of section 68 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (Help for aggrieved persons in obtaining information etc.) shall apply in any claim made under this Act'.

and Amendment No. 87, in Schedule 1, page 54, line 12, at end insert—
'(1B) The provisions of section 68 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (Help for aggrieved persons in obtaining information etc.) shall apply in any claim made under this Act'.

Miss Richardson: I shall be even briefer than the Minister was with his last reply. The purpose of the amendment is simply to inquire why the Equal Pay Act was not linked with the provisions of this clause. I do not see why it is not possible for those claiming under the Equal Pay Act to have the same facilities available to them as we are providing in this Bill.

Mr. John Fraser: Perhaps it is because we had not thought about it before my hon. Friend suggested it. However, there may well be some value in having this procedure in Equal Pay Act cases, because there are sometimes difficulties in knowing whether a pay structure exists or what is the pay of people with whom one is comparing the position.
I am not saying that I accept the amendment, but this is a valuable suggestion which I undertake to examine.

Miss Richardson: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 70

PERIOD WITHIN WHICH PROCEEDINGS TO BE BROUGHT

Miss Richardson: I beg to move Amendment No. 82, in page 42, line 16, at end insert:
'or was known to the complainant'.
You will be glad to know, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that this is the last of my amendments that have been selected.
We had a debate on this clause in Committee on the basis that the Opposition wanted to reduce the period during which a complaint could be made from three months, as in the Bill, to one month. I should like now partially to extend the three-month period, to make it three months from the time when the matter of complaint became known to the complainant.
Three months is about right, but this proviso must be added because there must


be cases in which the complaint is not known to the potential complainant within that period. It may not necessarily be possible for it to be known within that period.
I take as an example a person who had applied for and been interviewed for a job. The applicant often does not receive information on whether or not he has got the job until some weeks later. If he chose to complain that he had been discriminated against in the choice of applicants for that job, his complaint may well be out of time. Therefore, it is important to add to the clause the words
or was known to the complainant",
thereby making it just a little wider and better able to allow the complainant to make the complaint at the proper time.
I hope that the Government will consider this amendment very seriously. There are many cases in which this problem could easily arise. Having inserted the provision about three months, it would be a pity if the complainant were debarred in some way from making a complaint.

Mr. John Fraser: I think I can assure my hon. Friend that the situation that she has in mind is already fully covered by subsection (5). This allows a court or tribunal to hear complaints outside the three-month limit if it were not reasonably practicable for them to be brought earlier. Clearly, it would not be reasonably practicable for a person to institute proceedings before she had realised that she had been discriminated against.
I hope that with that assurance my hon. Friend will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

1.45 a.m.

Miss Richardson: I am not very happy about it. However, the hour being late, I shall not press it.

Amendment negatived.

Clause 73

ORDERS

Dr. Summerskill: I beg to move Amendment No. 83, in page 44, line 31, after 'power', insert
(exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like conditions)'.
This is a technical amendment which ensures that any power in the Bill to

revoke or vary orders is subject to the same conditions as the power to make the order in the first place.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 74

GENERAL INTERPRETATION PROVISIONS

Dr. Summerskill: I beg to move Amendment No. 84, in page 45, line 11, at end insert 'only'.
This amendment ensures that for the purposes of the exception in Clause 40 the definition of "charitable instrument" as it applies to Scotland corresponds with that which applies in England and Wales. The intention is that only instruments relating to purposes which are exclusively charitable should fall within this definition, and hence within the ambit of the exception which Clause 40 provides.

Amendment agreed to.

Orders of the Day — Schedule 1

EQUAL PAY ACT 1970

Amendment made: No. 86, in page 52, line 37, leave out from 'his' to end of line 43.—[Mr. John Fraser.]

Orders of the Day — Schedule 6

FURTHER REPEALS

Amendments made: No. 89, in page 65, leave out lines 16 and 17.

No. 90, in page 65, leave out lines 26 and 27.

No. 91, in page 65, leave out from beginning of line 30 to end of line 48 on page 66.—[Mr. John Fraser.]

Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

1.48 a.m.

Mr. Stanbrook: This is a bad Bill. If anything, it is worse than when it was read a Second time.
If it were possible to say that the Bill genuinely remedied a social problem in this country I would be in favour of it. There are strong arguments for removing the restrictions which at present inhibit women from playing a full part


in the community and living full lives. Those restrictions are artificial and are based upon a view of the female sex which is now inappropriate having regard to the changes in our social and economic life and in education. If the Bill did something about that I would be the first to support it. Unfortunately, the Bill at best will be of trifling value in this respect. At worst it will be a monster and an agency for stirring up trouble, magnifying petty and personal grievances and causing bitterness where there should be tolerance and understanding.
The Bill is a product of that fashionable theory that we can alter human nature by passing a law against it. It is a theory which is beloved of Socialists and Liberals. But Conservatives, with that realism which is characteristic of them, have always been wary of it. I am sorry that Conservative Front Bench Members have condoned this measure.
I believe that the Bill is objectionable because, in order to bring about the change of attitude which the protagonists of the Bill seek, it will require a vast new bureaucracy and apparatus for overseeing the lives of British citizens, backed up with Draconian weapons, calculated to arouse bitterness amongst those people who will be subject to its provisions.
There are a great number of objectionable features of the Bill. Some of them have been referred to by the Opposition during the passage of the Bill through the House. The main objection to it is that it leaves out of account those considerations of human nature which apply to relations between the sexes the application of the notion of equality involves measurability: quantitative concepts which allow for a neat and equal division. In such a world considerations of love, patience, loyalty, tenderness, tolerance and courtesy play no part. The Bill takes no account of the fact that most women are mothers, naturally endowed as the best home makers, and better fitted than men to look after children. In the world of their homes and their families women can find satisfying lives fulfilling, influential and complete in a world in which the fact that there are few women serving in public positions is of no significance to them.
But the Bill is not for those people. It is significant that the Home Secretary has announced that he will be appointing women to be the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Equal Opportunities Commission, because their identity shows how ludicrous the whole thing is. They are the national women's officer of the Labour Party and the wife of a prominent Conservative, two female politicians who will be seen as interfering busybodies who will ram this Bill down the throats of every business and social institution in the country.
The result will be a climate of bitterness, suspicion and mistrust in an atmosphere where there should be love and understanding. It will be the Race Relations Act controversy all over again. Matters will grow worse, not better, and before long the commission will be coming back to us clamouring for more powers in order to insist upon the acceptance of its own distorted view of life. At a time like this, a time of national crisis when we need all the concord and amity we can find, this Bill does a disservice to the whole population.

1.52 a.m.

Dr. Summerskill: I feel that I cannot permit the proceedings to end on that note. Late as it is, I should like to say that I appreciate that the Bill had all-party support in principle, although we may have disagreed on the details. I think that it goes to the other place greatly improved.
I thank the Labour Party working group which formed the basis for the Bill, all the bodies which made representations to us, representations which we carefully studied, and all the many officials in the Home Office and the other Departments for all their time and hard work. The Bill is the product of excellent interdepartmental co-ordination and co-operation. I wish it every success in the other place.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed.

Orders of the Day — ADJOURNMENT

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[[Mr. James Hamilton.]

Orders of the Day — MOT TEST (MR. WILLIAM TINGEY)

1.54 a.m.

Mr. Michael McNair-Wilson: Although the hour is late I am grateful for the chance to have this Adjournment debate to discuss the problems which confronted one of my constituents, Mr. William Tingey, of Speen, since he took his motor cycle, a Japanese Suzuki 120, for an MOT test in Newbury in February 1973. It was not the first test that the machine had had. In 1972 it had been tested at Redhill and passed.
Alas for Mr. Tingey, when he took the machine to Newbury in February 1973 he was not so successful. Instead of that machine passing the test, it failed and on two scores—that the frame was bent and that the headraces were too tight.
Mr. Tingey found this hard to believe. He had bought the machine all but new in 1967 in Vancouver and had owned it for the following six years until the time of the test, in which time he had ridden it 85,000 miles. It is therefore fair to say that he knew the machine extremely well, having ridden it not only in Canada but in the United States, and he had brought it back to this country where it was an essential part of his personal transport. He also knew of the damage it had sustained. It had a damaged headlight surround when he bought it and in Oklahoma City it had fallen against a lamp post and suffered a dent to the petrol tank. But apart from those two minor pieces of damage, there was no other damage of any kind.
Thus, when the machine failed its test, he was extremely surprised—so much so that he could not believe that it had failed on the grounds stated, namely a bent frame and too tight headraces. He took the course open to him and to every other citizen. He appealed and was granted a second test, which took place on 20th March, 1973 in Newbury and was carried out by two Department of Environment inspectors, Mr. John West and Senior Vehicle Examiner R. J. Davidson.
In this new test, the examiners dismissed the first complaint made at the test in February, that the headraces were

too tight. They said they were not and assumed that Mr. Tingey had adjusted them in the meantime. He informed me that he had done nothing at all.
He was still refused a test certificate on the grounds that the frame was misaligned and that the front wheel was approximately one and a half inches out of alignment with the rear wheel. On that basis they refused the machine a certificate and, in consequence, Mr. Tingey had to take it off the road.
At that point, faced with two failures in MOT tests, any of us might have felt that we should take the machine to a local garage and have it put right. But that would depend on the knowledge we had of the machine and whether we felt that the tests had been carried out in the best possible way.
Mr. Tingey knew his machine extremely well, because he had had it six years and ridden it 85,000 miles, and he was also suspicious that those who had examined it were not quite as well equipped to do that job as he would have liked to feel. The first set of examiners had said the headraces were too tight and the second set had said they were not. The first set had said that the frame was bent and the second merely that it was misaligned. Mr. Tingey felt that he knew more about the machine than the examiners, but because it had been failed by Department of Environment inspectors, he felt that it was his task to find out exactly on what grounds they had failed it.
They had chosen misalignment of the frame as the main cause for failing the machine on its machine test. Therefore, Mr. Tingey asked whether they would point out to him how he could discover this misalignment in the frame. They made it clear that he must strip the machine down to its basic frame with the two wheels. I have here a photograph of the machine stripped down to its basic frame with the two wheels. They also pointed out that by using a string attached to the rear wheel brought forward to the front wheel he would see how much the wheels were out of alignment.
This gave Mr. Tingey the first clue that the examiners were not quite as good as they might have thought they were. When he carried out the latter


test—leaving aside the fact that he found no bend in the frame—he discovered that because the front tyre was narrower than the rear tyre there was apparently a misalignment, not caused by a mechanical defect, but created because the tyre widths were different. He showed me that test and he wondered whether that might have been the area which the examiners did not take into consideration when they failed his machine on appeal.
Having satisfied himself that there was nothing wrong with the machine, Mr. Tingey sought a third party view. At this moment, after the March 1973 test, Mr. Tingey suffered two very sad bereavements in the death of his fianceé and her father, which for five or six months cast everything out of his mind. When he recovered his equilibrium and returned to the fact that his machine was off the road, knowing that his machine had been wrongly examined, he came to the conclusion that the only way to satisfy himself that his judgment was correct was to take the machine to the Suzuki agents in Croydon and ask them to test the frame for him, and that is what he did.
I have in front of me a copy of the letter which the Suzuki agents sent to him on 21st November 1973 and, at the risk of boring you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, and the Minister, I will read one or two paragraphs from that letter which are fairly crucial to the reason for this Adjournment debate. The Minister will perhaps have seen the letter, but I shall refresh his memory if I may. The letter was written to Mr. William Tingey:
The writer wishes to refer to your letter of 19th and 21st November and your visit to our works here at Croydon".
I remind the Minister that Mr. Tingey put his machine on a little trolley behind his bicycle and rode it to Croydon to prove his point.
In this connection we wish to advise you of the following. An extensive check has been carried out to the frame swing arm and front fork assembly of frame No. 5003 submitted to us for examination. Full examination of the frame submitted was completed in our workshop, and we would advise no misalignment is evident between the three assemblies. The only discrepancy visible is that of slight distortion of the engine mounting plates which would have no bearing whatsoever on the frame alignment. Careful inspection was made to the pressed steel sections around the steering

head and no visible damage in this area has been sustained. The whole frame assembly for the road mileage covered by this machine is in extremely good condition.
In view of the foregoing comments we cannot understand how in the first instance it could have been alleged by your dealer that this frame was possibly bent and out of alignment through accident damage. Their calculations must, we assume, have been brought about through insufficient attention being paid to the correct procedure in carrying out a wheel alignment test.
So, Suzuki, the makers of this machine, categorically say that there is no bend, no misalignment, and that the machine is in remarkably good condition bearing in mind its age and the distance it has travelled.
One may ask whether Suzuki could have said that because it was one of its machines. But Suzuki is a company with a considerable reputation and I cannot imagine that it would wish to lend its name to a false statement about one of its machines if that machine was unsafe. I therefore conclude that the test was rigorously carried out and that the results achieved were correct.
One is forced, therefore, to ask some simple questions. If Suzuki was right, the examiners were not right. How shall we know who was right? It is not for me to cast aspersions, but the examiners have to prove that they know as much about motor bikes and mopeds as the Department has hitherto said they do. Are Mr. Davidson and Mr. West fully informed about the testing procedures involved? Do they have the knowledge and experience of Suzuki machines which would allow them to say that Suzuki is wrong although it has carried out these exhaustive tests?
I ask the Minister whether, in his opinion, if there is this area of doubt, the last word should rest with the Department. If the Department says, regardless of the Suzuki report, that its examiners were not wrong, the doubt of an injustice must spring to mind, and I remind the hon. Gentleman of some words used by a Parliamentarian on another case:
It will be a bad day for the House of Commons, and for those who work within its walls, if they grow weary of the complaints even of the lowest of Her Majesty's subjects. In those complaints may lie an un-redressed wrong or a grave injustice which, once discovered, can be remedied. And that is one of Parliament's most important tasks.
Indeed it is.
I believe that Mr. Tingey is the victim of just such an injustice, imposed not by knavery but by ignorance of the finer points of his machine. He believes in his case and he has already bombarded the Department with letters because he senses this injustice. Tonight, the hon. Gentleman has a chance to redress that injustice.
Will the hon. Gentleman allow Mr. Tingey a further appeal test to be carried out on the frame of his machine? I assure the hon. Gentleman that if, when these inspectors examine the frame, they can prove—and I shall be there—that the frame is bent or misaligned, both Mr. Tingey and I will be satisfied. But if they cannot prove it, it is clear that Mr. Tingey deserves redress I hope that the Minister will agree both to the extra test and to the fact that redress will be the only honourable way for the Department to meet the problem if the misalignment cannot be proved.

2.8 a.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for the Environment (Mr. Ernest Armstrong): The hon. Member for Newbury (Mr. McNair-Wilson) has raised a matter which has been before my Department for over two years. I am grateful to him for the very reasoned and thoughtful way in which he has put his case, and of course I will take into consideration every word he said.
This has been a very difficult case. A great deal of activity has taken place in the Department over the two years and very detailed consideration has been given by my predecessors to it. It has already gone through all the stages in the courts. Yet it remains a source of dissatisfaction to Mr. Tingey, and I acknowledge, having read the papers very carefully, that Mr. Tingey does feel a genuine sense of grievance. This evening I trust that I shall be able to clear up this matter to the satisfaction of all concerned.
The MOT road worthiness test is the annual test of the basic safety aspects of a motor vehicle—in the case of a motor cycle, steering, lights, brakes and tyres. Requirements for the test are prescribed in the Motor Vehicles (Tests) Regulations 1968. It is designed to ensure that a motor vehicle is fit for use on the road, and in so doing it makes an important

contribution to the reduction of the terrible toll of road accidents, an aim which every Member must surely support.
Tests are carried out by the 18,000 authorised examiners appointed by my right hon. Friend. They conduct some 12 million tests each year. The testing system, in common with most other test systems, depends to a degree on the subjective judgment of these examiners, and there is an appeals procedure whereby my Department's vehicle examiners adjudicate in cases where the test result is disputed. This process works well.
In 1974 there were 11·7 million vehicles tested, and of these 4 million failed. These failures gave rise to 105 appeals and of these 63 were successful. Motor cycle tests numbered 539,000 with 148,000 failures. There were four appeals, two of them successful.
Although the number of appeals is insignificant compared with the number of tests they are none the less treated very seriously indeed by my Department. We go to considerable lengths to ensure that the authorised examiners maintain proper and consistent standards.
The hon. Gentleman has raised the specific case of the test carried out on the motor cycle owned by his constituent, Mr. Tingey, and three main issues have emerged. First, were the original test and the examination following the appeal properly carried out? Secondly, were the departmental engineers who carried out the appeal examination properly qualified? Finally, were they unbiased in their conduct of the appeal?
Mr. Tingey submitted his motor cycle for test on 23rd February 1973. The authorised examiner refused to issue a test certificate on the grounds that the headstock races were tight and the wheels were out of alignment. Mr. Tingey then appealed quite properly on 5th March 1973, and an appeal test was carried out on the premises of the authorised examiner by two of my Department's vehicle examiners. We have no detailed knowledge of the Suzuki letter, but the alignment itself is a simple test. The examiners are competent and experienced. There is no point in a new test as the conditions at the time of the test could not be reproduced if another test were to take place.
The two examiners allowed part of the appeal, taking the view that the headstock races were then satisfactory, but they confirmed that the wheels were misaligned, a fault that was evident to the naked eye, and refused to issue a test certificate. It is an important feature of this case that the contemporary report of the senior vehicle examiner concerned with the appeal stated that Mr. Tingey was satisfied with the way in which the appeal test was conducted and that he agreed that the misalignment was evident. This report was made in March 1973.
On 10th August 1973, some five months later, Mr. Tingey wrote to the South Eastern Traffic Area challenging the methods used to check the wheel alignment and the competence of the examiners. Even at this late stage the Department would have been prepared to carry out a further examination to satisfy an aggrieved citizen, but Mr. Tingey had stripped down his motor cycle and it was no longer possible to ascertain the vehicle's condition at the time of the first test. In the circumstances there was nothing that could be done other than to advise Mr. Tingey to reassemble his machine in a roadworthy condition and submit it for a new MOT test.
Mr. Tingey has always disputed that the frame of his motor cycle was bent as the original examiner found. He adduces in support the opinion of the manufacturer's agents. This is a conflict of testimony which it is now in fact impossible to resolve, but I would point out that the fault from the point of view of the test requirement was not the condition of the frame as such but the fact that the wheels were misaligned, and hence the steering was out of true.
This misalignment could have been caused in several ways. The original tester had suggested that the frame was bent. Indeed, this may well have been the case, as Mr. Tingey admitted at the time that the machine had been damaged by a lamp standard falling on it. But that was in no way material to the reason for refusing a test certificate, which was simply the self-evident misalignment of the wheels.
The Department's engineers who carried out the appeal test were both

experienced vehicle examiners. Both had had extensive experience of motor cycle maintenance before joining the Department, although there is very limited opportunity to conduct motor cycle appeal tests—only four were carried out in 1974—one examiner had previous experience of this. The method they used to measure the misalignment of the wheels is a normal and accepted method of checking this feature and they had the background and ability to do this work properly.
This case has been exhaustively examined on a number of occasions during the past two years. We make no complaint about that. We are anxious to satisfy the person concerned individually on these matters, and I know the importance which any citizen can attach to a test of that kind. There is no evidence to support a view other than that the examiners performed their duties in an exemplary manner. Accusations of bias and corruption seem completely misplaced. Where they were called upon to exercise their subjective judgment they did so in a way which was supported by their superiors and which Mr. Tingey, at least at one time, seems to have accepted. Finally, it is surely implausible to construct such a theory of conspiracy on what in the main seems to be such a trivial episode.
I am only the latest in a series of Ministers who have looked into this case. The hon. Gentleman will know that I have done it with a fresh eye, but I have given careful consideration to all the papers, and I hope he will accept that my judgment too is impartial. But I can see no cause at all to suppose that the examiners were in any way incompetent, or acted with anything but impartiality. I cannot but feel that it is a matter for regret that this case has gone to these lengths. As my hon. Friend recently pointed out to the hon. Gentleman, the cost of repair would have been a few pounds at most. But from this incident there has grown a mass of correspondence and allegations of incompetence and corruption which neither the repeated explanations we have given nor the proceedings in the courts seem to be able to check. I hope that the explanation I have been able to give tonight will finally put Mr. Tingey's mind at rest.
At least Mr. Tingey can feel that his Member of Parliament has done all he can to press the case with my Department. The hon. Gentleman has been persistent, consistent and conscientious. I assure him that we have examined the case carefully and impartially. I hope that my remarks in this debate will assure all concerned, particularly Mr. Tingey. I understand his anxieties, but

I hope he will be assured that we have carried out our side of the matter, that we have done our duty, and that we are satisfied that those responsible undertook their job in an impartial and unbiased way.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at nineteen minutes past Two o'clock.

Orders of the Day — Second Reading Committee

Wednesday 18th June 1975

The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Mr. Ifor Davies (in the Chair)

Brittan, Mr. Leon (Cleveland and Whitby)
Percival, Mr. Ian (Southport)



Rooker, Mr. J. W. (Birmingham, Perry Barr)


Callaghan, Mr. Jim (Middleton and Prestwich)
Solicitor-General, The (Mr. Peter Archer)


Carson, Mr. John (Belfast, North)
Temple-Morris, Mr. Peter (Leominster)


Dunn, Mr. James A. (Liverpool, Kirkdale)
Thomas, Mr. Jeffrey (Abertillery)



Weetch, Mr. Ken (Ipswich)


Gardner, Mr. Edward (South Fylde)
Weitzman, Mr. David (Hackney, North and Stoke Newington)


Gow, Mr. Ian (Eastbourne)



Kershaw, Mr. Anthony (Stroud)
Wilson, Mr. William (Coventry, South-East)


Kilroy-Silk, Mr. Robert (Ormskirk)



Mayhew, Mr. Patrick (Royal Tunbridge Wells)
Mr. C. B. Winnifrith, Committee Clerk.

Orders of the Day — LIMITATION BILL [Lords]

10.30 a.m.

The Solicitor-General (Mr. Peter Archer): I beg to move,
That the Chairman do now report to the House that the Committee recommend that the Limitation Bill [Lords] ought to be read a Second time.
The Bill is designed to remedy certain defects in the law relating to limitation of actions for personal injuries. The courts have had long experience of the problems which arise when someone who is entitled to bring an action exhibits no great sense of urgency for a long period and then stirs himself to pursue his rights.
We must accept that there are people who conduct their affairs like that. They are otherwise admirable people. Perhaps if our wives were asked they would say that none of us here could cast the first stone. A Member of Parliament who

comes from an area where the pace of life is somewhat slower than in the Metropolis tells me that in his area there recently came a Spanish worker who, whenever he was given an instruction, would merely reply "Mañana". On one occasion when he had received that response to a request the foreman asked someone the meaning of this word, which was the normal reply to his requests. It was explained that the man was saying that he would do it tomorrow. The foreman said "It is not that urgent".

There are people who exhibit that sentiment in the pursuit of their legal affairs. However, where they do, it is likely to cause unfairness in at least two ways. First, the defendant may have assumed that he was not likely to have to meet a claim so long after the event. He may have arranged his business accordingly


and may have destroyed his files relating to the matter, Secondly, witnesses' recollections are likely to be more shadowy. In some cases defendants may have lost touch with their witnesses, believing that they were not going to require their services. Of course, it is equally true of plaintiffs. Their witnesses may also forget. But to say that the incidence of unfairness is unpredictable is not a good reason for encouraging it.

Since at least 1623 Parliament has dealt with the problem by providing that someone who is in a position to bring proceedings and who delays doing so should not be permitted to bring an action after a specific period has elapsed. But that rule can easily operate oppressively towards plaintiffs. Sometimes it can produce greater injustice than it prevents. Legislatures have been successively led to make exceptions and provisos. At the end of the day it is often a matter of judgment where the balance of injustice lies.

If I may be permitted a thumbnail history of the matter, the Limitation Act 1939 provided a general period of six years for bringing actions in contract and tort, but it did not override the Public Authorities Protection Act 1893, which provided that for claims against public authorities there should be a period of only six months. It was found in practice that the six-year period was too long. In most personal injury cases there was no obvious reason why plaintiffs should not bring their actions earlier. On the other hand the six-month period was plainly too short. In the Law Reform (Limitation of Actions, &c.) Act 1954 Parliament prescribed that for personal injuries there should be a period of three years, whether the complaint was against a public authority or not.

But there emerged one class of case where the rule occasioned a real injustice. Normally, the period begins to run from the moment when there is a complete cause of action, when all the facts necessary to establish a case have occurred. Obviously one essential fact in personal injury cases is that the plaintiff should have suffered an injury. Where we are dealing with an ordinary accident situation, resulting, for instance, in a broken leg, there is one moment of time when the injury occurs and when the victim

knows that it has occurred. He may not know its precise nature or severity, but he knows that he has suffered an injury and can consider whether he wants to bring proceedings, but where we are dealing with an illness or disease there are at least two problems.

First, there is no one moment of time before which he did not have the disease and after which he did. There is no moment of time when a doctor can say with certainty that all the criteria of having the disease are fulfilled. Secondly, in any event, he is not likely to be aware that he has the disease until some time after he has begun to suffer from it. We have the same kind of situation with other kinds of injuries such as a slipped disc. Time begins to run. The victim does not know, not only that he has a right of action, but even that there is a problem. The whole period may have elapsed before he has learnt of the injury.

A clear example of this occurred in the case of Cartledge v. Joplin in 1963 where the plaintiff had suffered pneumoconiosis allegedly from his employers' breach of their statutory duty. He was not aware of it within the statutory period. That was not his fault. There was no reasonable step which he might have taken to become aware of it. It was held in another place that there was no power to extend the period, so that the plaintiff came to the courts for a remedy and found the doors closed. In that case the relevant period was six years.

It was obvious that there were going to be more of those examples when the period was reduced to three years. The Government, therefore, appointed a committee under the chairmanship of Lord Justice Edmund Davies, now the noble lord, Lord Edmund-Davies. That committee reported. Broadly its recommendations were implemented by the Limitation Act 1963. Even that Act gave rise to problems, which I shall consider in a moment after completing the thumbnail history. Some of the points were remedied in the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1971. Some remain outstanding.

In 1971 the then Lord Chancellor asked the Law Reform Committee, under Lord Justice Orr, to consider
what changes in the law relating to the limitation of actions were in the opinion of the Committee desirable".


It is still considering that reference, but in 1972 it was asked to give priority to limitations in personal injury cases. In May 1974 the committee produced its Twentieth Report, which related to this matter.

This Bill gives effect to those recommendations. And it is right that I should pay tribute to the hard work, the wealth of experience and the clarity of the recommendations of the committee.

This Committee will be relieved to hear that I propose to leave the chronological history there and to proceed to indicate some of the problems which the Edmund Davies Committee considered, the answers which it gave, and some reflections which have subsequently been made on those problems.

The first is, how long a period should the plaintiff have to bring his action when his disability is removed or when he has discovered the relevant facts? The Edmund Davies Committee suggested that the period should be 12 months. It did not suggest that there was any magic in that period. Clearly we were in an area of trial and error. The period of 12 months was enacted in the Act of 1963. It was found in practice that that period was too short. Having myself conducted very many of these actions, I confirm that that is so. By the time solicitors have taken instructions, traced the witnesses, taken statements, collated the evidence, exchanged correspondence with the other side, consulted counsel, instructed counsel to settle the necessary documents and issued the proceedings, and bearing in mind that often some months have elapsed before the victim is in a position to consult his solicitor, a year is clearly too brief.

The Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1971 increased the period to three years. The Law Reform Committee recommended that that period should be retained. The Bill proposes to retain that period. So far as I am aware, that is not in issue.

The second question is whether, where the normal period has been extended, because the plaintiff lacked the necessary knowledge, we needed some kind of screen. It was conceivable that, once it was possible to override a Limitation Act defence, people might bring hopeless actions. The Edmund Davies Commit-

tee recommended that actions should not be instituted without the leave of a judge. That was included in the 1963 Act, but it was found in practice that lawyers do not normally advise clients to bring hopeless actions.

The Law Reform Committee quoted figures about this. I am not a great believer in quoting statistics—at least, since I saw a document headed "The House of Commons, broken down by age and sex". However, I should like to quote a few statistics. They appear in paragraph 81 of the Report of the Law Reform Committee.

Master Jacob supplied the figures for applications made in London in the five years beginning in the year 1967. In 1967 the annual figure was 72, in 1968 it was 200, in 1969 it was 282, in 1970 it was 267, in 1971 it was 191. There was no source of statistics for the applications which were successful, but Master Jacob consulted the chief clerk to the judge in chambers and his recollection was that the number of refusals was infinitesimal. Out of all those figures there were two or three refusals at the most. Most hon. Members who have carried out that kind of work can confirm that those statistics are not misleading.

If a screen is not necessary, clearly it should be abolished, as it merely adds one step to the action, with resulting delay and an increase in the costs. The Law Reform Committee recommended that that screen should be abolished and the Bill so provides.

The third problem is probably the most difficult—what facts must a plaintiff know before the period begins to run? The 1963 Act set out provisions which I shall not trouble the Committee with by reading them out at length. Those provisions transpired in practice to be somewhat complicated and difficult to apply. They were considered in another place in Smith and Dodd v. Central Asbestos Company Ltd. in 1973. That was an asbestosis case. Although it is not clear from the report, it seems possible that the victim did not know that, as a matter of law the facts gave him a right of action. In that case the victim won his case. However, reading the report, it seems that he did so on the basis that there was a doubt on the findings in earlier courts as to


precisely what it was that he did not know.

Lord Reid distinguished four elements in a cause of action: the nature and extent of the injuries, what the defendant did, that what the defendant did was what caused the injuries, and that what the defendant did was wrongful. I would not seek to improve on an analysis by Lord Reid, but by "wrongful" he meant, presumably, in a factual sense and not in a legal sense; that is to say that somebody had already warned the foreman that the machine was defective, rather than a construction of the provisions of the Factories Act. Lord Reid was critical of the drafting. That is a fate which falls to the lot of draftsmen from time to time.

The question which chiefly exercised the minds of their Lordships was, what would be the position if the plaintiff was aware of the facts but was not aware that as a matter of law they gave rise to a cause of action? One test which had been suggested earlier by the Court of Appeal was formulated by the noble Lord, Lord Denning, in this way: "Did he know that he had a worthwhile cause of action?" The majority of their Lordships held that, at least on the wording of the 1963 Act, that was not the appropriate test. It was irrelevant, if he knew the facts, whether he also knew the appropriate conclusion of law.

The Law Reform Committee considered this problem. It rejected the "worthwhile cause of action" test. It said that the rule that everyone is presumed to know the law is an ancient one and founded on good reasons. It recommended that it should not be rejected. It recommended that the period should run from the date when the plaintiff has knowledge, actual or constructive, both of his injured condition and of the injury having been caused by acts or omissions of the defendant. That test was adopted. It has been turned into an appropriate form of words and is now in the Bill.

There is one other problem arising under this heading. Perhaps we can state it in this way. Suppose the victim requires advice in order to learn some of the facts. Suppose he requires medical advice as to whether his working conditions caused his present medical con-

dition. Perhaps he requires legal advice as to what questions of fact he should ask of his employers. Suppose he has taken all reasonable steps but has failed to discover the facts—for example, because either the advice was not available to him or he was given bad advice. Should he then lose his right to bring an action? The Law Reform Committee was unable to agree a clear recommendation on this. It offered two choices which it designated as the "strict" and the "liberal" approaches. The Government prefer the liberal approach and that is included in the Bill.

There is one final problem in this field. Is it right, having decided what is the test and the appropriate period of time, to have a specific cut-off date when time elapses once and for all, or should the courts have discretion to extend that time? It could be argued that there should be a specific time when a potential defendant knows with certainty that he can safely destroy his files and forget about the matter. However, any inflexible rule can on occasion produce injustice.

The Tucker Committee, which reported before the Act of 1954, recommended that there should be a limited discretion to extend the time, although it then suggested that there should be included what it called a "long stop date" well in advance—it suggested 10 years—after which the discretion should no longer operate. I understand that in German law there is a long stop date of this kind after 30 years.

The Edmund Davies Committee said that in its view there should not be a discretion to extend the time at all, and there is no discretion in the 1963 Act. The Orr Report said there should be a residuary discretion to consider actual hardship in particular cases and that there should not be a long stop.

That is the proposal which the Bill adopts. The new Section 2D confers a discretion upon the court to override time limits if to do so would be fair as between plaintiff and defendant. The court is required to consider all the circumstances and the section sets out specific guidelines, although these are not intended to be exhaustive, to which the courts should have regard. These include the length of the plaintiff's delay,


reasons for it, including, presumably, whether he was given bad legal advice, the conduct of the defendant, including, presumably, whether he deliberately concealed the facts from the plaintiff, disability suffered by the plaintiff after his injury, and the nature of any expert advice given to him. It will remain a matter of discretion, and the court will have to consider in each case what would be fair as between this plaintiff and this defendant. These were specific matters which the Edmund Davies Committee considered, and those are the answers which are now being given.

The Bill seizes the opportunity to codify the law on these matters and there are two other specific areas where it does that. One relates to the case where injury causes the death of the victim, in which area the previous law was undoubtedly somewhat complicated, largely for historical reasons.

I must explain to the lay members of the Committee that the death of a person may give rise to two distinct causes of action. There is the victim's own cause of action for injuring him and shortening his life, a cause which survives to his executors or personal representatives. There is also the cause of action in the victim's dependants for depriving them of the breadwinner. The former one is covered by the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934, and the latter by successive Fatal Accidents Acts.

Perhaps one can summarise the existing law in this way under the 1963 and 1971 Acts. If the victim knew the position more than three years before his death his claim is barred and neither his personal representatives nor his dependants can resurrect it. If he died unaware of the facts or was aware of them less than three years before his death, they have three years from his death or three years from when they first learned of the relevant facts, whichever is the later. I have stated that in concise terms, perhaps by contrast with some of my earlier comments, but that position is to be found over a fairly wide-ranging group of authorities. It is not found in any one place.

The Bill brings all the relevant provisions within the statute, although the existing law is largely preserved.

Mr. Patrick Mayhew: Is the Solicitor-General satisfied with the perpetuation in this Bill of the recent practice of patching up another Bill instead of, in this instance, producing an entire limitation Bill? We are taking bits out of the Limitation Act 1939 and putting other bits in with considerable consequential inconvenience to practitioners and a very untidy result. Is he satisfied with that?

The Solicitor-General: I suppose one is never satisfied with anything less than perfection in these matters and we should be striving for it. However, the hon. and learned Gentleman will know that the Law Reform Committee is considering the wider implications of the Limitation Acts. It was asked to consider limitations relating to personal injuries as a matter of priority, and we look forward—I hope in the not too distant future, although I say that without instructions—to some report on the wider aspects of limitations, when one hopes that it will be better to produce one codifying statute.
The other problem which the Bill has sought to bring within the code is as follows. Normally, time does not run against a victim while he is under disability, including while he is under age, the relevant age being now 18. Section 22 of the 1939 Act provided an exception to that. It said that time should run against a victim if he was in the custody of a parent, although the Act introduced that rule only for the protection of public authorities. The reason apparently was that public authorities are very much at the mercy of people who long afterwards bring allegations of negligence against schools. That was extended to all personal injury actions in the 1954 Act. It gave rise to a number of problems, which the committee has discussed at some length, including, for example, what happens if the person who causes the injury is the parent. The committee recommended that the rule should be abolished, and that is what the Bill does.
The Bill seeks to remove some of the sources of injustice to plaintiffs from the operation of limitation rules in personal injury cases and at the same time makes an admittedly limited move towards making the law simpler and easier to understand. It does not assist plaintiffs who


have merely been dilatory, and it is not intended to.
It was suggested to the committee that one solution might be to abolish all limitation periods in personal injury cases. The committee considered that proposal. The TUC, for example, had pointed out that normally it is at least as much to a plaintiff's advantage as to a defendant's to expedite the proceedings. But if there is a failure to do so all the mischief I have mentioned—files being destroyed, witnesses forgetting the facts and so on—will then arise with resulting injustice. If the Commission under Lord Pearson reports in a particular sense, and if the report is in due course adopted, many of these problems will be considerably eased, but for the moment the Law Reform Committee recommends retaining the limitation rules, and that is the solution which the Bill adopts.
The Bill is concerned, where by reason of delay someone must suffer, to consider how the balance of injustice should be adjusted. We have done the best we can after a great deal of thought by well-informed people. I wish to read from a letter from Justice to the Lord Chancellor. As a former member of the council of Justice I am conscious how often that organisation has produced penetrating criticism of the state of our law and of the inaction of successive Governments. I have the permission of Lord Gardiner, Chairman of the Council and author of the letter, to read out what it says. It reads:
The Justice Committee on Compensation for Disablement, under the Chairmanship of Paul Sieghart, has considered the Limitation Bill which is currently before Parliament, and I have been asked to pass on to you the views which that Committee takes on the Bill, and which the Executive Committee of Justice endorse.
We welcome this Bill, which seems to us to represent a substantial improvement on the present law. It removes a number of anomalies which have caused hardship in the past, and we are particularly glad to see the flexibility which Clause 2D introduces, and which will give the Courts important new powers to prevent injustice to any of the parties concerned.
One can only accept that compliment graciously on behalf of the Government.
There is one other matter which I wish to mention and which I hope will not trespass too far on the rules of order.

We are to have the benefit of the great learning and experience of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hackney, North and Stoke Newington (Mr. Weitzman). The Committee might be interested to know that today is his seventy-seventh birthday, which is a particularly appropriate occasion to welcome the wealth of his experience.
It is in that spirit that I recommend the Bill.

10.55 a.m.

Mr. Mayhew: In the current flood of legislation which is before Parliament it is pleasant to come across a Bill with which we can agree, and it is pleasant for me personally to be able to follow the Solicitor-General in what he said in support of the Bill.
No part of his remarks was more pleasant or felicitous than those with which he has just concluded in congratulating the hon. and learned Member for Hackney, North and Stoke Newington (Mr. Weitzman) on this happy day. We wholeheartedly concur with the Solicitor-General's words and wish to be associated with them.
I cannot think of any statute which has sustained more surgical transplant than the Limitation Act 1939. Even where rejection of the transplant has occurred, as with the subsection added to Section 22 of that Act by Section 2(2) of the Law Reform (Limitations of Actions, &c) Act 1954, the surgeons have not been daunted, and the provisions set out at page 6, lines 4 to 12 of this Bill, freshly plucked as they are from the Twentieth Report of the Law Reform Committee, have been deftly stitched into place by the draftsmen. Truly chloroform has been the agent of law reform.
However laudable the intention and the effect of the Bill, the body of that 1939 Act is now looking, I believe, distinctly battered, and in the interests of humanity with practitioners particularly in mind, I hope this mode of revising our statute law will be abandoned and that we shall make entire and not patchwork Acts of Parliament in future.
I follow the Solicitor-General's point about the as yet unfinished task of the Law Reform Committee in reviewing the whole question of limitation, the whole question of whether we should offer to


drop the portcullis on the would-be litigant and thus bar him from the judgment seat, and if so in what circumstances, but this is one of the most difficult problems that we have to resolve in Parliament, whether for the lawyer, the litigant or the legislator. The law must offer justice both to plaintiffs and defendants, and justice must be done to both, where ever possible, by the courts.
The Law Reform Committee under Lord Justice Orr came firmly to the conclusion that a period of limitation must be retained. I am sure that the committee is right, and it is worth reviewing briefly the considerations which led it to that conclusion. The first was that stale evidence from witnesses is unreliable evidence. Secondly, experience shows that without a limitation sanction even meritorious plaintiffs quite frequently do not get on with their litigation. The Solicitor-General referred to the "mañana" principle, and we have all come across that, not only from lay clients but from their solicitors, too.
The third consideration is that in personal injury cases the insurance companies are the source of such damages as are recovered in most cases, and if the time in which an action may be brought were unlimited some risks might become uninsurable, and that would be in no one's interest.
Lastly, because the implicit threat of a stale claim, however hopeless, has a real "nuisance value—and some of us would say a blackmail value—which is not consistent with justice to potential defendants, I think that the committee was right to retain the concept of limitation. The Government are right to adopt its recommendation in that regard.
I acknowledge what the committee expressly states, namely, that no solution is entirely satisfactory and that limitation inevitably involves a compromise between conflicting interests. Of course, no such compromise can give complete justice to both parties in every case. Parliament must try to do the best it can in those circumstances.
The next question is the length of the limitation period. This is an equally difficult matter, as may be seen by the history of this legislation. First, as the Solicitor-General reminded us, we have had a six-year period for contract and

tort. That was first enacted in 1623 and was re-enacted in 1939. For personal injury actions the period was reduced to three years by the 1954 Act.
However, three years was found to be too short in certain circumstances because it might unjustly shut out those who, through no fault of their own, did not know within three years from the date of accrual of action that the facts connected with their injury were such that they should bring an action. The 1963 Act relaxed that rule and gave an additional 12 months from the date when the plaintiff could first reasonably have been expected to have discovered the nature of his injury and its cause. That was expressed as his date of knowledge. That applied if the resulting date was later than three years from the date when his right of action accrued. Then there was the amendment brought about by the 1971 Act. That is the law as it now stands.
The 1963 Act was prompted by a notorious case in which 10 miners were shut out because their pneumoconiosis came to light outside the six-year period, the then limitation period. The period of three years, with a possible three-year extension, was calculated from the date of knowledge. In my view it is rightly retained in the Bill. However, it alters the base line for calculating the expiry date of the additional three years, or the potenial period of three years, by redefining the plaintiff's date of knowledge. I shall explain why I believe it is right so to do by setting out the principal reasons.
The Solicitor-General spoke with kind moderation about the drafting of the 1963 Act, but I am afraid I shall not be quite so moderate. I consider that it was abominably complicated. This may be seen from the fact that even the learned General Editor of the "Supreme Court Practice", the White Book with which lawyers are so familiar, was moved in his annotation on the rules of court made under the 1963 Act to describe the Act as "somewhat elaborate and complex". That can also be seen from the fact that, whereas for several years the Court of Appeal held that the wording permitted the extended period to run from the date when a plaintiff knew, actually or constructively, that he had a worthwhile cause of action, the House of Lords ultimately held in 1973 by a majority that that was wrong in the case of Central


Asbestos Ltd. v. Dodd. It was clearly right that the whole matter should be considered by Parliament afresh.
That leads me to my second reason for supporting this provision in the Bill—namely, that the definition of date of knowledge to be found in new Section 2A(6) is much clearer and one which we can all readily understand. It is in accordance with the Law Reform Committee's view and the "worthwhile cause of action" suggestion is expressly dispatched by the declaratory words. I believe that that is right.
The principle that no one may take refuge behind ignorance of the law does have, as the Solicitor-General said, good reasons to support it. To depart from it in this context would be unreasonable from the defendant's point of view. However, when the portcullis of limitation drops, the sanction of the rule of law is grievous in its severity. In my view there should be room for discretion. In what is always conveniently but not very helpfully described as a "proper case", the Bill makes such provision in new Section 2D. That is a separate reason for my support of the Bill. The discretion which it gives to Her Majesty's Judges to extend the period in which a plaintiff may commence proceedings is right, and the guidance laid down for exercising that discretion is also right. I am not sure that the judges will welcome it, as it imposes upon them the task of weighing prejudice to one party against prejudice to another. However, I am sure that they will be equal to the task.
Before concluding it is appropriate to acknowledge how much Parliament is coming to rely on the judges as the expression of our consciences. For example, when dealing with the leasehold reform legislation and the innumerable Rent Acts the judges have to weigh lay rather than legal considerations. In this instance they will be asked to decide whether it is equitable to allow an action to proceed. We should recognise that they have a difficult jurisdiction to exercise. However, modern experience shows that the judges will bring a fair and realistic approach to the task. I refer to the guidelines which appear in new Section 2D(3). We shall expect to hear in Committee from the Solicitor-General

the reasons for the departures in drafting from the tentative but expert and concise drafting of the Law Reform Committee in paragraph 69 of its report.
I am glad that the Government have opted for lenience where a plaintiff has taken all reasonable steps to obtain expert advice, even though in consequence he was misled. That is provided in new Section 2A(8). I rejoice, as will all practitioners, that the Bill abolishes the cumbersome and, as events have turned out, unnecessary procedure for seeking the so-called leave of court for the purposes of Section 1 of the 1963 Act. That is a necessary condition for bringing proceedings. The abolition of the harsh custody of a parent rule is long overdue, but none the less effective way in Clause 2.
With the reservations I have expressed about fitting out the body of the weary old 1939 Act with a new heart, and about the drafting of the guidelines for the exercise of the judge's discretion as to what is equitable, I warmly welcome the Bill and I advise my hon. Friends to support it.

11.9 a.m.

Mr. David Weitzman: First, I thank my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General and the hon. and learned Member for Royal Tunbridge Wells (Mr. Mayhew) for their kind words and good wishes.
I want to say how much I welcome the Bill. I congratulate my hon. and learned Friend on his presentation of this measure and his detailed account of the position that applies in respect of it.
During many years of practice at the Bar I have often been involved in cases where the period of limitation has been a matter of the greatest importance. In my early days of practice—I do not suppose that either my hon. and learned Friend or the hon. and learned Gentleman will remember this—among other statutes the Limitation Act 1623 and the Public Authorities Act 1893 applied. One often felt that there was considerable force in the argument that when a litigant had a just claim it was wrong that he should be debarred because he had not brought his action in time.
In personal injury cases, in particular, where proof depends upon the testimony


of witnesses which may well be untrust worthy with the passage of time and where defendants might well face difficulty in having to meet stale claims, some limitation must be imposed. The 1939 Act both consolidated and amended the statute law. The period then provided was a general limitation period of six years in almost all actions of contract and tort, although there were some exceptions. That period was felt to be too long in running down cases and in claims under the Factories Acts. The period was reduced to three years by the 1954 Act.
Again, that limitation was shown to be inappropriate. Indeed, it was far too short in certain cases. Industrial conditions and the growth of medical science revealed cases where a person contracted diseases due to exposure to dangerous conditions or substances, and it was very often the case that the man would not know, until the limitation period had passed, that his condition was due to his conditions of employment and that he had a just case for compensation.
It is true that the Edmund Davies Committee Report led to the 1963 Act and the provision that the plaintiff could bring his action within 12 months of the—vital words—"date of knowledge", but to do so the plaintiff had to obtain the leave of the court. He had, of course, to satisfy the judge not only that he had a good prima facie case but that his failure to bring an action within three years was because he had been unable to discover the injury and the cause within that period.
Section 7(3)(c) of the 1963 Act raised the problem of what was meant by the phrase
obtaining knowledge of the material facts".
There were conflicting decisions as illustrated by the judgment of the Law Lords in the asbestos case.
I was particularly interested in the problems which arose when my hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (Mr. Lewis) was fortunate in the Ballot for Private Members' Bills. I assisted in drafting his Dangerous Drugs and Disabled Children Bill, in which I inserted a clause aimed at clarifying the position. I note with satisfaction that the Law Reform Commission referred to that in paragraph 18 of its interim report on the

limitation of actions in personal injuries claims. The Second Reading of my hon. Friend's Bill on 9th February 1973, although well supported, was to my great disappointment talked out. We did not get enough in the Lobby to continue with the Bill. I think that we had 61 to 5. We were very disappointed. Hon. Members will appreciate how readily I support a Bill that removes the doubts and difficulties that previously existed.
The cumbersome process of applying for leave will now go. The Bill, in new Section 2A(3), permits the three years to run from the date of the claimant's knowledge. In Section 2A(8) is set out what is meant by knowledge. I add that it usefully sets out that the claimant is not fixed
…with knowledge of a fact ascertainable only with the help of expert advice so long as he has taken all reasonable steps to obtain
such advice, and, where appropriate, to act on it. It rightly caters, in my view, for the case where an expert, such as a doctor, has given an opinion. I am sure that my hon. and learned Friends will agree that even a lawyer has given advice that has subsequently turned out to be wrong.
Sections 2A(5) and 2B deal with the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 and the Fatal Accidents Act 1846.
What I am particularly impressed with is the provision in Section 2D, where power is given to the court, where it is equitable, to override the time limit in its discretion. It is true that there may be a burden upon the judges and that some uncertainty may be created, but the guidelines have been set out in subsection (3). As was said in another place and reiterated by the hon. and learned Member for Royal Tunbridge Wells, the judges have the training and experience to ascertain the facts and they can be trusted to be fair. I very much welcome this provision. It will mean that where there is a claim that ought to be allowed having regard to all the circumstances an injured person's rights will not be defeated by the lapse of time but he will be compensated. It is a good example of justice not only being done but being seen to be done.
This is an excellent Bill and I hope that it will quickly reach the statute book.

11.15 a.m.

Mr. Jeffrey Thomas: I shall not delay the Committee for more than a few moments. I have great pleasure in joining in the congratulations to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hackney, North and Stoke Newington (Mr. Weitzman) on this special occasion for him. I venture to hope that there will be no limitation of time upon his activities.
This is a Bill which is long overdue. Lord Reid, as long as 12 years ago, took the view that a change in the law was urgently needed. With commendable speed the House is at last bringing about such a change in the law. We hear a good deal about the law's delays, and this is an important matter for members of the public who are affected by the law. I believe that this measure will help to create a far better impression in regard to the administration of justice.
I have only one reservation and it refers to new Section 2D. The noble lord, the Lord Chancellor in the other place referred to this new provision in these terms:
New Section 2D provides that the court shall have a general discretion to override time limits if to do so would be fair as between the plaintiff and the defendant. The court must consider all the circumstances of the case; but guidelines are given in the Bill, specifying the matters to which the court should have particular regard."—[Official Report (Lords), 1st May 1975; Vol. 360, c. 11.]
I shall not elaborate on what those guidelines are because they are plainly set out in the schedule. I am happy that the Solicitor-General has given us an assurance that these guidelines are not intended to be exhaustive.
One of the factors the court will take into account is the fact that it is extremely difficult in many of these cases to get to the bottom of the point, in exploring problems which may have arisen many years ago. The difficulty with equity is that it varies with the length of the Chancellor's foot. In giving judges more and more discretion, I wonder whether there is not a certain

amount of laziness on the part of the legislature. That is not a step which I wholeheartedly welcome. It creates more and more uncertainty for a litigant. No doubt one can place trust in a judge as well as in a prince, but as a practising member of one of the branches of the law I know that it very much depends on the individual judge.
The Law Reform Committee said:
In suggesting this solution"—
referring to Section 2D—
we have not overlooked the difficulties which would face a judge in weighing the hardships on one side or the other, or the fact that even a measure of discretion erodes certainty in this field.
I am personally not clear about the situation in regard to injuries to an unborn child, nor am I clear about injuries sustained by a child at the time of birth. Perhaps these matters can be clarified in due course.
However, subject to that reservation, I wholeheartedly welcome the measure, particularly since I represent a mining constituency and know only too well the appalling problems which have arisen over the years due to the existence of pneumoconiosis and other chest diseases.

11.20 a.m.

The Solicitor-General: I seek leave to speak again for one brief purpose. Certain questions have been asked and reservations raised with which, I believe, it will be more appropriate to deal at a later stage. I merely wanted to rise to thank you, Mr. Davies, for the way in which you have presided over our deliberations. I hope that we have not imposed a great drain on your patience, or on your capacity to control the Committee. On behalf of the Committee, I should like to thank you for your patience.

Question put and agreed to.

Ordered,
That the Chairman do now report to the House that the Committee recommend that the Limitation Bill [Lords] ought to be read a Second time.

Committee rose at twenty-two minutes past Eleven o'clock.

THE FOLLOWING MEMBERS ATTENDED THE COMMITTEE


Davies, Mr. Ifor (Chairman)
Percival, Mr.


Callaghan, Mr. Jim
Rooker, Mr.


Dunn, Mr.
Solicitor-General, The


Kershaw, Mr.
Thomas, Mr. Jeffrey


Mayhew, Mr.
Weitzman, Mr.